Putin’s 2025 India Visit: Symbolism, Strategy, and the Multipolar Asian Order

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Image Source: Prime Minister of India 

 

Imran Khurshid* 

Putin’s 2025 visit to India reaffirmed the depth and resilience of a long-standing partnership amid shifting global geopolitics. It highlighted New Delhi’s strategic autonomy as it balanced ties with Moscow while managing intense Western pressure. 

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India on 4–5 December 2025 — his first since the Russia–Ukraine war — carried immense symbolic and strategic weight. The warmth of his reception underscored that, despite global disruptions, the India–Russia partnership remains stable and deeply valued. Prime Minister Narendra Modi personally broke protocol to receive President Putin at Palam Airport, greeting him with a handshake and hug — gestures reserved for only a select few world leaders — accompanied by a traditional cultural performance. These gestures reflect how much importance India attaches to its relationship with Russia, signalling personal commitment at the highest level. Modi tweeted: “Delighted to welcome my friend, President Putin to India. Looking forward to our interactions later this evening and tomorrow. India‑Russia friendship is a time-tested one that has greatly benefitted our people.” Demonstrating personal rapport and ease, the two leaders travelled together from the airport to the Prime Minister’s residence, while Modi presented Putin with a Russian-language edition of the Bhagavad Gita, emphasizing cultural goodwill. The following day, Putin received a full ceremonial welcome at Rashtrapati Bhavan, including a red-carpet reception, tri-services Guard of Honour, troop inspection, and playing of national anthems, with top officials in attendance. 

The visit coincided with the 23rd India–Russia Annual Summit, marking the 25th anniversary of the India–Russia Strategic Partnership. Putin’s previous visit to New Delhi was on 6 December 2021, when he attended the 21st India–Russia Annual Summit. Analysts noted that the visit extended beyond defence and energy cooperation, highlighting a broad-based agenda covering trade diversification, nuclear energy, agriculture, and labour mobility, signaling India’s continued commitment to strategic autonomy and a resilient, multifaceted partnership with Russia. 

Geopolitical Pressures and Strategic Balancing 

The visit took place against the backdrop of heavy sanctions on Russia and mounting pressure on India to reduce oil imports. The United States recently imposed sanctions on major Russian oil companies, including Rosneft and Lukoil, prompting Indian refiners to scale back Russian crude purchases and diversify suppliers. The West continues to press Russia to end the war in Ukraine, with discussions about potential peace proposals ongoing. At the same time, India faces challenges of its own, including fifty-percent tariffs imposed by the US on several Indian products. Washington has repeatedly urged New Delhi to cut energy imports from Russia and has intensified sanctions on Russian oil companies, indirectly affecting India’s strategic and economic decisions. 

US diplomacy under President Trump has become increasingly unpredictable. His outreach to Beijing under a potential G2 framework, silence on Taiwan and the South China Sea, and reluctance to uphold the Indo-Pacific strategy signal that the region is no longer a top priority. The Quad Summit this year, which was originally scheduled to be held in India, did not take place, leaving the grouping largely dormant. Additionally, the US has reverted to the older Asia-Pacific framing, rather than the Indo-Pacific concept. 

More troubling for India has been America’s renewed engagement with Pakistan. Trump’s interactions with Pakistan’s military leadership, including Field Marshal Asim Munir, have emboldened anti-India forces. Extremists in Pakistan are now issuing open threats against India, claiming US backing, while Munir himself made provocative, nuclear-tinged remarks from American soil, seemingly encouraged by Trump’s repeated praise and ceasefire-related statements. These developments have heightened mistrust in New Delhi, particularly given undiplomatic rhetoric from Trump and close advisers — for example, Peter Navarro’s remark accusing “Brahmins” of profiteering, and Trump referring to India as a “dead economy.” Such statements have further undermined confidence in the reliability and sensitivity of US commitments. 

Trade, Technology, and the Multipolar Vision 

Before the visit, speculation had intensified that major defence agreements might finally be concluded, including potential deals for the Su-57 stealth fighter, additional S-400 systems, the next-generation S-500 air-defence platform, and the long-pending logistics pact RELOS. These expectations grew after the Russian State Duma ratified the RELOS agreement just days before Putin’s arrival, and Russian officials publicly indicated that discussions on the Su-57 and air-defence cooperation were on the agenda. However, none of these things materialized. Although these possibilities generated considerable anticipation, both sides ultimately chose not to finalise or announce any major big-ticket defence contracts during the visit. Instead, the focus shifted towards consolidation: enhancing joint maintenance, expanding spare-parts production, and strengthening existing defence-industrial cooperation — signalling continuity without provoking geopolitical sensitivities. Given the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war, and the complex geopolitical situation created by this conflict at this moment, New Delhi deliberately avoided entering new large-scale defence deals that could be interpreted negatively at the international level. The absence of such agreements reflected a carefully calibrated strategy. 

Given India’s deep economic, diplomatic, and technological ties with the West — which it cannot afford to alienate — the government had to maintain a delicate balancing act, walking a tightrope between preserving a strong partnership with Russia and safeguarding crucial relationships with Western countries. New Delhi is also negotiating major trade agreements with the US and the EU, facing pressure to reduce Russian oil imports, and managing the potential threat of CAATSA sanctions on any significant new defence transaction. While long-standing defence cooperation with Russia continues, the government deliberately emphasized economic cooperation during this visit, including agreements on joint manufacturing, maintenance of existing defence equipment, and trade facilitation. This allowed India to highlight continuity and stability in its foreign policy while avoiding any perception of siding with one bloc over another. 

However, when it comes to trade, although India–Russia bilateral trade in FY 2024‑25 has touched nearly $68.7 billion, India exports only about $4.9 billion worth of goods to Russia, resulting in a significant trade imbalance. Putin arrived with a large business delegation, signalling Russia’s intention to open its market more broadly to Indian companies and underscoring the economic priorities of the visit. Both sides agreed on a roadmap to boost trade to $100 billion by 2030 and expand cooperation in energy, manufacturing, agriculture, and pharmaceuticals, with an emphasis on using local currencies to reduce dependence on the dollar. Russia, facing manpower shortages, also signed a mobility agreement with India, creating opportunities for Indian professionals. The entire economic agenda underscored India’s priority to correct the trade imbalance and broaden the partnership beyond the traditional defence sphere. 

The language of the joint statement was particularly noteworthy. Titled “India–Russia: A Time-Tested Progressive Partnership, Anchored in Trust & Mutual Respect,” it emphasized long-standing trust and shared interests, contrasting with the more transactional approach India has recently experienced from the US.  

Both countries “reaffirmed their strong commitment to preventing and countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including cross‑border movement of terrorists and terrorist‑financing networks and safe havens.” They “condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in India in Pahalgam … and in Russia at the Crocus City Hall.” Both leaders declared that all acts of terrorism are “criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation by any religious or ideological pretexts, whenever, wherever, and by whomever committed.” Zero tolerance for cross‑border terrorism aligned closely with India’s security priorities. The statement also reaffirmed cooperation in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and other multilateral forums, and articulated a shared commitment to a multipolar world. 

The statement also reflected cooperation in emerging geographies. It underscored collaboration in the Arctic, where melting ice is opening new northern sea routes, and highlighted the Vladivostok–Chennai maritime corridor as a critical link between India and the Russian Far East. Crucially, it reaffirmed the strengthening of the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), emphasising multimodal transport — rail, road, and sea — to enhance connectivity. Both sides agreed on training Indian specialists for polar navigation, demonstrating concrete steps to operationalise these new routes. These discussions showed that both countries are preparing for long-term geopolitical and economic shifts. 

However, what stands out is that towards the end, the joint statement placed unusual emphasis on a multipolar Asia, not just a multipolar world. It celebrated “the resilience of the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership” and affirmed that both countries “as major powers will continue to strive for global peace and stability in a multipolar world as well as in a multipolar Asia.” This specific phrasing is significant: it signals that New Delhi and Moscow are consciously pushing back against the idea of any single power—implicitly China—dominating the region, underscoring their commitment to a balanced and pluralistic Asian order. 

Interestingly, Western reactions to Putin’s visit were noticeably more measured this time. Unlike the strong commentary that followed Modi’s recent interaction with Putin during the SCO Summit in Tianjin, there was no overreaction or harsh criticism from Western capitals. Instead, there is growing recognition that India remains one of the few major countries able to maintain a stable working relationship with Russia. Rather than criticising India, Western experts increasingly believe that New Delhi can use its goodwill and leverage with Moscow to encourage diplomatic efforts or facilitate peace negotiations. 

Reaffirming Strategic Autonomy 

For Russia, the visit was highly significant. Post-sanctions, Moscow has become heavily dependent on China. By travelling to India and receiving an exceptionally warm welcome, Putin demonstrated that Russia is not isolated and still maintains important partners beyond Beijing. The message was clear: Moscow has options, and its relationship with India is stable, respected, and mutually beneficial. As strategic-affairs expert Brahma Chellaney noted, “Putin’s visit sends an unmistakable message that Moscow continues to value its long-standing partnership with India and will not reduce itself to a ‘junior partner’ to China. At a time of Western sanctions and global pressures, India’s warm reception of Putin underscores its commitment to an independent foreign-policy course, one that is based on strategic interests rather than external diktats.” 

Ultimately, the visit reaffirmed India’s commitment to strategic autonomy, showcasing New Delhi’s ability to make decisions in the national interest while carefully balancing its relationships with Russia and the West. Importantly, energy cooperation was also reinforced, with Russia committing to “uninterrupted shipments” of fuel to India despite Western sanctions. The visit further highlighted the enduring trust between the two nations—resilient despite the complex geopolitical environment and pressures from the United States and Europe. By emphasising economic cooperation, trade expansion, and long-term strategic engagement rather than announcing new defence agreements, New Delhi demonstrated prudent diplomacy, ensuring it was not seen as siding with any bloc while safeguarding its long-standing defence partnerships. Overall, the visit reinforced a partnership built on trust, stability, and mutual confidence—qualities that continue to guide India’s foreign policy in an increasingly turbulent and multipolar world. 

*** 

* Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow, ICPS, Adjunct Fellow, Peninsula Foundation, Visiting Faculty, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India. The views expressed here are personal.  

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