Pakistan’s Airstrikes on Afghanistan: A Strategic Diversion from Its Internal and External Challenges
by Imran Khurshid
As Pakistan’s internal and external challenges multiply, Afghanistan has once again become a convenient battlefield for its military establishment. The airstrikes allow Islamabad to project an image of confronting security threats while diverting attention from its own deepening crises.
Recently, Pakistan once again violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan by conducting airstrikes on Afghan territory.[1] Afghanistan has now become a soft target for Pakistan’s military establishment, led by Asim Munir. Whenever Pakistan faces pressure from any front, whether internal or external, its air force bombs locations inside Afghanistan. This has increasingly become routine, with little accountability and limited condemnation from other countries.
The recent attacks once again demonstrate this pattern. On September 21, Pakistan carried out airstrikes in Kunar and Paktika provinces, claiming that it had targeted militants and killed 28 terrorists.[2] Afghanistan, however, reported civilian casualties, with three killed and four others wounded in Kunar. Afghan authorities condemned the strikes as an act of aggression and lodged a protest with Pakistan. On September 24, Pakistan again carried out air and drone strikes inside Afghanistan, targeting 10 locations, according to Pakistani officials. Pakistan claimed the targets were being used to launch and store drones that had been used against Pakistan. Afghan authorities rejected Pakistan’s justification and reported civilian casualties. Within days, Pakistan had once again turned Afghanistan into a battlefield for its own security problems.
Mecca Joint Defence Agreement and the Limits of Rhetoric
The so-called Muslim countries and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which are often vocal in issuing statements against some selective countries, have also remained largely silent. No Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country has shown meaningful support for Afghanistan or clearly condemned Pakistan’s airstrikes. On the other hand, the OIC Contact Group on Afghanistan, instead of issuing a clear condemnation of Pakistan’s airstrikes and the reported civilian casualties, including women and children, has provided another platform to build pressure on Afghanistan, with Pakistan using its recent meeting to press its accusations against Kabul, which reflects a clear double standard.[3] It seems that the suffering of Afghans does not fit within the definition of the Muslim Ummah for these countries and organisations, or that Afghan Muslims receive less attention when the aggressor is Pakistan. This silence is particularly striking because these same countries and organisations are often quick to issue statements condemning certain countries selectively.
On August 7, 2026, Pakistan signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye—a trilateral defence pact stipulating that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Yet when Saudi Arabia faced major drone and missile attacks from the Iran-aligned Houthis, including strikes on Jazan and other cities and oil facilities across southern Saudi Arabia, Pakistan merely issued strong condemnations and used forceful language, as it often does, but provided no direct military assistance. In fact, when Saudi Arabia needed concrete action, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) embarrassingly responded by releasing a celebratory musical song rather than deploying forces.[4] Consequently, Saudi Arabia had to turn to its traditional Western security partners, including the US, Britain, and France, for assistance in protecting its airspace. Desperate for real support, Saudi Arabia even sought intelligence assistance from Israel, which reportedly supported it through US Central Command (CENTCOM)-mediated channels to track Houthi deployments and counter the threat.[5] Meanwhile, Pakistan has largely relied on strong language to demonstrate its support.
As attacks on Saudi Arabia continue, Pakistan does not want to enter the war against the Houthis. It is therefore deliberately opening another front with Afghanistan. By attacking Afghanistan and allowing the situation to escalate, Pakistan can claim that it is confronting its own security challenges and use this narrative to justify its position. Afghanistan, therefore, becomes a convenient front for Pakistan at a time when it wants to avoid direct involvement in another regional conflict.
Container City Lockdown
The second factor is Imran Khan. The former prime minister and founder of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) remains incarcerated in the high-security Adiala Jail. Khan served as Pakistan’s prime minister from 2018 until his removal by a parliamentary no-confidence vote in April 2022. Since his imprisonment in August 2023, he has faced a series of criminal cases and convictions, which he and his party have described as politically motivated. Most of his convictions have since been suspended or overturned, although he remains in prison.
His health has also become a growing concern after more than three years in prison, particularly regarding the condition of his right eye and his access to adequate medical care. Recently, Pakistan’s Supreme Court ordered that he be transferred to Shifa International Hospital for medical examination and treatment, but authorities instead took him to PIMS for a brief examination and then returned him to jail.[6] This prompted his party to seek contempt proceedings for non-compliance with the court’s order. Now, his sisters—including Aleema Khan, Dr. Uzma Khan, and Noreen Niazi—have also been detained under 30-day Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) orders, as part of a broader crackdown on PTI workers and supporters ahead of the party’s planned protest march, which has now been rescheduled from September 27 to October 4. Amnesty International has also criticised the arrests of Khan’s family members and PTI activists ahead of the protest.[7] There is so much fear and paranoia within the military regime led by Asim Munir that they have completely shut down major cities in Pakistan. They are placing around 20,000 double-stacked shipping containers, fitted with metal spikes, on the roads to block the movement of incoming protesters, turning Islamabad and other cities into literal “container cities”. They have even sealed off major motorways, including the Islamabad-Peshawar highway, the Hazara motorway, and the Grand Trunk Road at Attock. There are also strong reports that mobile internet and network services could be cut off completely.[8]
At the same time, Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), led by Emir Hafiz Naeemur Rehman, has launched its own “Super Long March” and a train march from Karachi to Islamabad to demand the abolition of the petroleum levy.[9] JI previously held sit-ins at 42 locations and blocked roads at hundreds of points as part of its campaign. The party temporarily paused its long march after Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif requested a postponement and agreed to further consultations. However, the incoming protest march led by PTI, fuelled by anger over Imran Khan’s continued imprisonment, poses a different challenge for the military establishment.
Beyond this political pressure, the military establishment is facing serious, multi-front security challenges stretching from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Balochistan, alongside severe economic problems. Across KPK, the army is reeling from deadly, sophisticated insurgent assaults like the recent mass-casualty suicide bombing on the Kohat Police Lines.[10] Simultaneously, Balochistan has turned into a warzone due to massive, coordinated waves of armed attacks, while PoK remains crippled by widespread, anti-regime public unrest and continuous protest movements. On top of these security failures, the country’s broken economy barely survives on life support, depending entirely on a stringent $7 billion IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF), which has forced the government to concede to over 170 aggressive legal and tax amendments.[11] This complete dependence on foreign debt and emergency bailouts makes it clear that the regime is physically and financially overextended on every front.
The Frankenstein Effect
There are also those who argue that Pakistan is attacking Afghanistan because Afghanistan is providing shelter to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). However, the TTP problem is not simply an Afghan problem. The TTP has deep roots inside Pakistan itself. The undeniable reality is that the TTP was originally birthed by Pakistan within its own vast network of state-sponsored Deobandi madrasas, where these assets were deliberately cultivated to fight proxy wars.[12] For decades, the Pakistani military establishment used these religious seminaries to groom and brainwash fighters under the banner of “jihad.” Now, when these very same groups turn around and demand enforcement of their own hardcore interpretation of Islam, they have become a catastrophic problem for the state.
These networks emerged along the Durand Line, and today vast areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), particularly the former tribal districts, still see these groups maintain a strong presence and the state’s writ remain weak. Pakistan has repeatedly accused Kabul of allowing TTP militants to operate from Afghan territory, while the Afghan Taliban denies harbouring such groups and argues that Pakistan’s militancy problem is entirely internal.
Afghanistan is therefore being scapegoated for a problem that Pakistan itself created and has failed to resolve. Although the TTP and the Afghan Taliban have historical and ideological ties, the TTP is a separate organisation that now increasingly operates independently of the Afghan Taliban while continuing to wage an aggressive campaign against the Pakistani state. Pakistan cannot simply shift responsibility for its own internal militancy failures – which it systematically manufactured inside its own madrasas – onto Afghanistan.
Strategic Depth
Moreover, Pakistan does not want Afghanistan to pursue an independent foreign policy, nor does it desire a stable, self-reliant, and peaceful Afghanistan, as a strong and unified neighbour does not align with its long-term strategic interests. Instead, a fragmented and unstable Afghanistan is viewed as beneficial to its long-term strategic goals. Furthermore, it wants Afghanistan to follow Rawalpindi’s dictates in its foreign-policy and strategic choices. Pakistan has historically viewed Afghanistan through the imperialist prism of “strategic depth” and, at times, as a potential “fifth province” or an extension of its own strategic space, reflecting a feudal vision of Afghanistan in which Kabul is expected to remain subordinate to Rawalpindi rather than act as an independent sovereign neighbour.[13] In fact, any government in Kabul that refuses to show subservience to Pakistan or seeks an independent course is viewed by the Pakistani military establishment as untrustworthy and a potential threat to its strategic interests. From Islamabad’s perspective, a perpetually fragile and dependent Afghanistan is far easier to manipulate, whereas a peaceful and economically stable Afghanistan would naturally resist external meddling. Pakistan has therefore used multiple means to keep Afghanistan under pressure, including military incursions, restrictions on trade and transit, and the expulsion of Afghan refugees. However, this deliberate instability carries wider regional consequences. A fragile Afghanistan can undermine regional stability, disrupt connectivity and trade projects, and increase the risk of militant violence and of humanitarian pressures spilling across neighbouring borders.
Moreover, Pakistan has a particular concern about Afghanistan developing independent ties with India. Any strengthening of India-Afghanistan relations, whether through diplomatic engagement, development assistance, trade, infrastructure, or people-to-people ties, creates anxiety within the Pakistani military establishment because it reduces Islamabad’s ability to dictate Afghanistan’s strategic and foreign-policy choices.[14]
So Afghanistan has become a strategic diversion. Pakistan is conducting airstrikes on Afghanistan to escalate tensions and then present its position more confidently by saying it is facing its own internal security challenges. At a time when the Pakistani military establishment is facing political pressure, economic problems, militant violence, and other security challenges, Afghanistan provides an easy external target. Instead of dealing with its own problems, Pakistan can once again shift the focus towards Afghanistan.
Endnotes
[1] “Pakistan Strikes 10 Sites in Afghanistan, Taliban Confirms.” Afghanistan International, September 24, 2026. https://www.afintl.com/en/202609245046
[2] Yawar, Mohammad Yunus. “Pakistan Says It Killed 28 Militants, Afghan Taliban and UN Report Three Civilian Deaths.” Reuters, September 21, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/least-three-killed-pakistani-airstrike-afghanistan-tolo-news-reports-2026-09-21/
[3] Dar, Ishaq. “Afghanistan’s Situation Demands Continued Attention in View of Implications for Regional Peace, Dar Tells OIC Moot.” Dawn, September 25, 2026. https://www.dawn.com/news/2031906/afghanistans-situation-demands-continued-attention-in-view-of-implications-for-regional-peace-dar-tells-oic-moot
[4] Chakraborty, Debdutta. “Saudi Arabia Wanted Mecca Pact Action, Pakistan Gave Songs.” The Print, September 2026. https://youtu.be/9hFOW8nDAw8
[5] I24NEWS. “Israel Aided Saudi Arabia against Houthi Threats in US-Mediated Talks—Report.” I24NEWS, September 2026. https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy/artc-israel-aided-saudi-arabia-against-houthi-threats-in-us-mediated-talks-report
[6] Al Jazeera Staff. “Pakistan’s Ex-PM Imran Khan Back in Jail after Brief Hospital Visit.” Al Jazeera, August 20, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/8/20/pakistans-ex-pm-imran-khan-transferred-from-jail-to-hospital
[7] Amnesty International. “Pakistan: Arbitrary Detention of Imran Khan’s Family and Party Activists a Flagrant Violation of Human Rights.” Amnesty International, September 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/09/pakistan-arbitrary-detention-of-imran-khans-family-and-party-activists-a-flagrant-violation-of-human-rights/
[8] WION. “Pakistan: Islamabad Sealed Off Ahead of March by Imran Khan’s Party.” WION, September 2026. https://www.wionews.com/videos/pakistan-islamabad-sealed-off-ahead-of-march-by-imran-khan-s-party-1790238894288/amp
[9] Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan. “JI Launches Super Long March from Karachi against Petroleum Levy.” Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, 2026. https://jamaat.org/en/news/ji-launches-super-long-march-from-karachi-against-petroleum-levy
[10] “Many Dead in Attack at Police Headquarters in Pakistan.” The Hindu, 2026. https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/many-dead-in-attack-at-police-headquarters-in-pakistan/article71483705.ece
[11] International Monetary Fund. “Pakistan: IMF Reaches Agreement on Economic Policies for 37-Month Extended Fund Facility.” International Monetary Fund, July 12, 2024. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2024/07/12/pr-24273-pakistan-imf-reaches-agreement-on-economic-policies-for-37-month-eff
[12] Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. “Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).” MP-IDSA. https://idsa.in/topics/tehrik-e-taliban-pakistan-ttp
[13] Rashid, Ahmed. “Pakistan’s Relations with Afghanistan and Implications for Regional Politics.” Brookings Institution, March 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/pakistans-relations-with-afghanistan-and-implications-for-regional-politics/
[14] Khan, Brig. Gurmeet. “Pakistan’s Afghanistan Problem.” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, December 5, 2019. https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/pakistans-afghanistan-problem
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Dr. Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace Studies (CPS), New Delhi. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Kashmir, specialising in Indo-Pacific studies, South Asian security, and India–US strategic relations. His research focuses on South Asian geopolitics, international security, India–US relations, and emerging strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. His academic work has been published in peer-reviewed journals including India Quarterly, the Journal of Asian and African Studies, and the Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs. His policy analyses and commentaries have appeared in Asia Times, The Diplomat, The Japan Times, Middle East Forum, EurAsian Times, Eurasia Review, Firstpost, News18, and leading Indian think tanks and policy platforms.
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