BRICS and the Maritime Dilemma


by Shiwani Dumbala
The recent expansion of BRICS into a broader BRICS+ configuration has fundamentally reshaped the grouping’s identity. What began as a largely continental economic coalition of emerging economies has now evolved into a grouping of diverse maritime actors. With the inclusion of Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, BRICS now sits astride some of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, including the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, and the South Atlantic Sea routes. Collectively, BRICS influences a substantial share of global trade flows, energy corridors, maritime infrastructure and shipping connectivity. Yet this expansion has also exposed a deeper contradiction within BRICS. While its members are increasingly connected by the oceans economically, they remain strategically divided by the very waters that bind them together.
This is the central maritime dilemma confronting BRICS as India assumes the chairmanship of the grouping in 2026.1 The timing is significant because the maritime domain is returning to the centre of global geopolitics. The contemporary 21st-century world order is no longer shaped only by territorial disputes or continental power balances, but by sea lanes, ports, undersea cables, energy corridors, and chokepoints. As recent crises in the Red Sea and around the Strait of Hormuz have shown, maritime disruptions can now reshape the global economy faster than conventional military action, and for BRICS economies these are not distant problems. China’s energy imports, India’s trade routes, Gulf energy exports, Russia’s alternative connectivity ambitions, and Egypt’s canal revenues are all deeply tied to the stability of maritime commerce and sea lanes of communication.
Despite these shared vulnerabilities, BRICS has failed to articulate a coherent maritime response. Member states acted independently, driven by their own strategic imperatives. China focused on securing maritime trade corridors linked to its global connectivity ambitions. Over the past decade, India has expanded its naval deployments in the Arabian Sea to protect merchant shipping and conduct anti-piracy operations. Russia approached the crisis through a sanctions prism, focusing on Eurasian trade corridors and strategic balancing against the West. Gulf members prioritised economic continuity and logistical stability. This reflects not collective maritime governance, but fragmented strategic behaviour.
Within this fragmentation lies the complex maritime relationship among India, China and Russia. China’s actions continue to be shaped by the “Malacca Dilemma”, Beijing’s longstanding fear that nearly 80% of its imported energy, which transits the Strait of Malacca, could be disrupted during geopolitical tensions. This vulnerability has driven aggressive investments in ports, maritime infrastructure, naval modernisation, and alternative connectivity corridors under the Belt and Road Initiative. Indonesia’s inclusion adds another layer. As the world’s largest archipelagic state, Indonesia is positioned near the Strait of Malacca and occupies one of the most geopolitically sensitive regions, with growing attention to regulating shipping traffic, including toll collection and maritime governance of strategic waterways.
India approaches maritime politics through a distinct lens. New Delhi’s Indo-Pacific vision has consistently emphasised openness, inclusivity, strategic autonomy and cooperative security. Through SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), India has sought to position itself as a stabilising maritime actor and a preferred security partner, with a focus on freedom of navigation, humanitarian assistance, capacity-building and rules-based connectivity.2
Unlike China’s infrastructure-driven expansion, India remains cautious about rigid geopolitical alignments at sea. This caution was evident in its decision to abstain from the BRICS-linked naval exercise “Will for Peace 2026” in South Africa, a clear signal of reluctance to allow BRICS maritime cooperation to evolve into a securitised framework shaped by Chinese priorities.3India continues to value BRICS as a platform for Global South diplomacy, financial reform and multipolar engagement, while remaining committed to strategic autonomy and multi-alignment, including its engagement with the Quad.
Russia’s priorities differ again, as Moscow increasingly views maritime access through the Arctic, Eurasian trade corridors and non-Western logistical systems as essential to long-term strategic resilience. Brazil and South Africa, meanwhile, approach maritime affairs primarily through the lens of regional stability, blue economy development and South Atlantic governance. This diversity of outlooks reveals a deeper truth: BRICS is not a formal alliance bound by shared threat perception. It is a coalition of rising powers united mainly by dissatisfaction with aspects of the existing international order, but not necessarily by agreement on what should replace it. Multipolarity does not automatically produce strategic unity; in many ways it intensifies competition over connectivity, infrastructure, trade routes and regional influence.
Yet dismissing BRICS maritime cooperation would be premature. The grouping may never evolve into a unified naval bloc, but it can still provide an important framework for maritime governance that is less Western-centric. Practical cooperation in anti-piracy operations, resilient
supply chains, port digitisation, blue economy partnerships, green shipping, marine sustainability, climate adaptation and disaster relief offers more viable pathways without forcing artificial strategic convergence.
During India’s 2026 presidency, some of this practical cooperation has already begun to take shape. The eighth meeting of the BRICS Working Group on Ocean and Polar Science and Technology was held in Goa in August 2026. Discussions centred on preparing a medium-term roadmap for joint work in marine sciences, coastal resilience, polar research and the sustainable use of the blue economy.4 Around the same time, the BRICS Seafarers’ Forum in Mumbai issued the Mumbai Declaration 2026, calling for better protection for seafarers in conflict zones, stronger action against crew abandonment, and improved labour standards.5 The Trade Ministers’ meeting in Jaipur also highlighted the need to strengthen ports, maritime logistics and transport corridors to make trade among BRICS countries more efficient and less vulnerable to disruption.6
Ultimately, the maritime dilemma within BRICS is not simply about naval exercises, shipping corridors or competing port networks. It is about the broader struggle to define what multipolarity will look like in the twenty-first century. Oceans today are no longer passive spaces linking economies; they are active theatres where influence, insecurity and strategic ambitions collide. BRICS embodies this contradiction, as its members are united by a shared desire to reform the existing international order yet divided by competing visions of connectivity, security and regional influence.
As India assumes the BRICS chairmanship in 2026, New Delhi faces the difficult task of ensuring that the grouping’s maritime future does not drift towards bloc confrontation or strategic fragmentation. India’s reluctance towards a securitised “Blue BRICS” framework reflects not hesitation about maritime cooperation, but caution against turning the oceans into another arena of geopolitical rivalry. Practical steps already taken under the Resilience, Cooperation and Sustainability pillars, such as scientific collaboration on oceans and polar regions, seafarer protection, and maritime logistics, demonstrate that flexible cooperation remains a viable option.7 The challenge before BRICS is not whether it can dominate the seas militarily, but whether it can create a framework for maritime cooperation flexible enough to accommodate diverse strategic interests and ambitions. In the end, the future of BRICS may well hinge on a simple yet profound question: can rising powers connected by the same waters learn to share the seas without competing to control them?
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Shiwani Dumbala is a Research Scholar in Maritime Security Studies, Department of Maritime Security, Central University of Gujarat. The views expressed here are personal.
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Endnotes
1 Official website of India’s BRICS Chairmanship 2026, https://www.brics2026.gov.in/
2 “MISSION SAGAR: A major Milestone in India’s Engagement with IOR Countries,” Ministry of External Affairs, July 01, 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases?dtl/32803/ ; India’s Maritime Vision: From SAGAR to Indo-Pacific to MAHASAGAR by Amb Suchitra Durai, Ministry of External Affairs, August 13, 2025, https://www.indembassydili.gov.in/section/articles-commissioned-by-xpd-division/india-s-maritime-vision-from-sagar-to-indo-pacific-to-mahasagar-by-amb-suchitra-durai/
3 Vrinda Malik, “BRICS Holds a Maritime Exercise at the Indo-Atlantic Crossroads – Without India” The Diplomat, January 27, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/01/brics-holds-a-maritime-exercise-at-the-indo-atlantic-crossroads-without-india/
4 “BRICS nations work on roadmap for ocean, polar research,” Times of India, August 13, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/bricsnations-work-on-roadmap-for-oceanpolarresearch/articleshow/133191719.cms
5 Directorate General of Shipping, Government of India, official update on BRICS Seafarers’ Forum 2026 and Mumbai Declaration 2026, https://x.com/dgshipping_IN/status/2076654674716115036
6 “India successfully concludes the 16th BRICS Trade Ministers’ Meeting in Jaipur under its BRICS Chairship 2026,” PIB, August 07, 2026, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2296367®=3&lang=1
7 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India – BRICS 2026 Theme & Priorities: “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and sustainability,” https://www.mea.gov.in/topic-infocus?3































