Philippines-Japan Maritime Delimitation Talks – A Stratagem?


by Captain (IN) TSV Ramana (Retd.)
Introduction
On 28 May 2026, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and visiting Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. issued a joint statement announcing, among other things, the commencement of maritime delimitation talks on the respective exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelves of the Philippines and Japan.1
Why is this Important?
China’s anger at this development was evident in the statement by the Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning, dated 29 May 2026, in which he stated that “the area the two countries announced they will delimit is East of China’s Taiwan island…China has an exclusive economic zone and a continental shelf in this area according to domestic law and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)…Japan and the Philippines’ so-called maritime delimitation talks constitute a flagrant violation of China’s maritime rights and interests, UNCLOS, and other international law and basic norms governing international relations.”2
Comments: Even a hint of talks between the Philippines and Japan on delimiting their EEZs and continental shelf riles China, as both the Philippines and Japan are locked in maritime disputes with China. The Philippines has a dispute with China in the South China Sea (SCS), and Japan has one in the East China Sea (ECS).
Geographical Context of the Philippines-Japan Maritime Delimitation Talks
China is in a maritime dispute in the SCS with other claimant countries, including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei, over features such as the Pratas, Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, Scarborough Shoal and the Spratlys. There is also recurring tension between China and Vietnam in the waters off Vanguard Bank. Indonesia and China periodically experience tensions over the Natuna Islands. Incidentally, all these areas fall within China’s infamous nine-dash line in the SCS, whose southernmost tip is believed to be the James Shoal.3 In addition, China, and by default Taiwan and Japan, have a dispute centred on the Senkakus in the ECS.4
The Philippines and Japan appear to have overlapping EEZs centred on the area between the Yaeyama Islands of Japan (located about 400 km south-west of the Japanese island of Okinawa) and Mavulis Island (the northernmost island of the Philippines). This area also overlaps with Taiwan’s EEZ.5
Comments: China claims Taiwan as a de facto province. Hence, the delimitation talks are seen as a direct challenge to China’s sovereignty. Further, the possibility that Taiwan may also be involved in these talks would lend legitimacy to Taiwan’s status as a sovereign country.
The relevant geography of the areas under discussion is shown on the map below: –
(Fig 1- Geography of the Disputed Areas) 6
How has China reacted?
China commenced what it described as a “special maritime traffic law enforcement and hydrographic survey operation” in waters east of Taiwan.7 From 06 to 10 June 2026, China deployed at least a six-ship flotilla comprising two China Coast Guard (CCG) cutters, three China Maritime Safety Administration (CMSA) patrol ships, and a China Rescue Service and Salvage Bureau (CRS&SB) vessel.8 This special operation involved China’s 10,000-ton-class maritime patrol vessel Haixun 09, the large patrol and rescue vessel Haixun 06, the hydrographic survey vessel Haixun 08, and the specialised rescue vessel Donghai Jiu 113. They hailed all passing vessels, directed them to comply with navigation rules, reportedly investigated and dealt with various maritime violations, and maintained navigation order.9 A total of 198 passing vessels were inspected, and reportedly, three instances of illegal or irregular vessel operations were addressed.10

Fig 2- Deployment of Chinese Flotilla11
Comments. China appears to have repeated its standard playbook from the SCS by deploying ships whenever tensions escalate and publicising the deployment.
How has Taiwan reacted?
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) of Taiwan strongly refuted the statements dated 29 May 2026 by the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (see note 2) concerning negotiations between Japan and the Philippines on maritime boundaries. MOFA of Taiwan reiterated that China had no right to comment on the territory and associated waters of the Republic of China (Taiwan). It further commended Japan and the Philippines for working to resolve maritime differences through peaceful dialogue, based on respect for international law. It also stated that Taiwan looked forward to cooperating with Japan and the Philippines to make concrete contributions to regional peace and stability and the preservation of marine ecology.12
Comments: Taiwan appears to be standing up to China’s assertion of sovereignty over the waters east of Taiwan. Furthermore, the statement that it would be willing to engage with both the Philippines and Japan on this issue seems to be a clear act of defiance by Taiwan.
What exactly have the Philippines and Japan done?
On the face of it, the Philippines and Japan have decided to hold bilateral talks to delimit the overlapping EEZs and continental shelf. However, it is difficult to believe that they were unaware of the repercussions of their decision and the associated complications arising from the claims and sensitivities of both China and Taiwan. The fact that this decision would evoke a response from China would have been considered by both parties. What their assessment of the nature, level and intensity of China’s response was remains unknown, and why they are confident that this response from China can be handled?
Future Scenarios-How this Could Play Out?
Scenario 1: The Philippines and Japan, in all seriousness, proceed with their negotiations, arrive at an agreement, and submit their respective claims to the United Nations. This scenario will have serious consequences for the region, and China’s reaction could turn aggressive, leading to tensions. Scenario 1, while plausible, appears unlikely.
Scenario 2: The Philippines and Japan hold periodic publicised talks and issue statements to the effect that they are close to a deal. However, no deal is actually reached. Scenario 2 is likely.
Scenario 3: Japan and the Philippines take no further action on this issue, but at the same time maintain that it remains very much active. Scenario 3 is more likely.
Comments: Scenarios 2 and 3 may both be likely in the near future.
Is this a Stratagem on the part of the Philippines and Japan?
The announcement of talks between the Philippines and Japan on the maritime delimitation of the EEZs can be seen as a good stratagem, in that it effectively turns the tables on China by using China’s own playbook of the so-called ‘grey zone’ and legal warfare.
It leaves China with little room to manoeuvre, other than to keep repeating the tactic of deploying vessels in waters east of Taiwan. It also gives the Philippines and Japan leverage to drag Taiwan into this fracas and thereby challenge Chinese claims on Taiwan. If Taiwan decides to participate in the talks under a trilateral framework or bilaterally with the Philippines and Japan separately, it legitimises Taiwan’s position as a de facto country.
Either by design or by default, the announcement of maritime delimitation talks between the Philippines and Japan seems like a good stratagem, albeit with the risk of provoking China. This appears to be an instance in which claimant countries (which have maritime disputes with China) have put China on the back foot, prompting Beijing to scramble for answers on how to handle it.
*****
Endnotes
1 Luisa Cabato, “PH, Japan start talks on sharing military info, maritime borders”, Inquirer.net, May 28, 2026, https://globalnation.inquirer.net/325115/ph-japan-start-talks-on-military-info-maritime-borders-ship-transfer
2 Liu Sen, “Japan-Philippines maritime delimitation talks: A geopolitical farce”, CGTN, 2026-06-03, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/2025xb/O_251451/16465284.html
3 BBC News, “What is the South China Sea dispute?”, BBC, 7 July 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349
4 Model Diplomat, “East China Sea Dispute”, May 23, 2026, https://modeldiplomat.com/learn/glossary/east-china-sea-dispute
5 Park Eun-ha, “China sensitive to Japan-Philippines maritime boundary delimitation…while staging shows of force at sea, it activates dialogue channels with the U.S. military”, kyunghyang Shinmun, 2026.06.02, https://www.khan.co.kr/en/article/202606021828057#ENT
6 Representational map generated by the Author utilising Gemini AI for the purpose of clarity. This map may not be accurate to scale.
7 Global Times, “China completes maritime traffic law enforcement, survey operation in waters east of Taiwan island after Japan-Philippines delimitation talks plan”, Global Times, Jun 10, 2026, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202606/1363243.shtml
8 Aaron-Matthew Lariosa, “Chinese Flotilla Surges East of Taiwan Amid Spat with the Philippines, Japan”, US Naval Institute, USNI News, June 8, 2026, https://news.usni.org/2026/06/08/chinese-flotilla-surges-east-of-taiwan-amid-spat-with-the-philippines-japan
9 See note 7
10 Li Shangyi , “China concludes maritime law enforcement operation east of its Taiwan island”, ChinaDaily.com, 2026-06-10, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202606/10/WS6a294796a310d6866eb4d884.html
11 See note 8 for source of image
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan), “MOFA response to China’s claims concerning Japan-Philippines negotiations on maritime boundary”, May 31, 2026, https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1330&sms=274&s=122413
*Captain TSV Ramana is a former Indian Navy Officer and a pioneer of the Indian Navy’s analytical studies vis-à-vis China, with extended tenures in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Headquarters, the China Cell at the National Maritime Foundation, at the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC) as part of the ‘Strategic Maritime Assessment Team (SMAT) – China’ and the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS). He is a qualified Mandarin interpreter from the School of Foreign Languages at New Delhi. The views expressed are his own. He can be reached at tsvramana68@gmail.com.
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