Af-Pak Refugee Crisis: Humanitarian and Geopolitical Implications

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons
by Sanjay Pulipaka*
While the attention of the international community is fixated on the Israel-Palestine conflict, there are concerns about serious human rights violations along the Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) border. The border is witnessing the forced migration of a large number of Afghan refugees from Pakistan.
Islamabad had ordered that all refugees illegally staying in the country should leave by November 01. While Pakistan authorities have denied that the policy targeted the nationals of a specific country, the most affected populace of the policy are Afghans. After the expiration of the deadline, the Pakistani government initiated measures such as arresting Afghan refugees in different parts of the country and opening new border centres to speed up their return. There were reports that local agencies were deploying vehicles to transport the refugees to the border. The homes of some refugees were demolished, forcing them to migrate. In the first week alone, it is estimated that over 200,000 people were forced to move across the border into Afghanistan.
Why is Pakistan deporting Afghan refugees in such large numbers? The security situation along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions has deteriorated significantly since the Taliban came to power in August 2021. There is a perception in Islamabad that the Afghan Taliban has adopted a lackadaisical approach to containing the operations of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). According to Islamabad, the TTP operates out of safe havens in Afghanistan. The recent attack on the Pakistan Air Force base in Mianwali was attributed to Taliban-linked groups. On November 08, caretaker Prime Minister (PM) Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar criticised “the Afghanistan’s interim administration for not doing enough to address Pakistan’s security concerns by clamping down on militants operating from its territory.” The caretaker PM went on to add that “since the Taliban government coming into power, Pakistan has witnessed a 60 per cent increase in terrorism-related incidents…” There is also a perception in Islamabad that Afghan refugees are participating in violent terrorist actions in Pakistan. Many in Afghanistan perceive that Pakistan’s refugee policy is aimed at pressuring the Afghan Taliban to act proactively against the TTP and other affiliates.
Amid the power play, sadly, it is the common Afghans who are suffering the most. After decades of conflict, there is very little economic activity in Afghanistan. If the economic situation in Afghanistan had transformed for the better, many Afghans would have returned to their homeland voluntarily. However, given the bleak economic prospects, pushing back refugees in such large numbers will make the lives of people even more miserable. Afghanistan’s economy does not have the wherewithal to absorb such a large number of people. Moreover, many refugees have been living in Pakistan for decades, and therefore, Afghanistan is an unfamiliar homeland. This is more so for second and third generation Afghans living in Pakistan. With no means of livelihood or place to stay, the unfamiliarity becomes even more challenging to navigate.
According to the Pakistani government, there are 3.8 million Afghans in the country, and about 1.6 million of them do not have a government-approved document that makes them eligible to stay. Sending over one million refugees back on short notice will be one of the largest cases of forced migrations in recent history and will have catastrophic consequences. Initial reports suggest that many refugees are “sleeping in the open, without proper shelter, food, drinking water and toilets.” According to the UN agencies, “more than 60% of arrivals are children.” While the Taliban has opened transit camps, the infrastructure is not sufficient to meet the inflow of people.
Not surprisingly, many human rights agencies have expressed deep concern with Pakistan’s policies. Concerned about the developments, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi stated that “large numbers of Afghans forced to leave Pakistan are facing grave hardship and risks… Afghanistan is in the grip of a humanitarian crisis compounded by the approaching winter”. In 2021, the UNHCR issued a non-return advisory “calling for a bar on forced returns of Afghan nationals, including asylum seekers who have had their claims rejected”. The advisory was renewed in February 2023.
Interestingly, speakers at the public hearing on Pak-Afghan relations at the Pakistan National Assembly Panel on Foreign Affairs, held in August this year, noted that the ‘absence of refugee policy, corruption, inordinate delays in visa approvals, harassment at the border entry points and weaponization of cross-border movement’ have undermined Pakistan’s national interest. A few politicians and human rights activists have approached the Supreme Court, challenging the government policy of expelling Afghan refugees. There are concerns in Pakistan that an interim government without a mandate from the people is pursuing a policy with long-term security implications. Of course, it is well known that behind the facade of the interim government, it is the military that is guiding the refugee policy.
It should be noted that Pakistan is not an innocent recipient of the refugees from Afghanistan. In fact, it was an active player in defining the contours of conflict in Afghanistan. For decades, Pakistan proactively intervened in the domestic politics of Afghanistan in support of its preferred political players, often by using these refugees as a tool. It is Pakistan’s quest to have strategic depth and its desire to define the geopolitics of the region that laid the foundations for the emergence of conflict in Afghanistan. As many Afghans point out, Pakistan often received considerable economic and military aid because of the conflict in Afghanistan.
It is evident that the Taliban is deeply disappointed with the policies of the Pakistani establishment. Taliban’s Prime Minister, Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, called on Pakistan to not “expel Afghans in an undignified manner, to not harass Afghans and to give them sufficient time so that they can return in a dignified manner.” The violence perpetuated on Afghan refugees figure prominently in the statements from Kabul. Taliban acting Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai complained that “Pakistani soldiers are looting the property and assets of Afghan migrants during their deportation from the country.”
Referring to the harassment of the refugees, the Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani stated that the policies were un-Islamic in nature. The reference to Pakistan’s un-Islamic policies requires careful examination. For decades, the Pakistani establishment often referred to the ‘Islamic brotherhood’ to advance its geopolitical interests in Afghanistan. Since Haqqani noted that the refugee policy is not in consonance with Islamic principles, the notions of brotherhood will get diluted, and the divergences between the Taliban and Pakistan may increase in intensity.
The refugee crisis, created by Pakistan, compounds the misery of Afghans who are dealing with multiple challenges (armed conflict, sustained political instability, economic stagnation and the recent earthquake). Therefore, the memory of forced migration will linger for a considerable period of time, which may have long-term negative impact on the bilateral relationship. Taliban’s acting defence minister in Kabul, Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid, reportedly stated that “Pakistan should face the consequences of its actions and reap what it sows…what is going on right now will have a negative impact on relations between both countries.” Unless Pakistan takes remedial measures quickly, the probability of a new wave of attacks on the Pakistani defence forces is rising.
Beyond the immediate security threats, Af-Pak discord may intensify the border dispute. A few weeks ago, the Taliban spokesperson reportedly stated that Afghans living in Pakistan are not refugees as they live on “Afghan soil since the Durand Line is invalid.” Many in Afghanistan may likely seek a re-examination of the Durand Line, which was drawn during British rule and divides some 17 tribes on either side. Such re-evaluations may lay the foundations for the rise of new political geographies.
*Sanjay Pulipaka is the chairperson of the Politeia Research Foundation. The views expressed here are personal.
Also see: Pakistan, Taliban and the Durand Line: Old Contestations and New Conflicts, PRF, October 13, 2023.































