PLA Exercises Off Taiwan – Are We Reading It Right?
Capt (IN) TSV Ramana (Retd.)*
China commenced an exercise codenamed ‘Mission Justice-2025’ off Taiwan on 29 December 2025 and subsequently announced its completion on 31 December 2025.1 New Year 2026 was therefore heralded with excitement among China analysts worldwide.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted many exercises off Taiwan. However, the four exercises that have been particularly noticed by China watchers have been those conducted from 04 to 07 August 2022, following the visit of US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan; Joint Sword 2024 A, held from 23 to 24 May 2024, just three days after President Lai Ching-te’s inauguration and his remarks underscoring Taiwan’s sovereignty; Joint Sword 2024 B, held on 14 October 2024, just four days after President Lai Ching-te’s National Day speech declaring that ‘China has no right to represent Taiwan’; and “Justice Mission 2025 drills’ from 29 to 31 December 2025, against the backdrop of increasingly frequent collusion between the United States and Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party authorities.
One of the images that has been particularly playing on the minds of all China analysts is as shown below: – 4
(Image source: see note 4)
The above image depicts a series of areas (boxes) within which the Chinese PLA deployed its units and totally surrounded Taiwan. The narrative that seems to have taken hold is that these exercises are a part of the rehearsals for a future invasion of Taiwan.
Further, the analysis of these exercises usually covers many aspects, such as: –
- the number of PLA(N) and China Coast Guard (CCG) units detected
- the distance at which these units reportedly operated from the territorial waters of Taiwan or the contiguous zone, whether the territorial waters or the contiguous zone was breached, the number of Chinese aircraft detected and whether these aircraft crossed the median line or intruded into the ADIZ
- the number of missiles/rockets, etc. that were fired
- how the Chinese units deployed in the promulgated exercise areas are in fact practising for a blockade of Taiwanese ports or exercising the mechanics of a quarantine of Taiwan
- the message that China is sending through these exercises
- a comparison of the current exercise with previous exercises in terms of duration, participation, the number of units, types of units and aims of the exercise, and many other such factors, depending on the areas of interest of the concerned analyst.
What are the challenges with this kind of narrative that is building around these exercises? The fact that China wants to reunite Taiwan is a given and does not require any examination. However, the issue is when and by what means?
One of the core tasks of intelligence analysts is to assess an adversary’s capability and intent. Normally, it would be comparatively easier to assess an adversary’s capability than their intent. This is primarily because there are certain tangible indicators that can be used to assess capability. Assessing intent is usually more difficult.
Interestingly, when it comes to Taiwan, China has clearly stated its intent for reunification and also the manner in which it is willing to do it. Some of these statements are explicitly stated in the white papers released by China in 2000, 2002, 2004, 2019, and 2025. The salient aspects mentioned in these white papers are reproduced in succeeding paragraphs.
“The Chinese government seeks to achieve the reunification of the country by peaceful means, but will not commit itself not to resort to force.” 5
“However, if a grave turn of events occurs leading to the separation of Taiwan from China in any name, or if Taiwan is invaded and occupied by foreign countries, or if the Taiwan authorities refuse, sine die, the peaceful settlement of cross- Straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will have no choice but to adopt all drastic measures possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and achieve the great cause of reunification.” 6
“The Chinese government will, in keeping with the basic principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” and the eight-point proposal on developing cross-Straits relations and advancing the process of peaceful national reunification at the present stage, strive for prospects of peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and the maximum effort. But it will not forswear the use of force. 7
“We will never allow anyone to split Taiwan from China through whatever means. Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of “Taiwan independence,” the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.” 8
“We make no promise to renounce the use of force, and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.”9
“China has always strived for peaceful reunification with the utmost sincerity and effort, but it will never promise to renounce the use of force and reserve the option of taking all necessary measures.”10
Interestingly, the 2019 white paper also states the reason for Chinese deployments around Taiwan. It says that “By sailing ships and flying aircraft around Taiwan, the armed forces send a stern warning to the ‘Taiwan independence’ separatist forces.” 11
The above-mentioned white papers can be considered unambiguous statements of intent regarding China’s plans to reunify Taiwan and the purpose of the deployments around Taiwan.
Further, the analyses that usually follow these exercises have many gaps that, if filled, could lead to a different assessment. Some of these factors include: the number of PLA(N)/CCG units/PLAAF/PLANAF aircraft detected versus those that were actually part of the exercise. The fact that 100% of the deployed units were detected seems improbable.
The attention paid to the promulgated areas also seems counterintuitive, as it assumes the Chinese are openly displaying their operational plan to the world at large. Even more intriguing is that the units deployed in these boxes are there to interdict merchant vessels bound for Taiwanese ports. Given the geography involved, China does not need to deploy any units at sea to affect a blockade of Taiwan. This has been amply proven by the Houthis, who have effectively interdicted world trade since November 2023,12without deploying a single warship.
The majority of the analyses also assume that the Chinese effort to reunify Taiwan (using force) will commence with an amphibious invasion. However, what if the amphibious assault were the concluding part of the invasion? Interestingly, none of these exercises seemed to have any significant amphibious aspect (at least none appears to have been highlighted).
Military operational logic dictates that the single most important factor in the success of any Chinese operation against Taiwan would be the involvement of the US and its allies. Hence, speed would be of the essence. If that is the case, then the conduct of blockades and quarantines, etc., would defeat the very purpose of any Chinese plan.
These exercises can at best be seen as part of a signalling strategy that is employed following a trigger, which could take the form of a visit by foreign dignitaries to Taiwan, statements by Taiwanese leaders, or any action(s) deemed inimical by China taken by countries like the United States. There is a need, therefore, to consider whether the intent of these exercises is being interpreted correctly and whether they are indeed part of rehearsals for an impending Chinese invasion.
End Notes:
- “PLA Eastern TheatreCommand successfully completes “Justice Mission 2025” drills.” Xinhua 21:09, December 31, 2025. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1231/c90000-20409311.html
- “Tracker of China’s Military Exercises Around Taiwan.”ASPI. https://www.pressurepoints.aspi.org.au/taiwan-and-the-taiwan-strait/chinas-military-coercion/chinas-large-scale-exercises-since-2022 ( accessed 23 January 2026)
- “Three key takeaways of PLA’s”Justice Mission 2025″ drills around Taiwan.” Xinhua. 08:11, December 31, 2025. https://en.people.cn/n3/2025/1231/c90000-20408708.html
- “China’sDefenseWhite Paper: China’s National Defense, China.org, July 1998”, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/5/index.htm.
- “China’s NationalDefense in 2000”, People’s Daily, 16 October 2000, https://en.people.cn/english/features/NDpaper/nd.html
- “China’s NationalDefensein 2002”, People’s Daily, 09 December 2002, http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd.html
- “China’s NationalDefense in 2004”, China.org, December 2004, http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20041227/
See also: Andrew S Erickson, “China Defense White Papers—1995-2019”
- “China’sDefenseWhite Paper 2019: China’s National Defense in the New Era”, State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 24 July 2019, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html
- In Their Own Words:2025 China’s National Security in the New Era, China Aerospace Studies Institute, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2025-09
- See note 9.
*Captain TSV Ramana (Retd.) is a former Indian Navy Officer and a pioneer of the Indian Navy’s analytical studies vis-à-vis China, with extended tenures in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Headquarters, the China Cell at the National Maritime Foundation, at the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC) as part of the ‘Strategic Maritime Assessment Team (SMAT) – China’ and the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS). He is a qualified Mandarin interpreter from the School of Foreign Languages at New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.
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