Pakistan’s New Constant: A “Constitutional Military” in Power

by Dr Bhashyam Kasturi

The Af-Pak region has long been in turmoil. However, today global attention has shifted to the Middle East and Ukraine. This shift makes the prevailing situation in the Af-Pak region even more dangerous and volatile. A number of developments signal a new security paradigm in the region, including vigorous attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) inside Pakistan, an ongoing but episodic border war between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and, most recently, the declaration of an independent Balochistan by sections of the Baloch nationalist resistance forces. These elements combine with diplomatic efforts by Islamabad to broker peace between Iran and the US. Underlying all these developments is the ‘introduction’ of the military into the Constitution as the power centre in Pakistan, termed “Constitutional Militarism” by Pak scholar Ayesha Siddiqua. This means that, for now and the future, the Army in Pakistan will remain in command.

The Pakistan story is that of a nation beset by internal violence, terrorist attacks, and the declaration of independence by its largest province. And yet Field Marshal Asim Munir and Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif are assiduously working to serve as mediators in the Iran-US conflict. This demonstrates the strange dichotomy that Pakistan faces today, ruled by the military yet trying to build itself without any economic foundation.

The bigger challenge for Pakistan is terrorist violence. For example, in early September 2026, security forces claimed to have killed 15 TTP militants attempting to cross into North Waziristan from Afghanistan. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies reports that July 2026 recorded the highest monthly death toll for Pakistani security forces since 2023. Lt. Gen. Ahmad Sharif Chaudhry, the military spokesperson, said Pakistan has recorded 3,145 “terrorism incidents” since the start of 2026, mainly suicide bombings, kamikaze drones, and small-arms ambushes.

Pakistan has long alleged that the Afghan Taliban is sheltering the TTP. The latest reports indicate the bilateral tensions continue to plague the relationship, something that became apparent in the aftermath of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021. Border clashes have been a recurring feature since that time, and early in 2026, the situation came close to open war after the Afghan Taliban claimed it had captured and killed several Pakistani soldiers in a cross-border operation.

The best illustration of the shaky ground on which Pakistan stands is the ongoing protests in large parts of Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK). What began as protests against economic hardship in PoJK, including Gilgit-Baltistan, turned into a political spectacle when the Joint Awami Action Committee sought to remove the constitutional provision reserving 12 seats in the local assembly for refugees. The street protests turned violent in early August this year, with some 30 people getting killed. While the Pak Supreme Court has said that removal of the 12 seats would require an amendment to the Constitution, the protests prompted the government to postpone the two phases of the ‘elections’ that were left, in anticipation of more violence. The one common narrative across Pakistan, especially in troubled areas, including AJK and Balochistan, has been media censorship and internet blackout, leading to the conclusion that Pakistan today faces real challenges from its own society.

Baloch Independence?

There is another headache for the Pakistani state in the form of the Baloch nationalist forces, led by armed groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), which have challenged the might of the State. However symbolic, the act of declaring 11 August as Balochistan Independence Day by Mir Yar Baloch marks a milestone, as it was on this day in 1947 when the Khan of Kalat became independent prior to its absorption into Pakistan a year later. For all practical purposes, Balochistan is still under Pakistan’s control, and Islamabad’s efforts to extract natural resources from the province include signing MoUs with the US and Canada. Apart from the US$500 million deal with the US for the sale of Rare Earth minerals, the Canadian mining firm Barrick Gold is already invested in the Reko Diq Copper-Gold mine in Balochistan. This gives Pakistan’s untapped mineral wealth legitimacy and raises expectations of future investment in the sector. Above all, it is a question of credibility.

The Military is in control, ‘Constitutionally’

Perhaps the most significant development in Pakistan is the abdication of responsibility by its Parliamentarians, who allowed the Army to entrench itself in the Constitution by passing the 27th Amendment at the end of last year. Thus, the serving Army Chief, General Asim Munir, promoted himself to Field Marshal, and the Nuclear Command Authority got a military head appointed by the Chief of Defence Forces. The moot issue is that Munir is now Field Marshal for life and enjoys immunity for all his actions while in office and, in effect, controls all the armed forces, including the nuclear forces. In effect, Munir commands Pakistan for all practical purposes. The Amendment also created a new Federal Constitutional Court with exclusive jurisdiction over constitutional interpretations and federal disputes, reducing the traditional Supreme Court largely to an appellate court for civil and criminal cases.

Thus, confident of his powers at the apex, Asim Munir conducts global diplomacy alongside Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif as his equal on almost all assignments, including the mediation effort in the Iran conflict. The military’s constitutional coup has thus made it a permanent fixture in Pakistan’s politics.

Future of Pakistan?

Every aspect of Pakistan’s internal politics now revolves around the Army and the military, including foreign policy. Does that mean that Pakistan is likely to see more changes in its form of governance? There has been speculation about a fresh constitutional amendment that could see a shift in Pakistan’s federal structure, perhaps involving Balochistan, a historically troubled province and the inclusion of Gilgit-Baltistan as another province of Pakistan.

The South Asian context still reflects the region’s peak instability in the Af-Pak. As geopolitical attention shifts away from the region to the Middle East, actors in these countries operate with relative impunity. This has furthered tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with the former blaming New Delhi and Kabul for acts of terror perpetrated on Pakistan’s soil. However, on its eastern flank, Pakistan is quite content to continue with its usual terror tactics and focus on creating more sleeper cells within India. The other factor that gives Pakistan the opportunity to bide its time against India is China. With Chinese support on every front, Islamabad can focus on diplomacy, with a military-led focus, thanks to Asim Munir.

Conclusions

As we head into the next decade, Pakistan has a new constant. The Army is now in positions of power with a constitutional stamp. With Munir in office till 2030, he could well work the wheels of power to have his candidate as Prime Minister in 2029. The economy may be in the doldrums, but the landscape of political convenience continues as before. Given this reality, Pakistan may well be preparing for bigger things, and this will not be about India, but about Pakistan itself.

India has kept a low profile diplomatically with both Pakistan and Afghanistan, despite some earlier promise of a likelihood of re-establishing formal ties. The long view from New Delhi does not appear to be very good of the region, and as long as national interests can be served by ‘ignoring’ the area, it is best to focus on other priority national security areas. In the meantime, it is good to keep the powder dry for Operation Sindoor 2.0.

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Dr. Bhashyam Kasturi is a former Director, National Security Council Secretariat and Consultant, MP-IDSA. He is currently Editor AGNI, Journal of the Forum for Strategic and Security Studies and Vice President, Risk (Consulting), WoRisgo. He writes extensively on international affairs, intelligence and military affairs.

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