Pakistan’s Manufactured Global Importance and the Deepening Military Grip
by Imran Khurshid*
Pakistan’s global diplomatic projection masks a deepening economic crisis and tightening military control over state institutions. Behind this narrative of rising importance, democratic space and civil liberties continue to erode rapidly.
Pakistan’s internal situation is deteriorating rapidly, with the country on the verge of economic collapse. Inflation is rising, fuel prices are soaring, and ordinary people are struggling to survive. Instead of addressing these real challenges, the state is busy projecting a different image abroad, that of Pakistan as an important player at the centre of global diplomacy.
This narrative is being pushed hard, especially through claims of mediation between the United States and Iran. But this projection is profoundly misleading. It creates the impression that Pakistan’s economic and political crises will somehow disappear simply because it’s engaging in high-level diplomacy. The truth is, this so-called global importance is being used as a cover.
Power Centralisation Under Asif Munir
At the core of this strategy is the military leadership under Asif Munir, which is using this narrative to further tighten its grip on Pakistan. What little democracy existed in the country has now been systematically dismantled. Almost all the key institutions – the judiciary, the media, the political structures – are now effectively under military control.2 Judges are being shifted, and the Judicial Commission’s recommendations to transfer Justice Mohsin Akhtar Kayani, Justice Babar Sattar and Justice Saman Rafat Imtiaz of the Islamabad High Court, which were approved in April 2026, have been widely criticised for lack of transparency.3Broader constitutional changes have altered the structure of the judiciary itself. Military courts are overriding civilian authority, and constitutional changes such as the 27th Amendment have further centralised power.
The crisis with India, particularly during Operation Sindoor in May 2025, was not merely a security incident. It provided the perfect opportunity for Munir to consolidate power, elevate his status, and justify a more authoritarian system. His promotion to Field Marshal symbolised not the strength of the state but the deepening dominance of the military over civilian life.4
At the same time, Pakistan’s outreach to Donald Trump has been highly strategic. By praising Trump and signalling a willingness to align with his expectations, Munir ensured the military regime would remain in his good books.5 This was especially significant at the time, because when Trump returned to power for a second term, expectations were growing—particularly among supporters of Imran Khan and sections of the Pakistani diaspora—that his administration would pressure Pakistan’s military establishment to secure Khan’s release. These expectations were reinforced by lobbying efforts and discussions within U.S. policy circles. However, by positioning himself as a cooperative and useful partner, willing to serve his interests in other important potential geopolitical theatres, Munir effectively neutralised potential external pressure.
This approach also fits within a broader pattern often seen in authoritarian systems, where rulers seek external validation to counter internal insecurity about political continuity. Crucially, in light of the substantial influence and leverage that the United States continues to wield over Pakistan’s military establishment, staying in the good graces of Washington is not merely a diplomatic preference but a strategic imperative, all the more so when shaping the political and strategic calculus.6 In the past, Pakistan’s military rulers have always relied on external support, especially from the United States, to bolster and prolong their rule, as in the cases of Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf.
As a result, when the 27th Amendment was introduced by Field Marshal Asif Munner to further consolidate his military control, there was little to no pushback from the United States. This was not accidental – it was carefully managed through diplomatic signalling and personal outreach.7
Preparing Ground for the 28th Constitutional Amendment
Now, the same pattern is repeating. Pakistan is again positioning itself as a mediator in global crises, not to genuinely resolve conflicts, but to distract from internal failures and to prepare the ground for even more draconian measures, including a proposed 28th Constitutional Amendment.8 According to government statements, this amendment is expected to address issues such as local governance, revenue distribution, and administrative restructuring. However, reports suggest that it will revisit federal–provincial power balances and shift key sectors towards the centre, further undermining its constitutional authority and cementing the dominance of its Field Marshal. This raises serious concerns that, under the guise of “reform,” further centralisation of power would occur, continuing the broader trend of weakening institutional autonomy in Pakistan. The Pakistani mainstream media is being used as a tool in this process, constantly glorifying Pakistan’s so-called rising global status while ignoring the suffering of its own people.
A political-economy dynamic guides the Pakistan military’s interventions in domestic politics. For instance, Ayesha Siddiqa noted that “the military’s political power hastens its involvement in the economy, and its involvement in the economy enhances its political power…as a result, the military has little incentive to withdraw to the barracks.” 9 However, as Christine Fair argued, the Pakistan military “intervened only with the active assistance of civilian institutions, which are subsequently further eroded with every military takeover.”10 The Pakistan army takes every available opportunity to consolidate its presence in domestic politics. As Michael Kugelman, referring to the 2014 protests, pointed out, “the outcome of the protests remains uncertain, this much is clear: The Pakistani military is the big winner…This is bad news for Pakistan’s fragile democracy.”11 To sum up, Pakistan’s military has historically expanded its institutional dominance during periods of political and economic crisis, reinforcing a recurring pattern in which instability becomes a catalyst for greater centralisation of authority rather than institutional reform.12
Elite Capture, and the Politics of Crisis Management in Pakistan
The economic reality tells a very different story. Pakistan’s situation is deteriorating rapidly, with rising inflation, higher petrol prices, and mounting pressure on ordinary citizens.
Recently, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif himself admitted that Pakistan’s oil import bill has surged to around $800 million per week, revealing the country’s deep economic vulnerability rather than strength.13 More importantly, Pakistan does not even have strategic oil reserves like India. Its Petroleum Minister Ali Pervaiz Malik has openly acknowledged that the country holds barely 5–7 days of oil stocks – a very serious condition for Pakistan – and, in the same statement, effectively contrasted Pakistan with India by highlighting that India possesses strong strategic reserves and the capacity to cushion such shocks.14 This admission underscores the stark contrast between the two countries and reveals the fragility of Pakistan’s energy security. Yet, rather than addressing these structural weaknesses, the government is increasingly relying on revenue extraction. Under IMF linked reforms, even solar energy – once promoted as a solution – is now being brought into the tax net, with proposals for new taxes and the removal of exemptions. What was once encouraged as an alternative is gradually becoming another burden.
At the same time, the government has also used the Gulf crisis as a convenient shield to deflect attention from its economic mismanagement and lack of structural reforms. The escalation of tensions between Iran and the United States provided an opportunity to justify extraordinary measures, such as lockdowns, with businesses, shops, and commercial centres being shut down.15 While officially framed as a response to external instability, these measures also suppressed economic activity amid severe fiscal stress and limited foreign exchange reserves, raising serious questions about whether crisis management is being used to mask deeper governance failures.
At the same time, there is almost no transparency about where the massive loans from countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and China – or from institutions like the IMF – are actually going.16 The benefits of these loans rarely reach ordinary people. Instead, they are absorbed by the ruling elite, both military and civilian, who continue to safeguard their wealth abroad while the public is forced to bear the burden through taxation and austerity.
Investigations such as the Pandora Papers have revealed that more than 700 Pakistani individuals – including ministers, business figures, and relatives of senior military officials – held assets through offshore companies and trusts, often involving millions of dollars in foreign investments and high-value overseas estates 17 These findings are reinforced by assessments from the International Monetary Fund in its recent report titled Governance and Corruption Diagnostic Report, which highlight entrenched governance weaknesses, corruption risks, and forms of elite capture, estimating that inefficiencies and corruption cost Pakistan roughly 5 to 6.5 per cent of its GDP annually.18
From Hybrid System to De Facto Military Rule
The suppression of democracy is equally alarming. Imran Khan, arguably the most popular political leader in Pakistan, remains imprisoned and deprived of basic rights. Reports of his deteriorating condition highlight the extent to which political opposition is being suppressed.19 At the same time, the space for civil liberties is shrinking further. Recent developments indicate that the government has regained the authority to render citizens’ passports inactive and impose long-term travel bans. Through mechanisms such as the Passport Control List, individuals can be prevented from travelling or even denied new passports.20 In several cases, passports have already been blocked or cancelled, particularly for those deported from abroad, who now face travel bans and legal action. While these measures are officially justified on administrative and security grounds, in an increasingly centralised political environment, they risk being used as a tool of control—allowing the state to restrict mobility and potentially deter dissent by targeting individuals selectively.
The term “hybrid regime” is now nothing more than a façade. What exists in Pakistan today is effectively military rule, with civilian leaders serving as instruments rather than decision-makers. No political leader can openly challenge the military establishment, and dissenting voices are systematically silenced.21
Meanwhile, the media continues to sustain this system. Rather than questioning rising inflation, unemployment, and governance failures, large sections of the media are engaged in non-stop praise of the military leadership. This propaganda is not accidental it is designed to convince the public that Pakistan is progressing, even as conditions on the ground deteriorate.
In reality, Pakistan’s so-called rise on the global stage is being deliberately manufactured. It is a narrative constructed to obscure economic mismanagement, justify authoritarian expansion, and suppress public resistance. While the country is urged to celebrate its “importance,” it is simultaneously losing what remains of its democratic structure and institutional independence.
* Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow, ICPS, Adjunct Fellow, Peninsula Foundation, Visiting Faculty, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India. The views expressed here are personal.
References
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2 “Pakistan’s Influential Army Chief Asim Munir’s New Powers, Big Immunity,” NDTV, November 2025, https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistans-influential-army-chief-asim-munirs-new-powers-big-immunity-9709490
3 “Law Ministry Notifies Transfer of 3 IHC Judges to Other High Courts,” Dawn, April 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1996098
4 “India to Iran: How Two Wars Shaped the Rise of Pakistan’s Asim Munir,” Al Jazeera, April 23, 2026, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/4/23/india-to-iran-how-two-wars-shaped-the-rise-of-pakistans-asim-munir
5 Vinay Kaura, “Trump and Munir’s Bonhomie and the Revival of U.S.-Pakistan Transactional Engagement,” Observer Research Foundation, November 17, 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research/trump-and-munir-s-bonhomie-and-the-revival-of-u-s-pakistan-transactional-engagement
6 Ted Galen Carpenter, “A Fortress Built on Quicksand: U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 80 (January 5, 1987), https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/fortress-built-quicksand-us-policy-toward-pakistan
7 Abid Hussain, “How Would Pakistan’s 27th Amendment Reshape Its Military and Courts,” Al Jazeera, November 11, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/11/11/how-would-pakistans-27th-amendment-reshape-its-military-and-courts
8 “Govt to Move 28th Amendment Soon: Rana Sanaullah,” The Express Tribune, November 11, 2025, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2577902/govt-to-move-28th-amendment-soon-rana-sanaullah
9 “Book Launch: Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 18, 2007, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-launch-military-inc-inside-pakistans-military-economy
10 Fair, C. Christine, Why the Pakistan Army is Here to Stay: Prospects for Civilian Governance? (February 1, 2011). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1753766 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1753766
11 Michael Kugelman, “Why Afghanistan Should Be Worried About Pakistan’s Political Crisis,” Wilson Centre, August 21, 2014, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/why-afghanistan-should-be-worried-about-pakistans-political-crisis
12 See endnotes 9, 10 and 11
13 “Pakistan Bleeding ₹76,000 Crore Weekly: PM Shehbaz Sharif Raises Alarm over Soaring Oil Import Bill amid Deepening Debt Woes,” The Economic Times, April 30, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/new-updates/pakistan-bleeding-76000-crore-weekly-pm-shehbaz-sharif-raises-alarm-over-soaring-oil-import-bill-amid-deepening-debt woes/articleshow/130624178.cms
14 “‘We Are Not Like India’: Pakistan Minister Admits on Live TV Country Has No Strategic Oil Reserves, Says Stock Only for Five to Seven Days,” The Economic Times, May 2, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/new-updates/we-are-not-like-india-pakistan minister-admits-on-live-tv-country-has-no-strategic-oil-reserves-says-stock-only-for-five-to-seven-days/articleshow/130714032.cms
15 “We Are Not Like India: Pakistan Minister Admits on Live TV Country Has No Strategic Oil Reserves, Says Stock Only for Five to Seven Days,” The Economic Times, May 2, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/news/new-updates/we-are-not-like-india-pakistan-minister admits-on-live-tv-country-has-no-strategic-oil-reserves-says-stock-only-for-five-to-seven-days/articleshow/130714032.cms
16 “Pakistan Govt Secured $26.7 Billion in Loans in Last Fiscal Year: Report,” The Economic Times, July 23, 2025, https://m.economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/pakistan-govt-secured-26-7-billion-in-loans-in-last-fiscal-year-report/articleshow/122853006.cms
17 “Pandora Papers: Wealth of Pakistan PM Imran Khan’s Allies and Military Revealed,” Al Jazeera, October 4, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/4/pandora-papers-wealth-pakistan-pm-imran-khan-allies-military
18 “IMF Warns Pakistan Loses Up to 6.5% of GDP to Corruption; Elite Capture Stifling Growth,” Energy Update, November 20, 2025, https://www.energyupdate.com.pk/2025/11/20/imf-warns-pakistan-loses-up-to-6-5-of-gdp-to-corruption-elite-capture-stifling-growth
19 “Pakistan’s Influential Army Chief Asim Munir’s New Powers, Big Immunity,” BBC News, accessed 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cly77v0n8e9o
20 “Law Ministry Notifies Transfer of 3 IHC Judges to Other High Courts,” Dawn, April 27, 2026, https://www.dawn.com/news/1995683
21 Vinay Kaura, “Hybrid Militarised Legalism and Judicial Hollowing-Out in Pakistan,” Observer Research Foundation, April 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/research/-hybrid-militarised-legalism-and-judicial-hollowing-out-in-pakistan
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