Pakistan, Taliban and the Durand Line: Old Contestations and New Conflicts

Torkham Border Crossing. Source: Wikimedia Commons
Over the past one and a half years, the steady deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can be traced to the repeated clashes involving the Taliban and the Pakistani military on the Durand Line. The state of the relationship between the two countries is in marked contrast to the expectation prevalent in the Pakistani defence establishment two years ago.
The civil-military leadership in Pakistan was ecstatic when Taliban forces took over Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan on August 15, 2021. Many Pakistani leaders and strategic analysts had assumed that the advent of Taliban rule would prove to be geopolitically advantageous by giving their country a strategic depth. However, the recent developments proved otherwise. Multiple nodes of tension are defining the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship.
There have been increased incidents of clashes between Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistani army since 2022. More recently, in the first week of September, four Pakistani soldiers and 12 others were killed in clashes with the TTP, which had launched a major offensive. The Pakistan army lost about six soldiers in a skirmish with the TTP a month earlier. In January this year, a suicide bomb attack on a mosque in Peshawar killed approximately 100 people. While the local TTP commander took responsibility for the bombing, the TTP spokesperson denied his group’s involvement.
The TTP emerged in 2007 and is regarded as a Pakistani branch of the Taliban and reportedly has very close relations with it. There is significant ideological congruence between TTP and the Taliban. Like the Taliban, the TTP wants strict enforcement of the Sharia law and withdrawal of the military from Pashtun-dominated tribal areas, earlier called FATA. The TTP members have declared allegiance to the head of the Afghan Taliban. The TPP is considered a terrorist organisation by the United States and figures in the United Nations sanctions list.
Islamabad is reportedly disappointed that the Taliban is not taking action against TTP despite numerous requests. Pakistan accuses the Taliban of harbouring the TTP militant forces. However, the Taliban in Kabul denies providing any safe spaces to the TTP. The Taliban noted that it has issued a religious decree that bars people from waging jihad in other countries.
The Afghan Taliban released all TTP militants from jails when it took control of Afghanistan. It should be noted that the Afghan Taliban facilitated talks between the TTP and the Pakistan government in 2022. The TTP agreed to a cease-fire, and in return, the Pakistan government released TTP militants. However, the cease-fire did not last long, and there were renewed hostilities between the two. Because of the intensity of the TTP actions, Pakistan is finding it hard to maintain control over large parts of its territory. There have been reports that the TTP is using modern small weapons like M4 and M16 rifles and night vision thermal sights left by American forces at the time of withdrawal.
In addition to military operations, Pakistan’s establishment response to the growing TTP threat has been three-dimensional. First, frequent border closures to halt trade between the two countries. For instance, the Torkham border crossing was closed for over nine days in September 2023. The border closure generated deep consternation among Afghans as hundreds of trucks lined up at the border for days carrying many perishable commodities such as vegetables and fruits.
Second, the Pakistan government announced it would levy a 10% processing fee on all imported items from Afghanistan. The Pakistani government claimed that the processing fee aims to reduce smuggling and increase tax collections. Subsequently, the Pakistani government banned the export of 212 items, including textiles, home appliances, and agricultural commodities. Pakistani authorities claim that many of these exports were being imported back into Pakistan illegally, and therefore, the ban was necessitated. There were reports of Afghan shipments, en route to India, were set a fire in Pakistan. The development raised concerns that such vandalism resulted from growing distrust in the Afghan-Pakistan relationship.
Third, there are apprehensions in Pakistan that the presence of Afghan nationals is contributing to the growing incidence of terrorism. Interior Minister Sarfraz Bugti claimed that “14 of 24 suicide bombings in the country this year were carried out by Afghan nationals.” Since Afghan nationals were involved in various attacks, the Pakistan government has ordered that all Afghan refugees illegally living in the country – an estimated 1.7 million people – should leave the country by November 2023. It is not certain how Pakistan would deport over one million people, and it constitutes a tactic to pressurise the Taliban. Identifying, detaining and then deporting such a large number of people is a logistical nightmare. Further, it has raised concerns, including from the United Nations, of possible massive human rights violations. The Afghan Taliban spokesperson stated that Pakistan’s attitude and proposed policies were ‘unacceptable’, and he went on to add that “the Pakistani side should reconsider its plan.” Subsequently, the Taliban spokesperson reportedly stated that Afghans living in Pakistan are not refugees as they live on “Afghan soil since the Durand Line is invalid.”
The Pakistan-Afghanistan border tensions have a long history. For long, many in Afghanistan refused to accept the Durand line as the border between the two countries. From an Afghan perspective, large swathes of Pashtun land are currently under Pakistan’s control because of the Durand Line, which was created during British colonial rule.
For decades, Pakistan has intervened in the politics of Afghanistan. Pakistan security agencies have sought to blur various lines, such as territorial boundaries and undermine inter-ethnic relations. Such persistent blurring of lines is now coming to haunt Pakistan. With Pakistan heading for elections, deep internal discord and a severe economic crisis, countering the TTP will be challenging. Further, the idea of the Durand Line as an unfair boundary for Pashtuns is getting re-energised.
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Sanjay Pulipaka is the chairperson of the Politeia Research Foundation. The views expressed here are personal.































