India, Israel and the Geopolitics of Escalation in the Middle East

by Priya Singh

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s February 2026 visit to Israel took place at a moment when the strategic equilibrium of the Middle East was already under severe strain. Within days, the regional environment shifted from persistent tension toward open conflict. Strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian military and nuclear facilities prompted Iranian retaliation through missile and drone attacks directed at Israel and United States military installations across the Gulf. Hezbollah subsequently entered the conflict from Lebanon, launching rockets and drones into northern Israel and triggering Israeli retaliatory strikes across Lebanese territory. As this cycle of action and response intensified, hostilities spread rapidly across multiple theatres, placing regional energy infrastructure and key maritime routes under heightened threat.

The situation escalated further with the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, in a joint military operation conducted by the United States and Israel. Khamenei had shaped the Islamic Republic’s political and ideological trajectory for more than three decades, first as president and later as Supreme Leader. His death, therefore, represents one of the most consequential developments in the region since the Iranian Revolution of 1979. While Iran’s immediate response has taken the form of intensified military retaliation, the longer-term implications may prove even more significant. The removal of a figure who stood at the apex of Iran’s political system introduces uncertainty into the country’s internal power structure and raises broader questions about the future balance of power in the Middle East.

The speed with which events unfolded illustrates the increasingly networked character of contemporary warfare in the region. Military operations now extend simultaneously across airspace systems, maritime corridors, digital infrastructures and energy supply networks. Iranian retaliatory strikes reached several Gulf states, with missile and drone attacks reported near major urban and economic centres, including Abu Dhabi and Dubai. These incidents exposed the vulnerability of Gulf cities that function as global hubs of finance, trade and logistics. The stability of such urban centres remains central to the economic model of the Gulf states, whose prosperity depends on open global markets, cosmopolitan labour systems and large expatriate populations, particularly from South Asia. In this environment, the line between limited military operations and wider regional war becomes increasingly blurred.

The current escalation reflects deeper structural features of the regional order rather than a sudden rupture. Scholars of Middle Eastern politics have long emphasised the cyclical character of instability across the region. Fawaz Gerges contends that contemporary Middle Eastern politics is shaped by recurring patterns of regime insecurity, ideological mobilisation and proxy confrontation that repeatedly undermine attempts to establish a durable regional equilibrium. Marc Lynch similarly observes that the political order that emerged after the Arab uprisings remains fragmented and fluid, marked by shifting alignments, weakened state authority and persistent institutional fragility. Viewed in this context, recent developments represent the intensification of longer structural dynamics that have shaped regional politics for decades.

These developments must also be considered within the broader strain affecting the international system. The post-1945 global order sought to embed power within institutional arrangements designed to moderate geopolitical rivalry and constrain unilateral action. As G. John Ikenberry argues, the durability of that order depended on the institutionalisation of authority through multilateral frameworks rather than the unconstrained exercise of power by individual states. Yet events across the Middle East illustrate the limits of these mechanisms. Diplomatic institutions continue to operate, but their capacity to contain violence or produce durable political settlements appears increasingly constrained in a geopolitical environment marked by growing competition among regional and global powers.

Modi’s February 2026 visit to Israel must therefore be viewed within these wider geopolitical shifts. The trip occurred just before the regional environment moved from uneasy equilibrium to open conflict. In such circumstances, diplomatic engagement signals more than routine bilateral cooperation. It reflects positioning within a regional order shaped by technological partnerships, shifting alliances and intensifying geopolitical rivalry. The visit thus highlights how India’s engagement with Israel intersects with broader transformations unfolding across the Middle East.

For Israel, the present conflict with Iran represents the culmination of a long-standing strategic rivalry that has increasingly shaped its security doctrine. Iranian nuclear ambitions, ballistic missile development and the expansion of Iran’s regional proxy networks have long been viewed as the principal strategic challenge facing Israel. Iranian influence extending through Lebanon, Syria and Iraq has gradually created a network of armed actors capable of exerting sustained military pressure on Israeli territory. From Israel’s perspective, recent strikes on Iranian facilities were therefore not merely tactical operations but part of a broader strategy aimed at weakening Iran’s military capabilities and limiting its regional reach.

India confronts a different set of strategic considerations. For decades, it has pursued a policy of strategic equilibrium in the Middle East, maintaining relations simultaneously with Israel, Iran and the Arab states. This approach reflects a combination of economic, geopolitical and social considerations. The Gulf region remains central to India’s energy security, supplying a substantial share of its oil and gas imports, while maritime routes linking the Arabian Sea with the Persian Gulf constitute vital arteries of Indian trade. Millions of Indian citizens live and work across Gulf states, creating dense economic and social linkages between India and the region.

Within this framework, India’s relationship with Israel has expanded steadily since the early 1990s, particularly in areas such as defence technology, surveillance systems and agricultural innovation. The partnership has become increasingly significant for India’s technological modernisation in fields including unmanned systems, missile defence and cybersecurity. At the same time, India has sought to preserve functional relations with Iran and maintain strong economic ties with Gulf states. The widening hostilities between Israel and Iran, therefore, place India in a complex diplomatic position in which strategic cooperation with Israel must be balanced against wider regional interests.

The conflict carries wider regional implications. Iranian retaliatory strikes against United States military installations across the Gulf have affected several Arab states, raising concerns about the expanding geographic scope of the violence. In some instances, missile and drone attacks have struck locations in countries that have historically attempted to maintain neutral or mediating roles in regional diplomacy. Such developments risk intensifying long-standing Arab–Persian tensions and potentially reviving sectarian rivalries that have shaped regional politics for centuries.

Maritime geopolitics further complicates the situation. The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the most critical chokepoints in the global energy system, carrying a substantial share of the world’s seaborne oil exports. Any disruption to maritime traffic through this corridor immediately affects global energy markets and international shipping networks. For India, whose energy imports depend heavily on Gulf suppliers, stability in this maritime space remains of direct strategic importance.

The crisis raises broader questions about the evolving geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. The region is no longer shaped solely by traditional alliances or by the strategic dominance of any single external power. China has steadily expanded its diplomatic and economic footprint across the Gulf through infrastructure investment, energy partnerships and mediation initiatives, most notably the 2023 rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran that restored diplomatic relations between the two rivals. Russia, despite the constraints imposed by the war in Ukraine, continues to retain influence through its military presence in Syria and its diplomatic engagement with multiple regional actors. These developments point toward a more multipolar regional environment in which external powers compete for influence while regional states pursue increasingly flexible alignments.

Several questions remain unresolved. Will Iran’s internal political order stabilise after the removal of its Supreme Leader, or will competing centres of authority emerge within the Islamic Republic? Will Israel’s attempt to reshape the regional balance of power weaken Iran’s network of influence or instead trigger a prolonged cycle of hostilities? How will Gulf states safeguard the stability of their global cities and energy infrastructures after missile and drone strikes reached urban and economic centres across the region?

In an increasingly multipolar Middle East where China, Russia and other external actors expand their presence, how will states such as India position themselves between strategic partnerships, energy dependencies and shifting geopolitical alignments? Equally important, how will Modi’s visit to Israel be interpreted across the region, particularly in the Gulf and in Iran, at a moment when Iranian retaliation has directly affected several Arab states and heightened regional sensitivity to diplomatic signalling and strategic perception?

Their answers have the potential to shape both the course of the present conflict and the future balance of power in the Middle East.

Priya Singh is an Associate Director at Asia in Global Affairs. The views expressed here are personal.

References

Fawaz A. Gerges, ISIS: A History. Princeton University Press, 2016.