China in IOR: The Missing Maritime Reconnaissance Capability?

Captain (IN) TSV Ramana (Retd.)

A PLA Navy (PLA(N)) anti-piracy escort force (APEF) comprising two destroyers and one tanker set sail on 26 December 2008 from Sanya to commence anti-piracy escort operations in the Gulf of Aden. Since then, these deployments have continued unabated, and presently, the 48th APEF is on task in the same region.

China has therefore maintained a continuous presence of task forces comprising three warships from 2009 to date, that is, for 17 years in a row, and this is likely to continue. Incidentally, on 01 August 2017, China also operationalised its first overseas support base at Djibouti.

The number of PLA(N) warships present in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) at any time fluctuates whenever a new APEF is on its way to the Gulf of Aden to relieve the incumbent APEF. Further, sometimes other groups of warships also get deployed to the IOR for various purposes, like goodwill visits, etc. 

Since 2013, China has also periodically deployed both conventional and nuclear submarines to the IOR, purportedly for ‘anti-piracy’ operations. In addition, Chinese hydrographic ships, oceanographic research ships, and space event ships also periodically make their appearance in the IOR. Hence, it is clear that at any given time, China could have a minimum of 03 and a maximum of 06 to 12 ships, or, on certain occasions, a greater number of units operating in the IOR.

Whenever warships/submarines operate at sea, they need to have maritime domain awareness (MDA). This MDA picture, at the bare minimum, includes the locations of both merchant ships, fishing vessels, and other civilian vessels, and also warships of other regional and extra-regional navies operating in the region. This should logically be true for the PLA(N) also.

It is fairly easy to get a picture of all merchant ships, fishing vessels, and other civilian vessels operating at sea using Automatic Identification System (AIS) data. This can be obtained through various commercial sources and is fairly accurate. This is not a problem. Hence, PLA(N) units operating in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere in the IOR would have this picture available to them at all times.

The challenge is to obtain an MDA picture of foreign warships operating in the region. This data is not available via the AIS mode, as warships do not switch on their AIS while on deployments. Ideally, a credible navy would operate its own maritime reconnaissance (MR) aircraft or UAVs to detect contacts at sea that are not transmitting AIS signals. How is the PLA(N) obtaining the MDA picture of foreign warships, both of the regional and extra-regional navies operating in the Gulf of Aden and in other areas of the IOR? 

In the 17 years since China commenced its deployments in the Gulf of Aden, no MR aircraft or UAV has been known to have been deployed in the IOR.  Is there a possibility that Chinese MR aircraft or UAVs have operated in the IOR, and that this information has not been made public? This scenario appears unlikely because the APEF deployments are authorized by relevant UNSC resolutions and constitute a perfectly legal reason for China to deploy its naval units in the Gulf of Aden. Once China has deployed its units and thereafter maintains a continuous presence, there should be no apprehension or debate about why it should not deploy an MR aircraft/UAV to obtain an MDA picture of the region.

The only issue is the access to airfields in the region from where the Chinese MR aircraft/UAV would operate. Has China tried to get this access and failed? Once again, this scenario seems unlikely, since China already has an operational support base in Djibouti and there is no reason for Djibouti to deny China the use of its airfield. Alternatively, the use of airfields in Pakistan for this purpose should be a given. Further, access to airfields in other countries in the region, such as Iran, could also be an option. 

Further, there is no pressing need for China to permanently deploy MR aircraft/UAVs at any of the above-mentioned airfields. These deployments could also follow the pattern akin to that of the APEF deployments. Therefore, the need for secrecy, for China, to deploy MR aircraft/UAVs for the purpose of obtaining MDA, ostensibly for its anti-piracy requirements, does not exist.

However, for the past 17 years, this has not happened. So, how do Chinese warships/submarines operating in the Gulf of Aden and other areas of IOR get the MDA picture of foreign warships? Some may argue that China is using its EO/SAR/ELINT satellites to obtain this picture. Yes, this could be one way to do this, but relying solely on satellites to detect and identify constantly moving warships at sea over a large expanse does not seem a credible option.

The other option is that, if China has entered into maritime intelligence-sharing agreements with various countries in the region, and for obvious reasons, this information is not in the public domain. Once again, this could be one of the options. However, the data China would obtain through these arrangements would be constrained by the surveillance capabilities of the relevant friendly country and is unlikely to be comprehensive. The best option, therefore, for getting this picture is by operating its own MR aircraft/UAV. However, surprisingly, this has not happened.

Would it be correct to assume that China is not interested in getting the MDA picture of foreign warships in IOR and passing it on to its units operating in the region? Considering China’s stated ambitions to be a credible military and naval power, this kind of an approach would be counterintuitive.

Presently, China also has three operational aircraft carriers with ambitions to build more. However, no PLA(N) carrier battle group (CBG) has yet operated in IOR. It is logical to assume that it is a matter of time before a PLA(N) CBG makes a foray into IOR. Would China be comfortable operating a CBG in the IOR without a comprehensive MDA picture in both peacetime and, more importantly, in wartime?

The absence of Chinese MR aircraft/UAVs for surveillance in the IOR and even in the Gulf of Aden does not seem logical. If China aims to maintain a permanent presence in IOR and be considered as a de facto Indian Ocean power akin to that of the United States, then it would need to have its own integral maritime surveillance capability in the region. It appears to be a matter of time, and it is, when? and not if? China deploys MR aircraft/UAVs in IOR. 

As and when China deploys these aerial assets to IOR, this development needs to be seen as a ‘critical battle indicator.’ The mystery of the missing Chinese maritime reconnaissance capability in IOR continues.

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Captain TSV Ramana (Retd.) is a former Indian Navy Officer and a pioneer of the Indian Navy’s analytical studies vis-à-vis China, with extended tenures in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Headquarters, the China Cell at the National Maritime Foundation, at the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC) as part of the ‘Strategic Maritime Assessment Team (SMAT) – China’ and the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS). He is a qualified Mandarin interpreter from the School of Foreign Languages at New Delhi. The views expressed are his own.