Strategic Communication on ‘Border Villages of China and India: A Tale of Two Villages’

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Border area development has been one of the major areas of focus for countries sharing long borders with one another, driven mostly by security reasons. However, China’s approach and tactics to develop its border areas, particularly along its borders with India, raises serious concerns from both the security and strategic perspectives. China has labelled its border area development efforts in terms of developing ‘xiaokang’ villages, an innocuous concept for its largely malign intentions and with clear external policy goals centred on coercion and encroachment. In contrast, India’s ‘vibrant’ villages model has been an effort oriented towards greater integration of the border areas with the mainland of the country and raising the standard of living of people residing in the border areas.

In China, the concept of ‘xiaokang’ (well-off) society was revitalised by Deng Xiaoping in December 1979, linking it to the ‘Four Modernisations – agriculture, industry, defence and science and technology’ programme. The stated goal was economic – to realise equal distribution of wealth among the Chinese society. However, Chinese President Xi Jinping has widely implemented a convoluted concept of ‘xiaokang’ village in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), including in the India-China border area, with a skewed emphasis on wolf-warrior offensive strategies and ethnic cleansing. The underpinnings of this became evident from the new Land Border Law that President Xi brought into effect since 1st January, 2022.

Articles 10 and 43 of the said law, in particular, challenge the status quo between India and China as far as infrastructure development in border areas is concerned. It inter alia, states that ‘the state shall take effective measures to strengthen border defence construction…’ Article 43 unabashedly lays down that ‘The state supports the construction of border towns, improve the border town system, improve the function of border towns and strengthens support capacity building.’

Such efforts by China to build infrastructure around the India-China border areas precede those of India by several decades. While the stated goals appear overtly noble, the underlying reasons have been clearly malicious for a number of reasons. Firstly, these xiaokang villages are located very close to the India-China and Bhutan-China borders. Some of the villages are even being developed in the contested area around the Doklam Plateau. The capture of disputed territories by stealth appears to be China’s tactic here. Secondly, in the TAR region, the traditional inhabitants are Tibetans. However, in the guise of ‘xiaokang villages, China aims to settle Han Chinese, preferably the retired military personnel from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in these villages. This serves four strategic purposes for China: 0ne, the retired PLA personnel would serve as the eyes and ears of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and PLA; second, enhance cultural exchanges and intermingling between the Han Chinese and Tibetans which in the long term would keep a check on pro-Dalai Lama and other hostile elements among the Tibetans; third ethnic cleansing of the indigenous population in XUAR (Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region) and Tibet; and fourth, all the above can be a force multiplier for strategic purposes, should the need arise. In other words, through such efforts, China is gradually ensuring the implementation of its ‘Sinicization’ plans and improving the legitimacy of the CCP-approved Lamas like the Panchen Lama. Alternately, by populating these remote and contested locations with the Han Chinese, ‘xiaokang’ villages serve as a cover for Chinese efforts to make future territorial claims based on the argument of not disturbing ‘settled populations’ along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), as agreed upon in the 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary question.

Further, xiaokang village development exercise has been used by China as a cover for blatant violation of human rights and exploitation of Tibetans in the TAR region. Reports suggest that the Chinese government has forced over two millionTibetan nomads out of their lands and sent them to live in appalling barrack-like conditions in so called ‘urban settlements.’ Moreover, in their own homeland, the Tibetans are discriminated against as preference is given to the migrant Han population for jobs leading to the former’s economic marginalisation. The Tibetans’ traditional lands, rich in minerals and natural resources are being exploited by the Chinese for commercial gains. The most sensitive issue has been the gradual weaning of the Tibetan language from the local school system and its gradual replacement by the Chinese language as the sole medium of instruction. In short, as in XUAR, the Chinese state has been working towards irreversible demographic changes in Tibet, wherein the share of the Han Chinese in the local population has risen to 12 per cent over the last decade, the influx of Hans continues, and the new generation of Tibetans are being deliberately kept away from their roots and language, thereby eradicating the distinct cultural identity of the Tibetans in their own land.

The Chinese insidious designs are in sharp contrast to India’s recent efforts to promote economic development in the villages along its northern borders. India’s focus on providing economic support to its border villages and prioritising infrastructure development has got focused attention in recent years. It was only in 2006 that the Indian government adopted a plan to build 73 border roads. Since then, infrastructure development along India’s borders has steadily picked up. In 2022, a major impetus for the economic development of India’s border villages came from the announcement of the Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP) announced by the Finance Minister in the Budget Speech 2022-23. The VVP programme “envisages coverage of border villages on the northern borders having a sparse population, limited connectivity and infrastructure, which possibly have often got left out from the development gains” accruing to the rest of the nation. In February 2023, India’s Cabinet approved a total of Rs 4800 crores (approx. USD 580.72 million) for the said programme over the next four years (2022-23 to 2025-26). About 2900 villages are targeted to be covered under the programme. The key outcomes of the initiative would be improving the standard of living of the people in these areas by providing “connectivity with all-weather roads, drinking water, 24×7 electricity-solar and wind energy, mobile and internet connectivity, tourism, health and wellness centres.” Unlike the Chinese tactics of uprooting the local Tibetan population, ‘vibrant villages’ would be working to prevent the out-migration of people from their homes to the interior urban settlements of India and provide them with modern-day opportunities at their doorsteps.

In sharp contrast to the all-pervading Chinese State and PLA that dictates activities in the ‘xiaokang villages,’ the ‘vibrant villages’ in India are envisaged under a ‘hub and spoke’ model wherein the local district administration and the gram panchayats would be drawing out the ‘Vibrant Village Action Plans,’ with the role of the Union Government being limited to disbursal of funds. These Action Plans would “identify and develop the regional economic drivers based on the border villages’ local natural, human and other resources.” It also seeks to develop growth centres on the ‘hub and spoke’ model “through the promotion of social entrepreneurship, empowerment of youth and women through skill development and entrepreneurship,” leveraging the tourism potential and development of sustainable eco-agribusiness. The initiative also aspires to work towards the convergence of all schemes for the people of the border villages, provide livelihood opportunities to achieve inclusive growth and enhance the standard as well as the quality of lives of the people in the region.

In addition to the VVP, the Indian Government has also been taking steps for all-round development of the border regions. Implementation of the ‘Aspirational Districts’ programme across the country since 2018 that focuses on socio-economic aspects like “health and nutrition, education, agriculture and water resources, financial inclusion and skill development and basic infrastructure,” included some of the less developed districts in the border areas as well. Large infrastructure projects that have been either announced or are already under implementation include the Frontier Highway Project, Frontier Railway Project, hydropower projects like those in Dibang and Kameng, an airport at Donyi Polo etc. All of these projects are an essential component of Gross Budgetary Assistance (GBA) amounting to about Rs 11,000 crores (approx. USD 1.3 billion) for the holistic development of the northeastern region. Unlike China, India has been consistently furthering its policy on protecting and promoting distinct tribal identities, their language and culture and taking effective steps to bring them to the forefront.

Overall, China with its ‘xiaokong villages’ and India, through its ‘vibrant villages’ have widely contrasting approaches and intentions. It is indeed a ‘tale of two villages’ with entirely different trajectories. China’s strategically coloured blinkers make it view even rudimentary efforts of India for the economic development of its border villages with serious concern and possible security threat. However, this is the farthest from reality. India’s initiatives for its border villages have been long-overdue efforts at providing the people in the border areas equal opportunities for growth and development. Such efforts are integral part of the country’s nation-building efforts and are largely a domestic matter without an external agenda. It is high time China comes to terms with this reality and, if at all, reconsiders its belligerent attitude along the borders.

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