India and Russia and a World in Flux

Sanjay Pulipaka*

The Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to India (on December 4-5, 2025) happened in a volatile geopolitical context. Three years after the initiation of war, the Ukraine conflict continues to persist. While the conversations between the Americans and the Russians suggest that a ceasefire in Ukraine may be imminent, there is no certainty that hostilities will end anytime soon. India-US relations have been strained because of President Trump’s additional tariffs on Indian imports of energy resources from Russia. In contrast, no such tariffs were imposed on China and the European Union for importing energy resources from Russia.

There has been a tendency to attribute the recent visit of President Putin and the hospitality accorded to the visiting dignitary as India’s response to US President Trump’s tariff policy. It is indeed true that the Indian Prime Minister went to the airport to receive the Russian President, which demonstrated the importance the Indian government places on its relationship with Russia. However, an examination of recent history shows that the Indian Prime Minister has often received leaders of countries of strategic importance at the airport. For instance, in the past decade, Prime Minister Modi received Barack Obama (in 2015), Sheikh Hasina (in 2017), Shinzo Abe (in 2017), Donald Trump (in 2020), Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (in 2024), and Amir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani (in 2025) at the airport. Furthermore, it should be noted that the India-Russia relationship is rooted in a long history of a mutually beneficial strategic partnership that has withstood structural shifts in global politics.

In addition to the emotional comfort of a time-tested strategic partnership, India’s approach to Russia is shaped by contemporary geopolitics and rapid power shifts in international politics. The American leadership in the past year has articulated strategic objectives which seem to be mutually contradictory. President Trump has often declared that China and the United States can collaborate under a G2 framework. Perhaps Indian leadership may have quizzed Russian leadership about President Trump’s repeated articulations of a G2 framework with China. Russia would be very uncomfortable with the prospect of America and China reaching an agreement to carve out their respective spheres of influence under the G2 framework. If the G2 framework indeed pans out, countries that share maritime and continental borders with China would like to diversify their relationships with other major powers.

A few months earlier, President Trump had stated that there is a need to “un-unite” the Russia-China partnership. The Secretary of State Marco Rubio also stressed the importance of peeling Russia away from China and stated that “if Russia becomes a permanent junior partner to China in the long term..[it is not].. good outcome” for the US. Given Russia’s robust multi-sectoral economic engagement with China, untying the Beijing-Moscow strategic partnership will require considerable work. Along with the US, India will have to scale up engagement to ensure that Russia has diversified economic partnerships.

The need for improved economic cooperation between India and Russia dominated the conversation during the recent summit meeting between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin. On economic cooperation, the following points from the Joint Statement of the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit are worth noting:

‘To achieve $100 billion in trade over the next five years, a “Programme for the Development of Strategic Areas of India – Russia Economic Cooperation till 2030” was adopted. There was also a convergence of views on the need to expedite negotiations on the “Free Trade Agreement on goods between India and the Eurasian Economic Union.”

Both countries agreed to increase interoperability among national payment systems and digital currency systems, and to use national currencies to settle bilateral trade.

To address the human resource shortages in Russia, both countries signed mobility agreements, which are expected to result in significant movement of workers from India to Russia.

The possibility of joint ventures to ensure a steady supply of fertilisers to India from Russia would be explored by both countries.

Scale up cooperation on the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) and complete the construction of the remaining units as per agreed timelines.

India and Russia will work to improve the connectivity infrastructure by supporting economic corridors and shipping routes such as the Chennai–Vladivostok (Eastern Maritime) Corridor, the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the Northern Sea Route. A memorandum of understanding between pertaining to the Training of Specialists for Ships Operating in Polar Waters was also signed.’

India’s eagerness to engage Russia economically may be a part of its efforts to diversify its export markets. It should be noted that Russia has a much smaller GDP ($2.17 trillion in 2024) than the United States ($29.18 trillion in 2024) and the European Union ($19.42 trillion in 2024). Consequently, exporting to Russia entails inherent limitations compared to exporting to the United States and Europe. However, Russia’s ability to provide crucial energy resources and defence equipment is of critical importance to India.

In the run-up to the summit meeting, there was considerable media discussion about whether India might announce the purchase of high-end weapon systems from Russia. Given the excellent performance of various weapon systems, such as the MiG-29 fighters, Su-30MKI, S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile systems, and the BrahMos during Operation Sindoor, such speculation was understandable. However, there were no such major announcements regarding the purchase or co-development of 5th-generation fighter jets or the S-500 Prometheus. While India-Russia defence cooperation is robust, there are concerns about delays in the delivery of platforms and spare parts. For instance, the fourth and fifth squadrons of S-400 have not yet been delivered. There are also growing demands that some of these platforms should be co-developed or co-manufactured in India.

In terms of regional dynamics, India and Russia decided to continue to exchange notes on Afghanistan. It should be noted that the US President has expressed interest in taking back control of Bagram airport in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has deteriorated significantly. Given the growing volatility along the Durand Line and in Pakistan’s domestic politics, India will keep a close watch on the activities of major powers in its western neighbourhood.

It has been 25 years since India and Russia redefined their relationship as a strategic partnership. While India’s economic and defence interactions with the United States have grown significantly, Russia-China relations have also consolidated. Simultaneously, the United States’ total trade (goods and services) with China, in 2024, amounted to a whopping $658.9 billion. Such crisscrossing interactions indicate growing fluidity in international politics. Given such increased fluidity, sovereign states are finding it difficult to choose one relationship over another. Perhaps, demanding that sovereign states make such choices increases Instability in the international system.

*****

Sanjay Pulipaka is the Chairperson of Politeia Research Foundation. The views expressed are personal.

References

“Joint Statement Following the 23rd India – Russia Annual Summit (December 05, 2025).” Ministry of External Affairs. 2025. December 5, 2025. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/40410/Joint_Statement_following_the_23rd_India__Russia_Annual_Summit_December_05_2025.

“PM Modi’s Rare Airport Reception Gesture: For Vladimir Putin and Who Else.” NDTV, February 2025. https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pm-modis-rare-airport-reception-gesture-for-vladimir-putin-and-who-else-9752051.

“Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Matthew Boyle for Breitbart News Network.” United States Department of State. 2025. February 24, 2025. https://www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-marco-rubio-with-matthew-boyle-for-breitbart-news-network.

“The People’s Republic of China,” Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china

Kong, Linggong. 2024. “Trump’s Desire to ‘Un-Unite’ Russia and China Is Unlikely to Work – In Fact, It Could Well Backfire.” The Conversation, October 31, 2024. https://theconversation.com/trumps-desire-to-un-unite-russia-and-china-is-unlikely-to-work-in-fact-it-could-well-backfire-252243.

Pandit, Rajat. 2025. “Russia Says Remaining Two S-400 Squadrons Will Be Delivered by 2026-27.” The Times of India, June 26, 2025. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/russia-says-remaining-two-s-400-squadrons-will-be-delivered-by-2026-27/articleshow/122096849.cms.