Politics and Geopolitics of Protests in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir

by Sankalp Gurjar

As the Iran War comes to an end and Pakistan seeks to project itself as a successful mediator, Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK) has been engulfed in protests. The call for protests was issued on June 5, and the protests were scheduled to take place on June 9. Despite the curfews, internet shutdowns, and the crackdown, thousands of people came out on the streets to protest. In fact, even before the planned protests, police and protesters clashed on Sunday (June 7) in Rawalakot city.

As is usual in the PoK, the state has responded with repression and brutality. Police opened fire on protesters. It is estimated that at least 15 people have died, with many more feared dead. Since then, protests have continued to simmer despite the crackdown. As the BBC reported, in Muzaffarabad – the capital of the territory – an “uneasy silence has now blanketed the city, with streets empty, businesses shuttered and police on patrol.”

The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which is spearheading the protests, has been banned under anti-terrorism laws. The JAAC has been accused of sedition through its speeches, written material, videos and audio recordings. Pakistan has announced a Rs 10 million reward for four leaders – Shaukat Nawaz Mir, Umar Nazir Kashmiri, Khawaja Mehran Arshad and Sardar Aman Khan –  of the JAAC. Notable Pakistani analysts argue that the PoK is unwilling to play by Islamabad’s rules.        

The major demand of the protesters is the abolition of 12 reserved seats for refugees who migrated from Indian Kashmir. The provincial assembly has 53 seats, and direct elections are held for only 33 seats. The party that governs Islamabad invariably comes to power in the PoK. The JAAC argues that these reserved seats allow Islamabad to influence local governance and politics. The provincial elections in the PoK are due on July 27, and therefore, the JAAC has sought to abolish these seats before the elections. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of the PoK has ruled that these seats cannot be eliminated without a constitutional amendment.

What has been the response from Pakistan’s major political parties? The chairman of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, urged protesters to end their demonstrations. He said that “at a time when the international spotlight is firmly on Pakistan, the ongoing unrest in Azad Jammu and Kashmir is damaging both the Kashmiri cause and Pakistan’s reputation”. The PPP is in government in the PoK. Nawaz Sharif, the former prime minister and president of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), has expressed concern regarding the situation in the PoK. He stated that “the struggle for public rights must remain within the constitutional framework” and that the PML-N “will work with all democratic forces and play its full role.” Thus, the two major political parties do not support the protesters or the JAAC.   

In support of the protesters in the PoK, London saw thousands of British Kashmiris march through the city. They raised the alarm about the treatment being meted out to people in the PoK. The issue of escalating tensions in the PoK has also been raised in the British Parliament. British MPs, in a letter to the foreign secretary, noted that the PoK is experiencing a “communications blackout, as part of a broader lockdown, alongside escalating tensions, and restrictions affecting the ability of people in the region to communicate with the outside world”. The letter urged the British government to “engage proactively and use all appropriate diplomatic channels to encourage de-escalation and a peaceful resolution”. The internationalisation of the protests and Pakistan’s behaviour in the PoK would worry Islamabad.  

The roots of discontent in the PoK run deep. The territory has been on the boil since 2023, and the JAAC, which emerged in the same year, has channelled the people’s disgruntlement. Beyond issues of representation and governance, the difficulties in daily life have become a rallying point. In 2023, people protested against the rising electricity bills, flour smuggling and acute shortages of subsidised wheat. In May 2024, people took to the streets over the same issues: subsidised wheat and electricity bills. In response, the government approved a subsidy program of $ 82 million.

In 2025, protests erupted in September and October. As in previous years, the Pakistani response to the protests was heavy-handed, and people often lost their lives. For example, in the 2025 protests, at least nine people lost their lives, including three police personnel. Dozens were injured on both sides. In 2025, Islamabad was presented with a 38-point charter. Two demands were key in this charter: to end the elite privileges and to abolish the 12 reserved seats. Elite privileges for high-level government officials include two government-provided vehicles, personal staff, including bodyguards, and unlimited fuel for vehicles used for government work.

Sensing the severity of the protests, a delegation was sent to negotiate with the protesters. They agreed on a 25-point deal that included provisions to establish two educational boards, provide MRI and CT scanners across districts, improve the electricity system, administrative and tax reforms, and infrastructure projects. The government officials say that 37 demands have been addressed. Thedemand for abolition of reserved seats remained unmet.. Hence, despite the 2025 deal, the PoK erupted in 2026.   

The geostrategic location of the PoK is a factor in Pakistan’s response to the protests. The PoK comprises two regions – the so-called “Azad” Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). AJK accounts for about 15 per cent of the territory, while GB comprises the remaining 85 per cent. The territory as a whole provides direct land access to China, Pakistan’s all-weather friend and chief geopolitical benefactor. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a signature project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), passes through the region. The PoK is a critical node in China’s desire to access the Indian Ocean via Pakistan. In addition, control over the PoK prevents India from linking up with Central Asia and Afghanistan overland and from outmanoeuvring Pakistan from the north.  

Meanwhile, it has become clear that instability reigns supreme along Pakistan’s western and northern peripheries. Except for Punjab, the rest of the country is gripped by volatility, insurgency, and violence to a varying degree. The region from Gwadar Port to Gilgit-Baltistan has been unstable, and Pakistan has been unable to exert control. In Baluchistan, the Baluch Liberation Army (BLA) has been conducting a full-fledged insurgency. The BLA hijacked a train last year carrying Pakistani soldiers.

In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) region, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has regrouped and has been challenging Islamabad. The TTP issue brings Taliban-ruled Afghanistan into the equation. Pakistan and Afghanistan have been exchanging blows along the Durand Line. Pakistan has even launched airstrikes on Afghanistan, including on Kabul. It demonstrates Pakistan’s inability and frustration. For Islamabad, the question of TTP links internal and external security problems.

The ongoing instability and security issues have plagued the CPEC. The CPEC faces difficult questions owing to Pakistan’s internal instability. Attacks on Chinese nationals and infrastructure projects, especially those associated with CPEC, have been a regular occurrence. Pakistan’s economic woes have added to the challenges facing Islamabad. The country is dependent on bailouts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It recently received $ 1.32 billion from the Fund.  

Although Pakistan faces deep domestic troubles, on the foreign policy front, the country has been in a favourable position. It is perhaps the only country right now with strong ties to both China and the US. Beijing provided Pakistan with real-time intelligence and tech support during the four-day conflict with India in May 2025. The Chinese weapons deployed by Pakistan were also tested in the war. Meanwhile, Islamabad has managed to curry favour with the Second Trump Administration. Pakistan has emerged as an attractive location for the crypto business interests of Trump associates. President Trump has not only hosted Field Marshal Asim Munir but has also called him “my favourite field marshal”. More recently, Pakistan has been a mediator in efforts to end the Iran War.  

As a result, Pakistan finds itself in a curious position. The continuing, and perhaps even growing, internal troubles and its externally favourable positioning go hand in hand. The Iran War mediation has brought global attention to Pakistan. However, the same global limelight has perhaps heightened visibility of Pakistan’s internal troubles. As Islamabad muddles through multiple and recurring crises, the situation in the PoK is unlikely to improve much. Pakistan’s politics and geopolitics will continue to stand in the way.

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Sankalp Gurjar is an Assistant Professor of Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune. His research interests include India’s Foreign Policy, Asian Security, and Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region.  

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