From Exclusion to Alignment: India, the UAE, and West Asian Geopolitics


by Imran Khurshid*
Despite bearing the brunt of Iranian attacks, the UAE found itself excluded from critical diplomatic talks in Islamabad. In contrast, India’s steady engagement underscores a shifting regional order shaped by reliability and strategic alignment.
Amid a fragile ceasefire, all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have suffered Iranian missile and drone attacks, but the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has suffered the most. It has borne the brunt and suffered significant damage.1 Yet when peace talks were held in Islamabad, its interests were not adequately taken into account—as if it did not exist or matter in the broader diplomatic calculus. This was also reflected in statements from the UAE.
In this context, Ebtesam Al-Ketbi, President of the Emirates Policy Centre, highlighted what she described as a structural imbalance in the emerging regional order, stating that “what is taking shape today is not a historic settlement, but a deliberate engineering of sustainable conflict.2” She further emphasised the distribution of costs in the current security environment, arguing: “Who’s suffering from missiles and proxies? Israel, and specifically the Gulf states. What would be a good deal for us is addressing missiles, proxies, and Hormuz. And it seems they don’t care about the missiles or the proxies.3”
Reflecting the Emirate’s position, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the unprovoked Iranian attacks on infrastructure, energy facilities, and civilian targets over the past 40 days including the launch of “2,819 ballistic and cruise missiles and drones”—had caused significant loss of life and extensive damage.4 It therefore called for Iran to be held fully accountable and liable for reparations. The Ministry further underscored the need for “a comprehensive and sustained approach addressing Iran’s full range of threats, including nuclear capabilities, missiles, drones, military capabilities, and proxies, while ensuring freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”5
It is not only the infrastructure loss that the UAE has suffered; it is also a reputational loss. The Emirates has built itself as a global financial hub—associated with peace, stability, and opportunity—which made it highly attractive to people and businesses. But this crisis has shaken that image. Despite such damage, its concerns were not directly reflected in the discussions, highlighting deep concerns over maritime security, energy routes, and the regional balance of power in the Gulf.
Growing Strains in UAE–Pakistan Relations
Moreover, the UAE has historically invested heavily in Pakistan. Over the decades, it has provided billions of dollars in financial and diplomatic support. A large number of Pakistani workers are employed in the Emirates, and their remittances contribute significantly to Pakistan’s economy.6 The UAE has repeatedly supported Pakistan during periods of economic crisis, especially when Pakistan required bailouts to sustain its economy. Naturally, the Emirates expected this support to be reciprocated in times of crisis.
However, during this particular crisis—when the UAE was under attack from Iranian missiles and drones – Pakistan appeared to show greater sympathy for Iran. Through its statements and actions during the war, it appeared to indirectly endorse Iran’s position rather than fully acknowledging the UAE’s security concerns. This created frustration in the Emirates.7 In response, it reportedly asked Pakistan to repay around $3.5 billion that it had previously lent. This frustration was also evident in the reactions of UAE-based experts and commentators on social media, many of whom openly criticised Pakistan’s stance.
At the political level, tensions have also been reflected in increasingly sharp commentary from Islamabad. In a notable instance, Pakistani Senator Mushahid Hussain described the UAE as “stuck and helpless” amid the ongoing financial situation and remarked that “we took loans from them and are repaying them in times of crisis,” even framing Pakistan’s repayment as a form of support.8 He further warned that the UAE’s growing ties with India could have long-term consequences, saying, “Pay attention that friendly ties… do not land you up as part of Akhand Bharat.9” Such remarks reflect not only frustration within sections of Pakistan’s political establishment but also a deeper unease about shifting regional alignments. However, they sit uneasily with the historical record of UAE–Pakistan relations. For decades, the UAE has provided sustained financial assistance, investment, and economic lifelines to Pakistan, particularly during periods of crisis. In this context, the use of dismissive and cautionary language towards a longstanding benefactor signals a striking lack of diplomatic reciprocity, revealing a widening gap between political rhetoric and the realities of continued economic dependence.
There is another important dimension to this issue.10 During the crisis, concerns emerged about the circulation of conflict-related videos and content on social media within segments of expatriate communities in the UAE, including Pakistani workers. In some instances, such content appeared insensitive to the gravity of the situation and the damage inflicted on the UAE’s infrastructure. This did not sit well with the authorities, who were operating in a highly sensitive security environment. As a result, strict monitoring and cautionary advisories were introduced to prevent the spread of content that could inflame tensions or undermine public order. These incidents not only angered the authorities but also caused reputational damage and raised serious concerns about internal sensitivities during a crisis.
New Delhi’s Outreach During the Crisis
Importantly, New Delhi has remained in close contact with the Emirates throughout this period. After the ceasefire was announced, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar visited the UAE to convey India’s message of support and solidarity.11 During the visit, he met with the Emirate’s leadership and discussed regional security, energy stability, and the broader implications of the ongoing conflict. India also placed strong emphasis on the safety and welfare of the large Indian diaspora in the Emirates, while both sides reaffirmed their commitment to continued stability and to the strength of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. India consistently condemned the attacks on the UAE and other GCC countries, reiterating that their sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected.12 India also co-sponsored a United Nations Security Council resolution that strongly condemned Iran’s egregious attacks on Gulf countries, reaffirmed their sovereignty, and called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, further underscoring its clear diplomatic support for the UAE during the crisis. This visit was clearly intended to signal that India stands with the UAE during difficult times.13
This deepening trust is also evident in the official statements of Emirati leadership. The UAE Ambassador to India, Abdulnasser Alshaali, emphasised that Indians in the UAE are “considered family by the leadership of this country” and reassured that “your family in the UAE is not alone,” thereby underscoring the depth of the societal and strategic ties between the two countries.xiv This characterisation goes beyond conventional diplomacy, highlighting a partnership grounded in mutual trust, interdependence, and long-term stability.
In addition, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has repeatedly emphasised that “ensuring safe and free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz is the foremost priority,” underscoring that secure, uninterrupted maritime routes are essential to global energy security and international trade.xv
Going forward, the India-UAE partnership is likely to deepen. This crisis has once again highlighted who stands with whom in difficult times, and such moments often shape long-term strategic relationships.
* Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow, ICPS, Adjunct Fellow, Peninsula Foundation, Visiting Faculty, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India. The views expressed here are personal.
References
1 “UAE Intercepts New Wave of 4 Ballistic Missiles, 26 Drones Launched from Iran,” Anadolu Agency, March 20, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/uae-intercepts-new-wave-of-4-ballistic-missiles-26-drones-launched-from-iran/3872821
2 “Gulf States Worry Their Concerns Not Priority in US-Iran Talks,” The Arab Weekly, n.d., https://thearabweekly.com/gulf-states-worry-their-concerns-not-priority-us-iran-talks
3 Ibid.,
4 “UAE Closely Following Ceasefire Announcement, Affirms Importance of Iran’s Adherence to Cessation of Terrorist Attacks, and Ensuring Freedom of Navigation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates, April 8, 2026, https://www.mofa.gov.ae/en/MediaHub/News/2026/4/8/uae-iran
5 Ibid.,
6 “Ashfaq Ahmed, “UAE-Driven Remittance Surge Pushes Pakistan’s Foreign Reserves to 39-Month High,” Gulf News, July 14, 2025, https://gulfnews.com/world/asia/pakistan/uae-driven-remittance-surge-pushes-pakistans-foreign-reserves-to-39-month-high-1.500197251
7 “Pakistan to Repay $3.5 Billion US Debt to UAE in April: Loan Repayments,” India Today, April 4, 2026, https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistan-to-repay-3-5-billion-usd-debt-to-uae-in-april-loan-repayments-shehbaz-sharif-2891452-2026-04-04
8 “‘Akhand Bharat’ Risk: Pakistan Senator Mocks UAE over $3.5 Billion Loan Repayment,” The Print, April 2026, https://theprint.in/world/akhand-bharat-risk-pakistan-senator-mocks-uae-over-3-5-billion-loan-repayment/2898371/
9 Ibid.,
10 “UAE Warns Against Sharing Unverified Information, Spreading Rumours Online,” Khaleej Times, February 28, 2026, https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/emergencies/uae-warns-against-sharing-unverified-information-iran-attack
11 “Jaishankar Meets UAE Deputy Prime Minister, Discusses Regional Situation,” The Hindu, April 12, 2026, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/jaishankar-meets-uae-deputy-pm-discusses-regional-situation/article70853338.ece
12 “PM Condemns Gulf Strikes, Says Working to Protect Indians,” The Times of India, accessed April 25, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/pm-condemns-gulf-strikes-says-working-to-protect-indians/articleshow/128957767.cms
13 “India Cosponsors UN Resolution Condemning Egregious Attacks by Iran Against GCC Nations, Jordan,” The New Indian Express, March 12, 2026, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2026/Mar/12/india-cosponsors-un-resolution-condemning-egregious-attacks-by-iran-against-gcc-nations-jordan-2
14 “‘Your Family in the UAE Is Not Alone’: UAE Ambassador Alshaali Assures Safety of Indian Diaspora Amid West Asia Conflict,” The Economic Times, March 10, 2026, https://m.economictimes.com/nri/latest-updates/your-family-in-the-uae-is-not-alone-uae-ambassador-alshaali-assures-safety-of-indian-diaspora-amid-west-asia-conflict/articleshow/129395668.cms
15 “Safe Navigation through Strait of Hormuz India’s Top Priority, PM Modi Tells Kuwait’s Crown Prince,” Firstpost, accessed April 25, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/world/safe-navigation-through-strait-of-hormuz-indias-top-priority-pm-modi-tells-kuwaits-crown-prince-13990923.html































