PLA Purges – Assessing Through Confirmation Bias?

Captain (IN) TSV Ramana (Retd.)
China’s defence ministry on Saturday (24 January 2026) announced that senior military officials Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli have been investigated for suspected serious disciplinary and legal violations. Zhang is a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). Liu is a member of the CMC and chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department. The decision to place them under investigation was made by the CPC Central Committee, according to the ministry.
This news is only the latest in a series of such purges reported within the Chinese PLA. At least 21 senior officers appear to have been purged or replaced since 2024.
News of this nature is often accepted, apparently, without passing it through the filters of verification, and motives for the ‘purge’ are freely speculated upon. Many times, there are news reports and social media posts in which the author(s) state that certain sources from within China or former Chinese nationals (now residing abroad) have provided the details of the reasons behind the purges of various high-ranking and senior military officials and politicians.
Official media releases typically only indicate the broad reasons for a particular individual’s removal or purge. For instance, in the present case of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, the media
release states that they are being investigated for suspected serious disciplinary and legal violations.
However, the so-called ‘sources’ seem to have access to highly sensitive information, including the exact reasons certain individuals were purged and, at times, the precise sequence of events that have taken place, which they can easily send abroad without being caught. The famed ‘great firewall of China’ seems to spectacularly fail in these instances.
Interestingly, one aspect that has been highlighted (almost with glee) is that the purges of CMC members and senior military commanders have catastrophically weakened the PLA, and that the PLA’s combat effectiveness is now almost degraded to a level where it is incapable of undertaking any kind of military operation.
If one were to assume that the removal or purge of the senior military commanders has indeed affected the basic functioning of the PLA, it seems strange that the daily news items appearing in various official, semi-official and social media sources indicate that ships are being commissioned, military exercises are taking place, milestones are being reported by various defence industrial entities in China, foreign visits are taking place and other such activities that are indicative of the fact that the ‘system’ seems to be functioning.
So, who in the PLA system (assuming the head of a particular entity has been purged) is issuing the necessary orders for these activities to occur? It is obvious that such activities will require someone to authorise them, monitor them, allocate resources, conduct inspections and ensure that stated targets are met. Why has everything not collapsed?
Further, in the Chinese political system, anyone who reaches the position of General Secretary of the CPC, President, Chairman of the CMC, etc., cannot simply parachute into those positions. They (as Xi Jinping has done) have to rise from the grassroots level.
Certain questions therefore, arise: –
- Is Xi Jinping unaware of the so-called ‘catastrophic’ consequences of his actions, in spite of his extensive experience? This seems baffling.
- Is the removal/purge of various high-ranking commanders happening without any thought to alternative arrangements being in place? This is obviously illogical.
- How does highly sensitive and top-secret information related to these purges leak out of China, with detailed analyses, whereas input on even basic issues is not available? The irony of this is not visible?
Many analysts seem to be avoiding the scepticism (that should ideally follow such news) regarding the assessment of the PLA’s degraded combat capability, simply because it makes life easy for China’s adversaries.
Further, over the years, the growing tribe of China analysts, researchers, watchers and enthusiasts worldwide have often emphasised that China excels in grand strategy, strategy, deception, the continuation of policies, the ability to formulate ultra-long-term plans, and the systematic, deliberate pursuit of its goals. This is, to some extent, reflected in China’s progress across all fronts defined by the ‘four modernisations’, namely, agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology. So, how can it be that, in the case of these so-called ‘purges’, the strategic acumen of the Chinese system is deemed to have failed completely to assess the consequences?
Since Zhang Youxia was the Vice Chairman of the CMC, it is natural that a thorough background check would have been conducted before his appointment to that position. In any country, high officials holding sensitive positions are always under intense scrutiny by the relevant intelligence agencies. To suggest that Zhang Youxia passed ‘nuclear secrets’ to the USA seems far-fetched. What could these ‘nuclear secrets’ be? As part of the P-5, certain information is shared between the nuclear powers regarding nuclear assets. Yes, it is theoretically possible, but there is no certainty on this.
Incidentally, this is not the first time a purge of high-ranking generals has occurred in China. During Mao’s time, China experienced the ‘Marshal Lin Biao incident.’ Lin Biao was even more exalted than Zhang Youxia. However, China did not collapse. Similarly, Stalin’s famous purge in Russia, prior to the German invasion during World War II, was certainly destabilising but did not result in total collapse; the Russians eventually regained momentum and won the war.
Whenever high-ranking generals in senior positions are removed or purged, it is obvious that vacancies are created that could then be filled by others waiting in the wings. So, ideally, there would be many generals in the PLA who are beginning to hope that they could now have an opportunity to be elevated to these positions. Hence, before concluding that the entire command and control of the PLA has disintegrated, that the senior officers and rank and file of the ‘Zhang Youxia faction’ would create difficulties, and that it will be difficult to conduct military operations, one may need to be cautious.
It is highly possible that there may be kernels of truth in some of the news regarding these purges, and maybe there are reasons to believe that PLA has been negatively impacted, but extrapolating it to extreme conclusions like the total degradation of the PLA and nullification of the combat effectiveness is fraught with risk.
One of the reasons why the news of purges and associated assessment of the weakening of the PLA’s combat effectiveness seemingly generates ready acceptance is that it is exactly what we want to hear. It seems to be a classic case of confirmation bias.
***
* Captain TSV Ramana (Retd.) is a former Indian Navy Officer and a pioneer of the Indian Navy’s analytical studies vis-à-vis China, with extended tenures in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Headquarters, the China Cell at the National Maritime Foundation, at the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC) as part of the ‘Strategic Maritime Assessment Team (SMAT) – China’ and the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS). He is a qualified Mandarin interpreter from the School of Foreign Languages at New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.































