Building Bridges for Peace & Prosperity: Thailand, Southeast Asia and India – In conversation with Warisa Intaratana

Sanjay Pulipaka (Chairperson, Politeia Research Foundation, India) interviewed Warisa Intaratana (Independent Researcher, Thailand) on recent political and security developments pertaining to Southeast Asia and Thailand. The conversation covered RCEP and its impact, Trump’s tariffs on Southeast Asian economies, the recent ASEAN Summit, developments in Myanmar, and India’s relationship with ASEAN and Thailand. The following is the transcript of the email conversation.

Sanjay Pulipaka: What has been the impact of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which came into effect in 2022, on Southeast Asian economies?

Warisa Intaratana: As the world’s largest free trade agreement, covering 15 Asia-Pacific economies (all ten ASEAN member states plus China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand), RCEP sets regulations for trade liberalisation through the planned elimination of approximately 90 per cent of tariffs over a 20-year period. Beyond tariff reduction, the agreement promotes trade and investment facilitation by streamlining customs procedures, enhancing regulatory transparency, and incorporating provisions on investment, intellectual property (IP), competition policy, and e-commerce.

As a multilateral, rules-based trade framework, RCEP is expected to support growth in intra-ASEAN trade, deepen regional supply-chain integration, and expand opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to participate in regional value chains. However, in practice, disparities remain among member states in the pace and scope of liberalisation—particularly in services sectors—which may affect trade flows and productivity gains in less developed economies within the bloc.

Sanjay Pulipaka: In the past few years, what have been the opportunities and challenges of RCEP for Thailand?

Warisa Intaratana: For Thailand, RCEP presents several opportunities. Harmonised rules of origin allow local firms to source regional inputs more efficiently and access broader East Asian markets, particularly Japan, South Korea, and China. This has the potential to enhance Thailand’s export performance in sectors such as agriculture, food processing, and manufacturing. At the same time, as a medium-sized economy, Thailand faces intensified competition in areas such as e-commerce and advanced manufacturing, where domestic firms may be comparatively less competitive.

Sanjay Pulipaka: What has been the impact of President Trump’s tariffs on Southeast Asian economies in general and Thailand in particular? Has RCEP helped Southeast Asian countries address these challenges?

Warisa Intaratana: President Trump’s tariff policies—particularly reciprocal and unilateral trade measures—have had notable short-term impacts on Southeast Asian economies with high export exposure to the United States or persistent trade surpluses, including Thailand. In response, many Southeast Asian countries have pursued bilateral negotiations with the United States to mitigate tariff impacts on specific sectors.

While RCEP is not designed as an immediate countermeasure to U.S. tariff policies, it contributes to long-term regional resilience by deepening economic integration and reinforcing a predictable, rules-based trade environment among its members. More broadly, Southeast Asian countries are increasingly adjusting their economic security policies to manage the spillover effects of U.S.–China trade tensions, including tighter controls over supply chains, technology transfer, and sensitive trade flows, informed by assessments of geopolitical risk.

Sanjay Pulipaka: What are the key takeaways from President Donald Trump’s recent participation in the ASEAN Summit?

Warisa Intaratana: One significant outcome of the ASEAN Summit was the announcement of a ceasefire agreement between Cambodia and Thailand—often referred to as the “Kuala Lumpur Peace Accords”—aimed at ending renewed border hostilities. This development can be viewed both as part of President Trump’s personal diplomacy, emphasising conflict de-escalation, and as a reflection of increased U.S. engagement in the Mekong sub-region, which is strategically important for regional stability and competition with China.

Effective de-escalation, however, will depend on follow-through measures, including humanitarian demining, efforts to prevent and suppress transnational organised crime (particularly cyber scams and human trafficking), and continued border demarcation and boundary negotiations through existing bilateral mechanisms.

Economically, the summit also highlighted U.S. priorities on economic security. For example, a separate memorandum of understanding was signed between the United States and Thailand to strengthen cooperation on critical minerals and semiconductor supply chains.

Sanjay Pulipaka: How should we interpret President Trump’s repeated references to a “G2” framework with China? How are Southeast Asian countries viewing this narrative?

Warisa Intaratana: Following President Trump’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 2025 APEC Summit in Busan, President Trump characterised the encounter as a “G2 meeting,” referencing tentative agreements to reduce selected U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods and establish an extendable one-year arrangement on rare earth supply cooperation.

The “G2” narrative reflects the Trump administration’s framing of China as a principal economic competitor and strategic rival, shifting emphasis from ideological confrontation to managing competition in trade, technology, and supply chains, as outlined in the 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy. It also underscores President Trump’s preference for bilateral, deal-based diplomacy over multilateral trade governance.

From a Southeast Asian perspective, however, this framing raises concerns. Given the region’s deep economic interdependence with multiple partners, ASEAN member states—including Thailand—have historically favoured inclusive, multilateral frameworks such as RCEP rather than exclusive power-centric arrangements that risk marginalising smaller states and limiting their influence in regional decision-making.

Sanjay Pulipaka: Given growing uncertainty in relations with major powers such as the United States, are Southeast Asian countries seeking to diversify ties with partners like India?

Warisa Intaratana: Amid intensifying strategic competition among major powers—spanning military, economic, and technological domains—and the weakening effectiveness of multilateral mechanisms due to declining consensus, medium and small states increasingly seek to strengthen cooperation with one another. This cooperation potentially takes two forms: first, enhancing collective capacity to address transnational security threats and disasters; and second, reinforcing interactions grounded in a rules-based international order.

Since the early 2020s, India’s engagement with Southeast Asia has evolved toward broader and more comprehensive partnerships encompassing both economic and geopolitical dimensions, supported by increasingly institutionalised cooperation mechanisms. Bilaterally, India has elevated relations to Strategic Partnerships with several Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore (2015), and more recently Thailand and the Philippines (2025). These partnerships share common areas such as defence industry cooperation, security and intelligence exchange, domain awareness, counter-terrorism, transnational crime prevention, maritime security, infrastructure connectivity, and the digital economy. Indonesia and Vietnam have similarly expanded security cooperation with India along comparable lines.

At the multilateral level, India–ASEAN relations have progressed from a dialogue partnership in 1992 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022, aligning with ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific and India’s Act East Policy, including the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Engagement has expanded beyond political dialogue to include economic cooperation, security, connectivity, and people-to-people exchanges. India’s active participation in ASEAN-led mechanisms—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference + India, and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus)—reinforces ASEAN centrality in the evolving regional architecture

Sanjay Pulipaka: Could you please explain India’s political and economic engagement with ASEAN countries?

Warisa Intaratana: India’s engagement with ASEAN can be illustrated through three interrelated dimensions.

First, India serves as a strategic connector between Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean community. India plays a leading role in safeguarding economic, transport, and energy sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, while actively promoting cooperation through multilateral mechanisms such as BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). For example, these platforms facilitate formulation of coordinated guidelines on maritime law enforcement, information sharing, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR. Collectively, they contribute to strengthening a rules-based international order at the operational level—from peacetime cooperation to crisis response—and offer interfaces that can complement and reinforce existing and emerging ASEAN-led initiatives from the Southeast Asian region.

Second, India has deepened defence and security engagement with Southeast Asian countries, alongside growing linkages in defence research and development supply chains. This reflects increasing trust and shared interest in capacity-building to address common transnational challenges. By 2025, India and several Southeast Asian partners had expanded joint military exercises across multiple formats. In Thailand’s case, these include bilateral activities such as the Indo–Thai Coordinated Patrol (CORPAT) and Exercise MAITREE-XIV, as well as multilateral exercises such as the Singapore–India–Thailand Maritime Exercise (SITMEX) in 2025. On the defence supply side, India has supported regional cooperation through initiatives such as the ASEAN–India Science and Technology Development Fund (AISTDF), which promotes collaborative R&D in priority areas including artificial intelligence, marine and materials science, research connectivity, and training. India has also emerged as an increasingly important partner in defence technology transfer, including in maritime security-related capabilities in the region.

Third, India and ASEAN hold significant potential to expand trade and investment in strategically important sectors. ASEAN is one of India’s major trading partners, with bilateral trade reaching approximately USD 122.67 billion in 2023–24. From Thailand’s perspective, there are opportunities to deepen economic cooperation with India in areas such as sustainable construction, real estate development, and e-commerce platforms, aligning trade expansion with long-term development priorities.

Sanjay Pulipaka: What has been the effect of the political turmoil in Myanmar on Thailand?

Warisa Intaratana: As an immediate neighbour, Thailand has faced multifaceted challenges arising from Myanmar’s post-2021 coup situation, spanning regional stability, security spillovers, and humanitarian concerns. Thailand’s approach to Myanmar has been framed around five key pillars:

Support for ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus as the principal diplomatic framework aimed at the cessation of violence and conflict resolution through constructive dialogue.
Humanitarian engagement to alleviate suffering and facilitate diplomatic space, including responses following the March 2025 earthquake.
Addressing regional security spillovers, particularly along the Thai–Myanmar border, which has informed Thailand’s participation in ASEAN led dialogues.
Advocacy for inclusive dialogue, recognising the need for engagement across political divides in Myanmar.
International cooperation through ASEAN, the UN General Assembly, and other multilateral platforms to support peace, stability, and humanitarian outcomes.

Among these concerns, Thailand—working closely with regional partners—has prioritised mitigating spillover effects from Myanmar’s conflict, particularly illegal activities and destabilisation risks along the border. A key challenge has been transnational organised crime, notably cyber scam operations that exploit legal and enforcement gaps in conflict zones and traffic victims into forced labour for online fraud.

In 2025, the Thai government launched a series of interventions, including disrupting criminal infrastructure, strengthening border screening to identify individuals at risk of trafficking, and repatriating victims through the National Referral Mechanism in coordination with foreign embassies.

International coordination has been a critical component of these efforts. Thailand has engaged bilaterally and multilaterally—including through ASEAN Summits, the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, and cooperation with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Most recently, Thailand and UNODC co-hosted the International Conference on the Global Partnership against Online Scams in Bangkok on 17–18 December 2025, bringing together over 400 participants from 67 countries to enhance global coordination against online scam networks. As a concrete follow-up, at the 2026 World Economic Forum in Switzerland, Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow joined a strategic discussion on ‘From Data to Collective Action Against Forced Labour.’ He advocated for a ‘Data-driven Partnership’ to address forced labour, emphasising the need for efficient, real-time data sharing across borders and various sectors. On the other hand, the Royal Thai Police launched Scam and Human Trafficking Information Exchange and Linked Database (SHIELD), a platform designed to enable proactive intelligence sharing and coordinated law enforcement with international partners.

Sanjay Pulipaka: What specific areas would you suggest for India to further engage with ASEAN countries?

Warisa Intaratana: While existing India–ASEAN cooperation already covers a broad spectrum of comprehensive security, further engagement could be considered in three areas to support sustainable regional development over the long term.

First, cooperation in countering transnational crime should be enhanced to support growing regional interaction driven by economic and transport connectivity. This includes maritime routes under the BIMSTEC Master Plan for Transport Connectivity, the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway, and financial connectivity initiatives such as Project Nexus. Immediate shared challenges—particularly those linked to instability in Myanmar—include drug trafficking from the Golden Triangle and organised cyber scam networks. These issues could be addressed through sustained joint operations and intelligence cooperation under the existing bilateral arrangements and multilateral mechanisms.

Second, joint capacity-building in cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection should be prioritised, particularly in support of expanding digital connectivity. In the context of submarine cable protection, ASEAN has already taken steps toward harmonising best practices through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Digital Ministers’ Meeting and the adoption of the 2019 ASEAN Guidelines for Strengthening the Resilience and Repair of Submarine Cables, which are aligned with standards of the International Cable Protection Committee. India’s engagement in this domain would complement ASEAN’s existing efforts by leveraging its maritime security infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, thereby strengthening regional resilience against both accidental disruptions and malicious interference with critical undersea communications.

Third, India and ASEAN could deepen cooperation on disaster preparedness and response, particularly for large-scale, cross-border disasters exacerbated by climate change. This could include exchanges on crisis coordination mechanisms and enhanced collaboration with regional institutions such as the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre).

Sanjay Pulipaka: What roles do BIMSTEC and the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation play in India–Thailand relations?

Warisa Intaratana: Both BIMSTEC and the Mekong–Ganga Cooperation serve as important mechanisms for strengthening connectivity between the Bay of Bengal and the Mekong sub-region across physical infrastructure, digital networks, and people-to-people exchanges. Projects such as the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway exemplify this multidimensional connectivity.

BIMSTEC has undergone a notable “security turn,” with growing potential to positively shape regional cooperation by establishing networks and coordination mechanisms to address transnational threats—from organised crime to maritime security. This evolving security cooperation contributes to shared sustainable development objectives and supports the long-term trajectory of India–Thailand relations within a broader regional context.

On the other hand, Thailand recognises the potential of this framework to bridge the regional development gap, particularly through the promotion of sustainable development and good governance under the Bio-Circular-Green (BCG) Economy concept. Consequently, the MGC serves as a strategic platform to communicate and drive joint initiatives that address transboundary human security challenges of common concerns. This concept of cooperation is particularly timely as the sub-region currently faces pressing issues such as water resource management and transboundary haze pollution.

*****

Warisa Intaratana is an independent researcher based in Thailand. Warisa has expertise in maritime security and ocean governance, disarmament and non-proliferation, and Thai and Southeast Asian security. Her experience includes working on maritime cooperation within frameworks such as ASEAN, BIMSTEC, ReCAAP, and bilateral initiatives. Warisa holds a Master of Arts in International Conflict Studies from King’s College London with support from the UK government’s Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) Chevening Scholarship (2016-2017), and a Bachelor of Political Science from Thammasat University, Thailand.