In Conversation with Kallol Bhattacherjee: Bangladesh – A Difficult Transition

Sanjay Pulipaka (Chairperson Politeia Research Foundation) interviewed Mr Kallol Bhattacherjee (Senior Assistant Editor at The Hindu) on the political developments in Bangladesh. The conversation covered the functioning of the interim government, the National Consensus Commission, the July Charter, the election strategies of various parties, leadership styles of a few key politicians, regional geopolitical dynamics and a host of other issues in Bangladesh. The following is the transcript of the conversation.

Kallol Bhattacherjee: Well, thank you so much, Sanjay, and it’s an honour and a privilege to be in

conversation with you.Bangladesh, of course, is not, you know, stranger to political turmoil, and it has a particular trajectory in which political turmoil has a tendency to break out in Bangladesh after a certain period of pause. If we look back at the last 50 or 55 years in the history of the region, or even go back in time to 1947. But what was most dramatic this time was actually the fact that Sheikh Hasina, who was known as the leader of the Awami, was known as the street fighter, and she had a reputation for empathy, etc. The fall of her government was understandable. Governments fall in Bangladesh. But then the way she fled the country, I think that was, that was dramatic because, you know, had it displayed that she had little understanding about the timing of her own politics because perhaps she had, in a way got her senses, had perhaps got blunted because she didn’t understand when to really retire from the trajectory that she was in. She was continuously at the helm of affairs for nearly 15 years. And I think, you know, it was really too much for her. And by the time she started talking about the children of the Razakar, that is, all the protesters who were on the streets of Dhaka and other cities, were actually the children of traitors. That was, I think, the turning point, and she should have resigned before that. And yet she went on with the crackdown after that. And that really paved the way for a sort of point of no return. And, you know, Hasina had a reputation. You know, she was a people’s leader. If you look at the two leaders that Bangladesh has witnessed in the last half-century, that is Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Hasina was the street fighter. She was the person who used to hit the streets first. And whether, you know, I’ve been talking about it because she displayed that element of empathy in her character repeatedly. Be it in 1981 when General Zia-ur-Rahman was assassinated in Chittagong, when she left her home in the middle of the night and she wanted to reach Chittagong to see what was happening to General Zia Rehman, or in 1991, when the cyclone hit, you know, even before the relief services had reached the southern part of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina had reached there, and she was standing in the middle of this devastation and water and all sorts of, you know, mud, and she was there. So, for this sort of a leader to have a form so complete in which she had no option but to leave her own country and her own followers, you know, who actually wanted her to stay on and fight. Because I think, you know, that also busted a lot of myths about the leadership that she represented. You know, she represented a legacy of Sheikh Mujib, Tajuddin Ahmed, Nazrul Islam and many others in her party. The whole tradition of Bangladesh was shaped by the Awami League. If I’m not, you know, I’m trying to simplify it a little bit, but then the Awami League was the party of liberation in 1971, and that’s an undisputed fact. And today Awami League is nowhere because of the simple fact that it is not just her government that was uprooted, but also that she had to flee the scene. So I think that when she fled the scene, that was, I think, unforgettable because it proved that it was basically not just a regime change, but perhaps even it’s sort of a threat to the state itself. And it was a complete, complete washout. So, yeah, I think that was the most dramatic thing, you know, in terms of visuals and the political significance of that particular escape. Yeah, I think that was the most important, surprising thing.

Sanjay: While Sheikh Hasina left the country, Mohammed Yunus quickly took over the reins of government and became the chief adviser to the interim government. He’s known for his economic interventions. How do you evaluate his government over the last year, or his governance over the last year or more? Are there any specific economic policies he has introduced? Or was his governance consumed by responding to or managing the troubled transition taking place in Bangladesh?

Kallol: Well, Professor Yunus delivered a speech, I think, on the 7th of June. It was the Eid speech that he delivered. And it was in that speech that he talked about his economic vision and also some of the initiatives that he had taken in the last, you know, months that he was in charge. And it was quite clear that he had a vision. He had a vision for Bangladesh to emerge as some sort of a, you know, connector or some sort of a dynamic, you know, platform for South Asia where it would be meant for, it would be open for investments, and it would be free of corruption. It would have an open market system. And he kept on talking throughout that speech that the previous mega projects that Bangladesh had witnessed were riddled with corruption, and that he was turning those mega projects into inclusive projects of the future. So his idea was that Bangladesh would continue to have massive investment and would have mega projects in the coming years. And he also talked about turning that country’s, you know, maritime sector into the lifeline of the country because Bangladesh has natural ports like in Chittagong and then the upcoming ports like Matabari and others under construction. And he talked about his vision that if Chittagong could be handled in a more effective way than in just one port, one major port could be the reason for Bangladesh’s progress. So he talks about, you know, attracting more investment, and he believes that Bangladesh has become more attractive. And that is also a kind of opinion among certain sections of the West that sees Bangladesh as a more attractive destination for investments. But then, you know, as you said, he has been caught up with the entire issue of reform, etc, that has been part of his main plan. You know, surprisingly, economic development or economic reform was not really one of the three main things that Professor Yunus has been talking about. Professor Yunus’s agenda has been shaped by, number one, justice. That is justice for the killings that took place in July and the first week of August 2024. And then he talked about administrative reform. And finally, he talks about the election. That is, if the reform and the justice are delivered, then they would proceed towards the election. Now these are the three issues that he kept in front of his supporters. But then economic, you know, economic development or economic vision that he had was not really at the forefront when he took charge. So the issue is that without solid law and order, neither election nor economic development can take place. And you know, the, the reason that Bangladesh has witnessed sort of an economic boom in the past, say till 2024 in the, in the 15 years prior to 2024 was because there was an authoritarian system that was ensuring the country would stay on track and the country would ensure that, that some of the goods of this boom would go down to the weaker sections of the people of the society. But that has not been the case ever since he came to power, in the sense that the interim government came to power because what we are witnessing is basically daily instability, though in terms of the attractiveness of the market. It is very much in front of everyone that Bangladesh remains an open market. But then the lack of law and order and the lack of stability in the country is a matter of concern. And I think that is a handicap for the country’s economy as well. So I think his vision, I agree that if Bangladesh can take care of its maritime sector, if it can revive the garment sector once again, which has been hit because of the, decline in orders and other factors, including, you know, difficulties in importing raw materials, those sectors have been hit. But to ensure the revival of these sectors, he needs to revive and revitalise the law and order first of all. And I think that will happen only once we have a stable government in place.

Sanjay: You just referred to the fact that there is a daily instability that is plaguing Bangladesh’s politics and economy. One of the important pillars in Bangladeshi politics has been the military. There have been moments when many people speculated that perhaps now the military will step in, but that has not materialised. Do you think that the military will confine itself to barracks, or there is a larger question that we need to ask: what do you think would be the role of the military in Bangladesh politics moving forward?

Kallol: Well, the Bangladesh military actually has been out of the barracks for quite some time. They have taken charge of the magisterial issues in the country, starting in September 2024. That said, they are not really hands-on in the sense that they are not directly in charge of the affairs of the state. They want the law-and-order authorities to carry out their duties on a daily basis. But the fact is that if you look at the situation on the streets in Bangladesh, you will often find that there is a policeman standing in front without his tools, like without a stick, without a weapon, without even a handgun with him. And behind the police, there will be a military person, or maybe at some distance from the police, there will be a military person. So the military person is armed. But the fact is the Bangladesh military is not so large that it can take care of the Bangladesh police, because the Bangladesh police is really humongous. An organisation which can take care of Bangladesh’s law and order situation. But then, the Bangladesh police are not functioning. And as a result, there is a daily, you know, tendency to basically see the law and order situation break down almost on a daily basis. So, what we are witnessing is that the military has given itself magisterial powers all over the country. And not just all over the country, even in the air, that is, you know, the sky, the aviation. So anything that happens, whether in the skies of Bangladesh or on the waters of Bangladesh or on the territory of Bangladesh, is entirely Bangladesh military. But then it is not directly, you know, in a position to govern the affairs of the state. It has not done that so far because I think, you know, the General felt that it was the best thing to do because there was a popular uprising and there was this government created by the protesters, which was led by Professor Yunus. So it is more like a council of elders or a council of eminent citizens who are more or less in charge, and people are more or less, you know, agreeing with that sort of a setup. So the military sort of stayed away from taking charge directly. But now the big thing is that the election is coming up, and if the Bangladesh authorities can hold the election in the correct way, then perhaps the military will go back to the barracks. And General Waker Zaman has been talking about sending his boys back to the barracks because there is, you know, there is a daily attrition that takes place, you know, when the military is out, because there would be somebody falling sick or someone, you know, getting into a fight. And there are all these incidents that happen when the military is out on the field. And that is also happening to the Bangladesh military, which is known for basically peacekeeping, more like abroad, peacekeeping abroad. So he wants his military to get back to doing what it was doing before. But so far, he has been stuck with the situation because the Bangladesh police and the Bangladesh paramilitary are not fully in control of the situation. So they have to be out on the field for at least three to four months, or at least till the next government is formed and the law-and-order authorities get back in shape.

Sanjay: One of the other issues you mentioned just now is justice for killings. What do you think of the death penalty given to Sheikh Hasina? What do you think of the process? Do you think it will bring closure to the victims of the violence, or do you think it will open up new grievances? What is your opinion on that?

Kallol: Well, we have to really go back in time to July 2024 and look at the way the killings were taking place. You know, there is of course a dispute from the side of Awami League because they allege that some of the killings were committed by the opponents, that is, by Jamat-e-Islami and others. They wanted to defame the government forces for carrying out extrajudicial killings, etc. But then there were a number of killings in those days. For example, when the internet, you will very well remember, the internet was shut down repeatedly in the second fortnight of July and there were killings like, you know, 90 deaths a day and 100 deaths a day happening in 18th, 19th and 20^th  July of 2024. So these require very serious investigation. Number one, I’m not going to get into whether the death sentence was legit or not because I think that is to be evaluated by a thorough judicial system, through a proper legal process. What appears to me at the moment is that this particular legal process, which was of course carried out through the International Crimes Tribunal, was done in a hurry. And the whole internal political process of Bangladesh casts a greater shadow on that particular process of investigation and justice that was carried out by the International Crimes Tribunal. Because the number of deaths that we are talking about is basically in the range of 1400-1600 that the opposition is accusing the government forces of carrying out. After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, there was an unknown number of deaths of policemen that took place. And these deaths also need to be accounted for because the interim government said there were around 44 or 48 policemen who were killed. But then the government sources who are sympathetic to the police also say that these deaths were also of hundreds of policemen who were lynched by mobs and who were killed in that revenge attack, which took place after Sheikh Hasina left. So I think we really have to look for a more thorough investigation. And only then would we know whether this particular judgment given to Sheikh Hasina was the right judgment that one would expect. And one would say that is logical as far as the killings are concerned. I mean, in India, of course, you know, we talk a great deal about the fall of the government of Sheikh Hasina. But then inside Bangladesh, there is a lot of talk about justice for these deaths because, you know, these are their relatives, these are their children who have been shot to death. So there is also public clamour, public demand for justice. And that also has to be taken into account. That, you know, whether we like a death sentence or criticise a death sentence is one matter, but then on the ground, there is a strong, strong urging that these deaths need to be met with justice because these are precious human lives and most of them are very, very young people. So the United Nations investigation came out with the report, and it said that more than 1400 people were shot dead. So you compare it with, in fact, these days I have been comparing these two because Nepal also had an uprising, but Nepal’s uprising had almost like 40 to 50 deaths with hundreds of injured. But then in the case of Bangladesh, there were reportedly 12,000 injuries. So yeah, so you can look at it, it’s almost like a very savage, you know, clash. So it is not just, you know, a very intense fight that took place during those two weeks of confrontation and mostly in the urban centres of Bangladesh. So I think, you know, we have to also because it’s part of the public demand, and their grievances have to be understood. Why do people feel so strongly, because such a large number of people have died.

Sanjay: Indeed, very tragic. While we often discuss Sheikh Hasina, the other important/principal player for quite some time has been Begum Khaleda Zia. She passed away recently. How do you evaluate her politics and her legacy?

Kallol: Well, Khaleda Zia, in fact, had a longer political trajectory than Sheikh Hasina because Sheikh Hasina, of course, left Bangladesh in the late 1970s, from mid 70s to late 1970s till 1981. In fact, on the 13th of May 1981, she returned to Dhaka. But Khalida Zia had already, you know, debuted in politics first as the housewife of Ziaur Rehman. And after Ziaur Rahman’s assassination, she joined active politics. But by that time, she was already well known as the spouse of the president. So, in that sense, I count her political presence at least in the platform of Bangladesh nation-building as a little longer than what Sheikh Hasina was known for. But I would look at not just the entire political duration of Khaleda Zia, but two parts of her politics that really acquire greater relevance because of the situation that Bangladesh is in right now. Number one is of course her struggle in the late 1980s when she was giving leadership to the anti Ershad movement. And number two, when she came out of this political, you know, rather this, she was imprisoned during Hasina’s tenure. So when she came out of prison and the way she spoke about herself and her politics without any bitterness, I mean, Sheikh Hasina left Bangladesh on the 5th of August, and it was very easy for Khaleda Zia to come out, and she was freed on the same day. The same afternoon, she was freed from detention. And the first thing she said was that she has no bitterness towards anybody. And there was the media when she came out, and they asked her this question: Do you feel angry? Don’t you feel angry? And she said no, I have no bitterness towards anybody. Because I think it was not that she was a kind-hearted person. I mean, she was actually politically extremely astute. And she saw that her allies who were with her in the 2001-2006 period, that is, Jamaat-e-Islami, would now emerge as her rivals because her long-term and familiar rival, that is, Hasina, had fled the country. So she, with her wisdom, understood that now I have to sound reconciliatory because I will have old friends as my rivals. So they need to somehow relax, and they need to calm down because they’re not going to be overwhelmed by my leadership. Because she’s a, she was a great leader of the people. She could mobilise the people because she was a kind of mother figure in comparison. Sheikh Hasina was never really perceived as a mother figure, though she also projected her mother as the real mother of Bangladesh. Fazilatunnesa Mujib, Sheikh Mujib’s wife, Sheikh Hasina always talked about her mother as the mother of Bangladesh. But then, for BNP, Khaleda Zia was projected as the mother figure for the country. So Khaleda Zia always had this, you know, healing sort of a personality that she carried. And I think these two aspects, that is number one in how she conducted herself during 1989 to 1990, during the anti-Ershad period as a democrat, which was really the finest period of both Sheikh Hasina as well as, because they both came together and surprisingly even Jamaat-e-Islami supported them because there was such a popular urging for greater accountability and democracy in the country. So I think these two phases of Khaleda Zia’s politics are of significance because these two indicate that even Professor Yunus doesn’t have that sort of healing touch that was displayed last August when she said that she had no bitterness. I mean, Professor Yunus has been rather bitter, though. He’s in charge of the government, and he often talks about fascism, etc, but Khaleda Zia never talked about her rivals in those terms. I mean, she talked about fighting against tyranny, fighting against Operation Military rule, etc. So I think that that touch of reconciliation and the touch of, you know, taking everyone along is something that Khalida’s legacy would be remembered for now in this present circumstances.

Sanjay: I think now Tarique Rahman will take over the reins of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) for the next election. But before we move on to that, quick thoughts on what the politics and the principles of the National Consensus Commission that was constituted and the July Charter that came out. What do you think will be its impact on the forthcoming elections?

Kallol: Well, the July Charter was basically an outcome, as you mentioned, of the National Consensus Commission. And the National Consensus Commission is part of these two commissions that led the anti-Hasina movement. One was the Anti-Discrimination Commission, the other was the National Citizens Commission. So these, these, these two commissions were used in a sense, to mobilise the protesters against the, the oppressive government of Hasina in July, August 2024. And then they created the Consensus Commission. But then we have to remember that the election is not just the election of the ruling party or the ones who are going to govern. The day of the election is also going to be the day of the referendum on the July Charter. And the July Charter. Yeah. And the July Charter is essentially a charter or a set of goals or principles that will reshape the state of Bangladesh. And here we have some of the most significant things. For example, even at the beginning, Bangladesh is known for its, you know, language nationalism, because that is the root of the origin of Bangladesh after the formation of Pakistan, because Pakistan was formed, and Muhammad Ali Jinnah came to Dhaka and said that everybody should start speaking Urdu. And with that Urdu started the problem that Bangladesh should speak its own language. That’s Bangla. But in this particular July Charter, you will see that it starts with recognizing not just Bangla, but also all other languages that are spoken inside Bangladesh as recognized languages. So that is some sort of a broadening of the idea of Bangladesh itself, you know, in terms of language and language nationalism, it will be more broad-based. And then it proceeds to multiple other sectors of the state, starting with accountability and transparency in judicial appointments, bureaucratic appointments, and then the whole political setup, you know, where Bangladeshi politics remains particularly attractive for political parties because it is a prime ministerial or in the sense in a Westminster kind of system. But this July Charter is basically bringing in changes in the power of the prime minister. So, for example, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, in future, if the July Charter is adopted through the referendum on 12^th of February, will not be able to contest more than two elections. That is, maybe, you know, the person will be able to contest more than two elections, but he will not be able to become prime minister for more than two terms. So these are the things that are coming and which will also take away some power from the position of the prime minister. And then it is creating more, in a way, in a more authoritative institution of the president. So the president will have authority now in the sense that today, the current president of Bangladesh is just titular. You know, it’s a, it’s a titular position. But then the future government, the future president of Bangladesh, will have the authority to appoint the Human Rights commissioner, the authority to appoint the Right to Information commissioner, and the Information commissioner. You know, these sorts of important positions, these officials will be chosen by the president of Bangladesh in future. So there is some sort of parity or perhaps some sort of, you know, balance that will be struck between the position of the prime minister, who will be an elected leader of the country and the president, who will be chosen by the, you know, parliament and others. And then, the procedure of impeachment of the president will also be similarly, you know, a little bit modified. So there are many such structural changes that are coming in that way, you know, so this is again a very interesting experiment that Bangladesh is going into. On the one hand, it will have a parliamentary election. On the other hand, it will also have a referendum, which will take some of the power of the parliamentary system itself and turn it into some sort of a quasi-presidential system. So, you know, as we see in case of, say again, to come back to Nepal, which has both the parliamentary system as well as the quote-unquote, Politburo system, they don’t call it Politburo, but they call it the Central Committee and the Standing Committee system of Maoist parties, you know, because the Maoist parties are more or less in charge in Nepal before this particular interim government came in power in Nepal. So similarly, Nepal is always caught between balance. They have to balance between the Maoist impulses of Maoist party rules and the parliamentary system, which also has to be handled. So I think Bangladesh is going to enter a phase where, because of their recent bitter experience with the parliamentary system, they are trying to balance it in such a way that this sort of, you know, situation is never faced by the country in the future. But this is again to give it in a very brief capsule: the July Charter will come for its ultimate test on 12 February, when people will have to agree to everything it is offering. Until that time, we’ll have to see whether people really agree to every formulation that is coming up in the July Charter.

Sanjay: One supplementary question here. The system is parliamentary but quasi-presidential. Do you foresee Muhammad Yunus trying to position himself as president after the elections?

Kallol: Yes, yes, that is what the rumour is in the market because you must have seen that there was a Reuters report that came out after the current president gave an interview to Reuters, and he said that he has been treated very badly and he feels left alone. And, he said that he perhaps is considering stepping down immediately after the election. So he can’t step down before the election, but he can step down immediately after the election once the government is formed. Because, say in a purely speculative manner, if the BNP comes to power, you know, the single largest party, or by winning a simple majority, the BNP will have the authority to set the house in order to its own preference. So, it will have the choice of getting a president of its own. Or you know, what sort of an adjustment will have to be made. So at that time, I think if you look at the July Charter, it hints at somebody who is politically aware of the situation that is currently Bangladesh in. Someone like that would throw his hat in the ring. And I have a feeling that Professor Yunus is not done yet because he is respected as part of, you know, as the person who has led the interim government. And it’s quite possible that he might contest or he might be persuaded to contest the next, you know, presidential election or presidential contest and continue as the next president of Bangladesh. So again, I mean his office, I mean his press advisor and others, they continue to deny that he will continue, he will linger on. But my guess is that in the given circumstances, either Professor Yunus or the Chief Justice, who has just retired, he’s also a highly competent person. I think either of the two would be the next president of Bangladesh.

Sanjay: We have been talking about institutions in terms of parliamentary, presidential. You are hinting at the possibility of the BNP coming to power. Tarique Rahman is now back in the country. He has received a fantastic welcome at the airport, and the roadshow was attended by thousands, if not more. And the subsequent public meeting was also a grand success. A few questions here. Why was he in exile for 17 years, and he’s now back? Yes, the initial public reception was good, but do you think he really has a touch with the grassroots of Bangladesh, and do you think this positive reception he got at the airport on his arrival continues till the elections?

Kallol: Well, Tarique Rahman was basically the architect of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party’s victory in 2001, and he partnered with his mother from 2001 to 2006 as the brain of the government. And he was highly influential, but he was not a member of the parliament during that time. He became the Joint Secretary, the first Joint Secretary of the party, which was an important position that was given to him by his mother because he had, in a way, engineered that election victory. And it was a massive verdict that she had. And then Khaleda Zia partnered with Jamaat-e-Islami, and a lot of law-and-order issues happened. The international situation was also very different because we had the 911 happening at that time and the whole issue of, you know, sensitivity was, was a matter which acquired a particular sense of urgency during that time and which did not get that sort of response from the BNP in 2005, 2001-6, though BNP continues to insist that they actually took a lot of actions etc. But these are for later analysis. What happens here is that Tarique Rahman, after 2006, you know, when the political instability started in October, November 2006, and finally when the 1/11 government was formed in January 2007, there was a lot of, you know, contest for power as it happens in Bangladesh and the BNP was accused of corruption, and Tarique Rahman was taken into custody. He was, quote/unquote, tortured. And there were also very severe, you know, physical injuries that he had to endure during that time. And in that set of circumstances, he gave an undertaking to the government of that day that he would stay away from the politics of Bangladesh. And it is on that undertaking that he was allowed to leave Bangladesh. So the reason that he basically, it’s kind of a black-and-white statement here, is that the reason that he stayed away from Bangladeshi politics for a certain period of time was because of this undertaking that he had given not just to an interim government, but to an interim government that is backed by the Bangladesh military. And the Bangladesh military is not going anywhere, you know. So if anybody makes an undertaking to the Bangladesh military, then that is an undertaking given to the Bangladesh’s establishment. And that’s a serious matter. So what happened here is that as long as Sheikh Hasina was contesting, or rather, she was, she was ruling from 2009 to 2014 that undertaking was sacrosanct. But once the 2014 election appeared to head in a direction where the opposition, that is BNP refused to participate, that is the moment when undertaking basically fell apart because the BNP’s position from that election onwards was that since we have boycotted all the three elections down to 2024 January, so therefore that undertaking to the military is no longer valid because we, we didn’t participate to begin with. So, where is the question of staying away from politics or getting involved with politics? So Tarique Rahman’s position was therefore revised in the backdrop of the boycott of the election. And you know, since the election was boycotted and his mother made it very clear that since it’s a boycott by the party, neither Tarique Rahman nor she herself would be at the forefront of the political activities. So the reason that she and he stayed away for the first five years was because of the undertaking given to the military, and for the next five, for the next three elections that the BNP stayed away was because there was a consensus within the party that there is no point in contesting elections because the Awami League is going to rig the elections. And that was the position that they took. And therefore, he stayed away subsequently because of an internal political understanding. Yeah. Also, that the rally that he has, you know, the welcome rally that we all saw on our TV screens in Dhaka, I mean, it is absolutely stupendous because we haven’t seen such a huge rally for a leader who stays away from his or her country. I mean, the only comparable example that comes to my mind is when Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in April 1986. And reportedly, there was a consideration of Benazir, whether she should come to Karachi because she belongs to Karachi, or should she return to Lahore. And there was a feeling within the Pakistan People’s Party that Benazir, if she returns to Lahore, perhaps the number of people would, the turnout would be smaller because, you know, she’s not a Punjabi. But then there were 3 million people who came to welcome her at Lahore airport. And, she wrote in her autobiography, The Daughter of the East, that how, you know, she saw those, you know, millions of people from, from her aircraft in the sky, that they were literally covering the whole surface of Pakistan, Lahore. So, I think even Tarique Rahman must have felt that, you know, the power of a political party, especially a party which is known as an establishment party, just like, you know, Awami League was till its leader fled. This sort of political party has a particular advantage because they are automatically connected to the people, and people miss its leaders, you know, when they are not seen on the ground. But then having said that, you know, what happened immediately after that welcome was also interesting because we have to remember what’s happening in the dynamic political field of Bangladesh. The next day, after Tarique Rahman’s return, Jamaat-e-Islami went ahead and snagged this new political party called the National Citizen Party. More or less, you know, the party fell apart because Jamaat Islami grabbed that party and made it into an alliance partner for the next election. So Jamaat scored a tactical victory vis-à-vis BNP. So we also have to remember that, yes, Tarique Rahman has received a great deal of support and a very warm welcome, but the coming days are no less challenging because every day is a challenge. So I think considering that they have planned this period of mourning for Khaleda Zia in which people are, you know, interacting with the party, they are meeting the party’s leadership and, you know, people are coming to Khaleda Zia’s grave in Dhaka from different parts of the country to place flowers and show their respect. And then all over the country, in every district and division, BNP is conducting these meetings, these meetings in remembrance of Khaleda Zia. So this campaign will have to be, in a way, kept on if they have to really, you know, take advantage of that emotional, that sympathy factor.

Sanjay: You just mentioned that the other important player, Jamaat, had moments when it contested in alliance with BNP during the previous elections, whenever they contested, but its election performance was not spectacular. Do you think, with the tactics you are talking about, the performance of Jamaat may be very different this time around?

Kallol: Yes, because that is what the surveys are telling us. Because multiple surveys have indicated that Jamaat is the second player in the field, and they will do very well considering that, you know, what happens in Bangladesh is that when a change takes place, people actually vote for the change makers. When the change took place in 1990, people voted for BNP because Khaleda Zia was perceived as the leader who brought in the fall of tyranny and the fall of the dictatorship. So in that same way, this time, BNP, that is, the 2024 election, BNP was not in the fray. But after the election, when the mobilisation had to take place for fighting Sheikh Hasina, the leadership came from the students wing of Jamaati Islami, that is, Shibir. So that gives you a hint about the direction that the people’s sentiment would be in. Because in 2001-2006, when the BNP partner took Jamaat as a partner, Jamaat was a junior partner; I think they had some three to four ministers with them. And one of those ministers was later hanged because of the International Crimes Tribunal that Sheikh Hasina had conducted during 2014-2016. But the fact is that this time around, the political change was brought in visibly, and everybody says this on the ground that without Jamaat, this kind of political change would not have been possible. So the muscle power and the sacrifice that a lot of people, you know, happily did is because they were associated with Jamaat. And I think that is the factor that people will also take into consideration. Obviously, Jamaat in a leading role will set the alarm bells ringing in many quarters of stakeholders of Bangladesh. But you know, this is a new, uncharted terrain that Bangladesh is in. And Jamaat’s political muscle is for everyone to see, including its former ally BNP, which he wants to obviously become the sole master of Bangladesh. But then I think the surveys are saying that or indicating that Jamaat is going to do quite well if they can keep the momentum going till the 12th of February. Jamaat also has many disruptive elements, many extremist elements. Some of them make many irrational demands, and they have a tendency to launch many protests, sometimes disjointed from the central leadership. So we have to see whether this particular uprising-prone party will be able to sort of orient itself as a party of governance in the short time that is in the next 30 to 35 days.

Sanjay: In addition to Jamaat, students have also been at the forefront and in the recent past, some of them have launched the National Citizen Party and Jamaat and NCP have tied up together. How is this alliance being perceived? And do you think Jamaat will benefit more than NCP?

Kallol: Well, Jamaat made, it’s my understanding of course, that it made a mistake because Jamaat started talking about its agenda. And one of the things Jamaat mentioned was that the women of Bangladesh should work only 5 hours a day. Because Bangladesh’s garment sector basically thrives because of the participation of Bangladesh’s women, and not just the garment sector, I mean, look at many other sectors, be it farming and fishing. Women participate in the activities of multiple sectors of Bangladesh’s economy. And to tell the women of Bangladesh that you can’t work for more than five hours is slightly audacious because it did not make Jamaat e Islami popular. And we saw the reflection of this statement, you know, when multiple female leaders in the National Citizen Party either immediately quit or announced that they would contest the election independently. Now, one of these leaders is this lady called Tasnim Zara. Now she’s a doctor, and she used to practice in London. She returned, and she is now contesting on her own. You know, and she has actually raised a lot of money from the public for her independent bid for a parliamentary seat in Dhaka. Now, you know, these are just indications that, you know, if Jamaat comes up with such ideas that women should not work and, you know, women should dress up in a certain way, then these things will scare people away. But despite that, they have managed to strike an alliance with NCP because NCP, as such, is, as you know, at its core, basically a collection of some 20 or 25 young men and a few young women. And they don’t have the kind of political network that someone as seasoned as, say, you know, Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir would bring for BNP, you know, who is almost 80 years old, and he knows everybody in Bangladesh’s politics can call up anybody in Bangladesh’s political terrain, and have a talk about an alliance. So these boys, they basically lost direction, and they were, to my understanding, they had little option but to come to Jamaat because many of them were also raised in the student units of Jamaat’s Shibir. So in that way they basically went back to where they started, you know, so NCP has gone into an election alliance. But it’s also been said that the NCP is a vanishing force. It is a diminishing force. But interestingly, NCP is also a sort of school. It’s kind of a learning centre for many aspiring politicians. And I mentioned Tasnim Zara because she is bright/young and she has a bright future because the amount of money that she has raised just by crowdfunding is amazing. And there are also many other young women who are part of the NCP and are thinking about what to do next. So the party has been more or less divided, with the majority of the party joining Jamaat, but a significant part of the party has actually stayed back in the NCP fold, minus alliance with Jamaat. So I think it is an experiment of sorts. It is not really like the Aam Aadmi Party of India or anything comparable, but it has some sort of appeal for the people, for the young people who participated and who suffered in the crackdown of July-August 2024. The rise of Jamaat, in a way, is also mirroring the rise of religious fundamentalism in the country.

Sanjay: What do you think is the secular space today in Bangladesh? What is it looking like? Is there a party or parties that are trying to strengthen the secular space in Bangladesh? What is your assessment?

Kallol: Well, the secular space in Bangladesh’s society and Bangladesh is within the people of Bangladesh will always be there. But whether Bangladesh will have that space in the future, especially after it has undergone the traumatic period of 2024-25, is something we have to see. Because if a particular political party with a specific religious agenda or a specific theological agenda comes to power, then that can impact the Bangladesh state’s secular orientation. You know, I’m sure you also observe it quite often that, you know, every time the fundamentalists give a push, there is an equal amount of counter push that comes from the seculars in Bangladesh. And you know, in Bangladesh, secular fundamentalists are quite fundamentalists. You know, they are not like, they’re not like the polite secularists that we see in India because, you know, they have a history of fighting for their variety of secularism. And you saw that when these two institutions, which are actually synonymous with Bangladesh’s secularism, i.e. Chhayanaut and Udichi, were attacked along with these two prominent newspaper offices that were burnt down. What we saw was that the day after the attack, hundreds of singers and performers who came to these two institutions to sing and dance were actually singing and dancing on the streets of Dhaka. It was a kind of polite but loud protest and also a message to the fundamentalists that Bangladesh cannot be steered in one direction or the other. Because there is a great deal of possibility that the fundamentalists or even, for example, I would say Jamaat, can commit a terrible mistake if they think that the anti-Hasina movement was basically a license to turn Bangladesh into an authoritarian Islamist state. That was not the idea because the verdict of the people in the election is one thing, but the verdict of the people who came out and got shot to protest against a particular form of oppression was also very clear that they were not giving permission to turn their country into an Islamist theocracy. So, I think Jamaat will make a mistake if it turns, if it takes away that secular space and converts Bangladesh into an Islamist theocratic state. I think that it is not going to be liked by the people of Bangladesh because there is a lot of talk that there will be one more uprising if Bangladesh moves in that direction, because they don’t want the revolution to be hijacked. In any way or the other. They also don’t want to be in this eternal mood of uprising. You know, they don’t want to burn down buildings, and they don’t want to destroy this and destroy that. They want to go on with their lives. And I think that is possible only if a kind of status quoist power comes to Dhaka and more or less reconciles all sections of people, and, more or less, you know, restarts the law and order machinery so that the economic machine can again come back to life.

Sanjay: A very large number of people from Bangladesh also live abroad. I mean, there is a huge diaspora there. They contribute significantly to the economy through remittances. I presume they started this postal vote as well. So, what do you think their impact on politics will be? One, in terms of voting; second, in terms of the financial flows they provide. And third, more importantly, since we are discussing the possibility of Bangladesh turning into an Islamic theocracy or not, where do these diasporas stand? How do they see Bangladesh back home?

Kallol: Well, the reason that prompted the postal ballots was that it is a kind of, you know, note of gratitude for the people who send remittances home. Bangladesh is one of the largest manpower exporters from South Asia. And I think it’s second only to India when it comes to the Gulf region. You know, be it Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Bahrain, the Bangladesh diaspora is second to India. So I think, you know, in that sense it’s a recognition of the contribution of the remittance suppliers of Bangladesh, the remittance warriors, as Muhammad Yunus keeps on referring to them, that apart the remittance warriors were also the first anti-Hasina regiment that protested because before the crackdown started, there was this massive online campaign among the, the non-resident Bangladeshis to stop sending remittances home. So there was this in the month of June 2024, and in the month of July, when the crackdown actually began, there was this entire, you know, online campaign that stopped sending money to Hasina because Hasina is taking our money and this money is not reaching our families. So this was a kind of, therefore, a kind of recognition of the role that they played in ensuring this political transition happens back home. And that was the primary factor. But then there is also politics because many of these people live away from home, and they have naturally, slightly, in terms of being based in the Gulf, they have a slightly religious and puritanical perspective on the way of life of Bangladesh, but that doesn’t mean that they are politically sagacious. So we do not know what sort of political wisdom they represent because there is no such organisation or association as such that represents them in the political field. So at the end of the day, it is understandable that the bulk of the votes, that is more than 1 million votes that have been registered as of now, will go for either the Jamaati Islami or the BNP. And, they are the students, of course, because many of these are, you know, these people are young, they’re part of the young workforce of Bangladesh. So these young people would be voting for Bangladesh, the National Citizen Party. So it’s quite possible that most of these votes will be essentially non-BNP votes. This is my understanding. But having said that, BNP is also very active in the non-resident Bangladeshi communities, especially in Europe, in the United Kingdom, in Germany and of course also in Saudi Arabia, because Saudi Arabia has one of the largest chunks of the non-resident Bangladeshis and they have, the BNP has units of its supporters in the non-resident Bangladeshi communities and I think they will try to mobilize some of the votes and steer it, steer them towards BNP. But my assessment is that, given the popularity of the uprising among the non-resident Bangladeshi working class population, a bulk of it will go to Jamaat and the students’ party, that is, the National Citizen Party.

Sanjay: One of the things we often notice when we discuss Bangladesh is that we focus a lot on religion. In contemporary discussions, we tend to see Bangladesh through the prism of religious fundamentalism. Are there any other major social trends taking place in Bangladesh that we may not be looking at?

Kallol: Yeah, that’s a very interesting question. You see, Bangladesh is known for its nationalism, and it’s a very modern sort of nationalism because it’s language-based nationalism. That is why the uprising or the protest of 1952, which is now recognised as the International Mother Tongue Day. So I think what we are witnessing today in Bangladesh is that there is a perceptible shift from language-based nationalism to religion-based identity. And this again is, I mean, I’m not sure whether this is a temporary phenomenon or if it’s going to linger on for some time. But as of now, you know, for example, some of the important advocates of this particular religious identity-oriented nationalism are among the biggest. The editor, Mahmudur Rahman, was based out of Turkey for nearly five to six years when Sheikh Hasina was in power. And then he returned last year after Hasina left the country, and he launched this newspaper called Amar Desh. Means my country. And he just made this speech, I think yesterday or day before, where he said that if I can’t say Allahu Akbar in my country, then what sort of a Bengali Musalman am I? And then his whole argument was that this whole emphasis about Bengali culture, or, you know, he used a particular term that was Sanskriti. Bengali Sanskriti is basically a kind of tactic to appropriate the identity of Bangladeshis. So, there are multiple issues here in this debate because, on the one hand, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party believes in Bangladeshi nationalism, not just in Bengali nationalism. On the other hand, people like Mahmudur Rehman and others are saying that we are Bengali Musalman first and our Musalman identity has to be recognised first. Only then will we talk about the rest of the issues, be it language, be it region and be it economic future, etc. So when you say that, you know, the, the religion and the way Bangladesh is shaping up, I think it’s basically that the whole spectrum of nationalism in Bangladesh is being subjected some sort of an experiment where its original premise, original tenets, tenets like, you know, language, its own particular, very specific sort of history, you know, where Bangladesh was seen as stemming out of the rebellion of the 18th and the 19th century Bengali Musalman against the British colonial rulers. Those, you know, those foundational ideas and historical facts are also being thrown into the air, and they are looking at more global inspirations. You know, for example, how it is to be a Muslim in the 21^st  century and what are the factors that are governing that experiment, that, you know, how to be a Muslim in the 21st century. Today, you have someone like you know, Mamdani coming to New York. And again, there are these, you know, very young boys and girls who have overthrown a very established government in Dhaka in 2024. So I think again, it’s a, it’s a pendulum kind of a thing. I mean, it’s not yet settled. But it’s interesting to observe this experiment that Bangladesh is doing, just that one hopes that it will lead to more stability and some sort of reconciliation within the society and less fissures.

Sanjay: If you have to sum up the election process that is taking place, do you think the February 2026 elections constitute a systemic shift in the politics of Bangladesh? Or do you think it is a process through which new leaders and new parties are coming to power, or old parties under new leadership are coming to power, who may bring about change sometime in the near future? How do you see this?

Kallol: Well, the election would have just been an election if it were just an election. But this election is being held along with a referendum. And the issue here is that the outcome of the election, that is, the government that will come out of this election, hopefully, there will be a government that will come out of an election and not a political stalemate. If that government comes out of that election, then it will have the additional and not just the additional, it will have an immediate responsibility of implementing the outcome of the referendum. Now, if the referendum is a yes referendum, because everybody is saying that this will be a referendum that will be a yes referendum. If the referendum is yes, then this government will have to implement the results of the referendum. So whatever the agenda that the government comes up with, you know, when it goes to the, say a political party, BNP or Jamaat and others are going into election, saying we will bring XYZ changes into the system and we will govern according to these tenets. But all these promises will have to take a back seat immediately because first of all they have to implement the agenda of the July Charter, because the July Charter’s agenda will then have to be implemented. So then what does the July Charter say? The July Charter says some of the principles that will get ratified in that referendum will have to be implemented within a specific time span. So say in the next 100 to 140 days that will unfold after the election. In that period, the government that comes to power will have to implement these issues. So it’s again, you know, tricky terrain that the election, you know, everybody, everyone wanted an election, but then now having merged that election with this referendum, it’s some sort of a fused, it’s some sort of a, you know, mixed entity that Bangladesh is, is going to meet on 12th of February and then you have a lot of political violence that Bangladesh is naturally vulnerable to. And then, with the broken-down law and order system, the Election Commission of Bangladesh has sanctioned a particular amount of money for the law and order process. But it remains to be seen whether this will be sufficient to address the law-and-order challenge prior to the election. Because one of the biggest parties in the country will not participate, that is Awami League. So what happens to the supporters of that party? Will these supporters play the role of silent supporters of the BNP, or would they turn into disruptors and a law-and-order challenge in the country? So these are the things that will determine the actual fate of the election. But actually, for me, I think it’s going to be again a very difficult experiment because along with the election, you also have the referendum, and along with the election result, you also have the referendum’s result. And then the referendum’s result takes precedence over the result of the election. So again, uncharted terrain. And I really don’t know how Bangladesh is going to deal with so many challenges. I think the interim government was supposed to just hold the election, but they have ensured that they will also have a referendum. So it’s, it’s a really, really difficult time ahead for Bangladesh. Nothing looks easy at the moment when you’re talking about Bangladesh moving into very uncharted territories.

Sanjay: And we have been looking at Bangladesh. Many in India have been looking at Bangladesh with an element of concern. We have seen a lot of anti-India sentiment that has been expressed there. What are the roots of this anti-India sentiment? Is it power asymmetry? Is it a cultural similarity where you’re trying to show I’m different? Or is it stemming from political personalities? Because there is also an argument that India has been close to Sheikh Hasina but the people on the Indian side say look, Sheikh Hasina was in power. We have to deal with people in power. So, how do you explain, how do you evaluate the anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh?

Kallol: You know, Sanjay, the anti-India sentiment is not new in Bangladesh. Even when the Liberation War was taking place in 1971, and even when the leaders of the Awami League who were living in India, there was disagreement about how much support they should get from India. And there were again problems and complaints coming from them. That’s one section of the Awami League leaders who felt that India was giving too little support. One section felt that India was giving the right amount of support. So these feuds and discords about India always evoke very strong passion in Bangladesh, and it goes back in time. So there is nothing new about these matters. And what actually stands out is that earlier these opinions used to be filtered through the lens of nationalism. But today, there is an element of religiosity. There is an element of, you know, there is an element of the idea of the self of Bangladesh, which is defined through religious identity. I think that is a new element, and that is something that should concern India also because, as far as having an Islamist identity is not a problem. But if the Islamist identity is mixed with anti-India ideas, then that’s a problem.

Sanjay: Where do you think the relationship with Muhammad Yunus, with India, the dynamic, where do you think it fell off the cliff? In the initial months after the Sheikh Hasina government collapsed, the Indian government continued with its connectivity projects, like opening the Petrapole border area, I mean, customs depot, upgraded customs depot, whether it is electricity supplies from Nepal to India to Bangladesh, all those things were continued for a few months. But somehow the relationship never worked. Where do you think it went wrong?

Kallol: Well, to a limited extent, some of these relationships of the connectivity and exchanges that you are referring to are continuing even now as we speak. For example, the supply of electricity, the exchange of expert manpower that is necessary for carrying out certain repairs and certain, you know, technical supervision, etc, inside Bangladesh. These are the supports that India continues to provide. You know, these things don’t come into the news because these are part of the routine grind, and these things are taking place, and nobody will dispute that. And these things don’t, you know, are not discussed because these are part of the political issue. The main problem was connectivity, transport, exchange of say, you know, the people-to-people exchange of the visa, etc. These things are a reflection of the political relationship. And every ruler who comes to power in the region, in a way, subconsciously expects that he or she would be recognised by the most powerful state in South Asia, that is, New Delhi, the capital of India. And be it the new Prime Minister of Nepal or the Generals of Myanmar, there is a tendency to be acknowledged by New Delhi. But you have seen that in the last few months, New Delhi’s statements have repeatedly referred to the people of Bangladesh. It has not referred to the interim government of Bangladesh. And the meeting that took place between Prime Minister Modi and Mohammed Yunus in Bangkok is now ancient history. And because India has not hosted Chief Advisor Yunus, because the primary problem from Bangladesh’s side, again a political problem, is that Sheikh Hasina continues to be based out of India. And not just Sheikh Hasina, but even many of her senior colleagues, you know, be it the former Home Minister who has received a death sentence, including her, it’s being said that her private physician is also based out of India. So these factors also have a political cost for the interim government. And it also could not take chances and travel to New Delhi to meet the Indian leadership. So I think the lack of recognition from India was a setback for Professor Yunus’s interim government. It has received recognition from China. It has not been hosted by White House, but it has been hosted by multiple former American presidents. You know, Bill Clinton has met, I think Joe Biden also met Professor Yunus on the sidelines of the United Nations when he was the President of the United States. So those things indicate that other countries have agreed to interact and engage the Professor, you know, but India has not engaged the Professor, you know, because it’s number one. It’s embarrassing for India because, you know, Sheikh Hasina is still in India. So how do we reconcile these two opposing strands? I think that brainstorming was not possible to take place in the short period of time of the last 15, 16 months. And so, therefore, this relation was doomed as far as its political quotient was concerned. Having said that, I think India has again extended its support to the people of Bangladesh for the upcoming election. And that was in full display with External Affairs Minister Mr Jaishankar’s visit to Dhaka, where he met with the leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the foreign affairs advisor of the interim government. But Mr Jaishankar did not seek an appointment and obviously did not meet Professor Yunus. One of the other guests, including the speaker of the Pakistan national assembly, the Nepali, the Foreign Minister, they all met the Professor, the Chief Advisor, Professor Yunus. But Mr. Jaishankar actually returned to Delhi immediately after completing those engagements. That is, you know, extending a condolence message to Tarique Rahman and meeting other leaders in the parliament premises, you know, without really meeting Professor Yunus. So it gives you a clear indication where India’s sentiments are at the moment, as far as the interim government is concerned, that they will engage them only till the time it doesn’t recognise the leadership of the interim government. Because recognising the leadership would mean something really significant from the Indians. And I don’t think India is considering extending that to the interim government.

Sanjay: Do you think India’s Foreign Minister S Jaishankar, meeting Tarique Rahman, who is leading the BNP, will have a positive impact on the bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh in the coming months? Do you think the bilateral relationship may improve?

Kallol: Well, yes. I mean in the sense that India has supported the people of Bangladesh. Whatever the choice the people of Bangladesh make. And it is from India’s assessment that it appears that the people of Bangladesh will choose someone like Tarique Rahman to govern the future of the Bangladesh state. So it appears that the people’s choice will be supported by India. That is the message that India has conveyed. Of course, you know, whether Tarique Rahman will become Hasina’s second edition. I don’t think that is possible because a lot of water has already flown in the rivers of Bangladesh, and the past will not come back. And even the next government that will engage India will be a new challenge for India. You know, it is not going to be the same in any sense. Because the next government of Bangladesh, be it led by Tarique Rahman or be it under a coalition led by Tarique Rahman and some other forces, will be a very, very tough regional partner for India. So I think it’s best that India sides with the people of Bangladesh so that at least it can talk about what is in the best interest of the people of Bangladesh. Because the times have changed for Bangladesh completely with the departure of Sheikh Hasina.

Sanjay: Last question. How optimistic are you about Bangladesh’s politics in the run-up to the elections and after the elections? In the initial part of this conversation, you said there is daily instability. Do you think it will be addressed after the election with the coming of a new political party?

Kallol: Some of the instability is the making of the interim government and the making of the uprising, also because you cannot have stability in the country by alienating your bureaucracy. Now in comparison, when you look at the statements that Tarique Rahman has made after returning home on 25^th of December, his first statement that he made in the speech on the, on that road called 300ft Road because it’s called 300ft Road because it’s a 300ft wide broad road made during Hasina’s time is because, you know, what he said was that he expressed his gratitude towards the people who ensured law and order in the country. He expressed his gratitude to the police, to the military, and then again after the funeral of Khaleda Zia, in a very long social media post, Tarique Rahman said that he acknowledged the support and the great work done by Bangladesh Police, Bangladesh paramilitary like Ansar, then the Rapid Action Battalion and many other, also border guards. Now, this actually shows you how an experienced person should be conducting his affairs. Because the Bangladesh Police has been condemned for the last 15 to 16 months by the interim government. But in comparison to the interim government’s rhetoric, look at the rhetoric of Tarique Rahman. Tarique Rahman is saying thank you, Bangladesh police, thank you, Bangladesh military and acknowledging their contribution in ensuring law and order in the country. Now if you go back in time, not just the, the interim government’s leader, Professor Yunus, but even people like, you know, some of the, you know Asif Nazrul, the law and order advisor who is also the sports advisor of the, currently the sports advisor of Bangladesh interim government, all of them have been talking about accomplices of fascism inside the administration of Bangladesh. You know, the allies of fascism inside the administration of Bangladesh. Now you know when, when a government setup, whatever, some sort of a political setup threatens the administration in this way, on a day-to-day basis, it becomes very difficult for the administration to function. And that is what has happened in Bangladesh. The law and order instability is not because the police don’t exist. The law-and-order instability is because the police have a blemished past because of its involvement in the mass killings of July, August 2024. But having passed through that phase, there was a necessity to get the cleaner version of the police out and make them responsible for the stable conduct of law-and-order machinery on a day-to-day basis after Hasina fled the country. But that hasn’t happened. Instead, what is happening is that daily intimidation, daily harassment of the law-and-order machinery has taken place. Especially because, you know, most of the countries now run by social media influencers, slash student leaders. These people cannot ensure governance because, you know, these are young men or young boys, rather. And then they can call on their social media platform that they will go to XYZ destination in the next two hours, and there will be 2000 people coming there and converging and raising slogans. They will create a traffic blockade. But that is not governance. You know, governance is done by established law-and-order mechanisms. The reason that Bangladesh is witnessing such daily instability is because the law-and-order machinery is not being allowed to function in harmony with the political leadership. Now this political leadership right now is in the hands of the interim government. If, after the election, the interim government paves the way for an elected government in a smooth manner and then if someone like, you know, gives a healing touch to the administrative machinery saying that whatever mistakes have been committed in the past will be consigned to the past and now they will start afresh, that will give, that will push the restart button for the law and order machinery. Because right now, you know, much, much of it is actually the making of their own. Professor Yunus was supposed to give that healing touch because he is the Nobel Peace Prize winner. But that has not happened, you know, because power has its own dynamics, with daily uprisings and daily instability. And this is, I know, at the level of politics is one thing, but at the level of the poor people, the impoverished people, the working class people, it’s actually felt in a more immediate manner. You know, when, for example, I think last week there was this incident of a factory that was burned down. I think 16 labourers perished in that incident. And prior to that, there was, I think, in the month of October, the cargo terminal of Dhaka airport, International airport, got entirely burned down. The reason given was that the fire service could not reach the airport on time. Obviously, there are some fire tenders inside the airport, but that was insufficient because the fire was so big. So if these basic services are not functioning properly, then how do you think law and order will function for the common people? I think the real, real price of this breakdown is being borne by the poorest of the poor in Bangladesh, the working-class people. And one just hopes that the election leads to some sort of healing of the ties between the political leadership and the law and order. The administration and the bureaucracy, who are silent, are quiet right now because you know, they are being blamed for much of the violence that has taken place during Hasina’s time. But most of them were not involved. Many of them were not involved. So why, why to blame the entire bureaucratic machinery for being involved with, you know, quote/unquote, fascism and fascist elements, etc. I think that’s also an overzealous revolutionary attitude that will have to be reigned in after the election.

Sanjay: Thank you. Let’s hope Bangladesh finds the statesman who will give it a healing touch, restart the economic process, and restore the vibrancy of its economy. Thank you, Kallol, for a wonderful conversation, genuinely wonderful conversation. A comprehensive analysis of what is happening in Bangladesh. Its politics, its economy, its society. Thank you once again, and hopefully we will reconnect very soon to discuss what is happening in Bangladesh after the elections.

Kallol: Thank you so much, Sanjay. It’s a great pleasure and an honour to be with you. Thank you. And all the best.

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Lakshmi Gayathry, an intern with Politeia Research Foundation, assisted with the transcription of the interview above.