Source: Wikimedia Commons
Sanjay Pulipaka
The recent Chatham House publication by Damien Symon and John Pollock on Myanmar’s Coco Islands has generated considerable interest in South Asia and beyond. Using the satellite photographs developed by Maxar Technologies, Symon and Pollock contend that there is increased construction activity on Greater Coco, which includes ‘two new hangars, a new causeway and freshly lengthened 2,300-metre runway.’ The authors contend that new facilities can ‘support aircraft..to conduct maritime surveillance operations.’ The authors state that the Tatmadaw (Myanmar military) is carrying out new construction, not China. Nonetheless, they allude to the possible use of such facilities by the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the near future, given the growing presence of Beijing in Myanmar.
As the above mentioned publication and many others have noted, numerous reports have speculated possible Chinese military activities in the Coco Islands. In 2001, the Irrawaddy reported that Tatmadaw “with the help of China..[had]..set up signals intelligence (SIGNIT) equipment on Hainggyi Island, Coco Island and Zadetkyi Island..” In 2007, after evaluating various publications, Andrew Selth argued that there never was a SIGNIT base on Coco Island. However, reports about Chinese involvement in Myanmar’s naval bases continued to persist. In 2014, Namrata Goswami’s IDSA publication titled China’s Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India referred to the presence of “Chinese technicians and instructors…on radar installations in naval bases” and that the Indian navy “intercepted fishing trawlers flying Myanmar flags off the Andaman Islands. On inspection, all the crew turned out to be Chinese nationals.” Three years later, Vinayak Bhat provided photographic evidence to buttress his claims that the Coco Island is witnessing increased military-related activities which include ‘reclamation of land, expansion of the airstrip, construction of a new naval pier, and the installation of a new radar station with three SHORAD guns.’ After the Chatham House publication in March 2023, numerous reports expressed suspicion that Beijing is indeed involved in intelligence gathering through a set-up in the Coco Islands. China’s foreign ministry and Myanmar’s State Administrative Council (SAC) have reportedly referred to Beijing’s involvement in construction activity in Coco Islands as “sheer nonsense” and “absurd” respectively.
Despite repeated denials, the speculation that the Chinese military will eventually make its presence felt in Coco Islands shows no signs of abatement. Partly this may have to do with China’s strategic behaviour. In 2015, the Chinese leadership emphatically stated that they do “not intend to pursue militarisation” of the artificial islands in the South China Sea. However, within a few years, at least three islands in the South China Sea witnessed significant militarisation. Therefore, given Beijing’s many leverages on Myanmar, many expect China to adopt a similar strategy – deny and then demonstrate military presence – in Coco Islands as well.
In addition to Myanmar, there is a substantive increase in Chinese presence in Sri Lanka and Pakistan. Consequently, China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy, often a source of much debate, has become a reality. The Coco Islands are strategically located at the northern tip of India’s Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) island chain. Chinese military presence on these islands will have a negative impact on India’s power projection capabilities in the region and will fundamentally alter the geopolitical dynamic of the Bay of Bengal.
The Bay of Bengal has witnessed numerous non-traditional security threats, such as forced migration, human trafficking, illegal narcotics trade, humanitarian crisis, tsunamis and cyclones. However, thus far, the Bay of Bengal was never a geopolitical hotspot. Indeed, there were incidents such as the US naval fleet moving into the region during the 1971 Bangladesh war. Nevertheless, despite such episodic events, the Bay of Bengal has largely remained relatively insulated from global power politics. To a large extent, this was due to the responsible conduct of most of the littoral states.
India, with its peninsular landmass jutting into the Indian Ocean, island chains in the Bay of Bengal/the Arabian Sea, formidable defence forces and vibrant economy enjoys, significant advantages in the region. Delhi has proactively responded to many non-traditional security challenges in the Indian Ocean region with alacrity. As a liberal democracy, India has sought to uphold the rule of law in the maritime domain and has not violated the territorial integrity of its neighbours. Neither did India make unreasonable maritime claims or create artificial islands for military purposes. In fact, India has abided by the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration on a maritime boundary dispute with Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal.
If neighbouring countries tend to discard Indian concerns and allow extra-regional powers to establish military bases, there may be demands within India to re-examine its accommodative foreign policy. Moreover, such military bases will result in trust deficit and acrimony among the Bay of Bengal littoral states, which will scare away foreign direct investments and dent economic growth.
A peek into contemporary history may provide some pathways to ensure greater stability in the Bay of Bengal region. In the 1980s’ there was considerable discussion on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. However, the time has come to take a more disaggregated approach and think of multiple zones of peace. Each zone of peace can have distinct characteristics and varied operating principles.
India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Indonesia should seriously consider declaring the Bay of Bengal as a Zone of Peace. The countries in the region should pledge to refrain from granting military bases to non-littoral countries and should not allow a prolonged presence of military/dual-use vessels from non-littoral countries. Countries that handed over ports on long-term leases to others should put stringent controls on the visit of military/dual-use vessels from non-littoral countries. The Zone of Peace framework will also empower relatively smaller states in the region to fend off pressures from other powers demanding greater military presence. Regional frameworks such as the BBIN and the BIMSTEC can also be platforms to discuss and build the Zone of Peace framework.
In addition to diplomatic initiatives, India will have to further strengthen its defence forces’ presence in the A&N islands and take necessary technological countermeasures to the SIGINT facilities in the neighbouring region. There is also a need to scale up the connectivity networks between India’s A&N islands and the neighbouring regions.
For continued peace and prosperity in the region, countries abutting the Bay of Bengal must work assiduously to contain the emergence of geopolitical competition involving non-littoral powers. Such prudent approach will go a long way in assuaging geopolitical anxieties which have the potential to undermine the regional stability in the Bay of Bengal region.
Sanjay Pulipaka is the Chairperson of the Politeia Research Foundation. The views expressed here are personal.
References
Andrew Selth, “Chinese Whispers: The Great Coco Island Mystery.” The Irrawaddy, January, 2007, available at https://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=6640&page=1.
“Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between Bangladesh and India (Bangladesh v. India),” Permanent Court Of Arbitration, July 08, 2014, available at https://pca-cpa.org/en/news/bay-of-bengal-maritime-boundary-arbitration-between-bangladesh-and-india-bangladesh-v-india/
“China Has Fully Militarized Three Islands in South China Sea, US Admiral Says.” The Guardian. March 21, 2022, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says.
Damien Symon and John Pollock,”Is Myanmar Building a Spy Base on Great Coco Island?” Chatham House, March 31, 2023, available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/the-world-today/2023-04/myanmar-building-spy-base-great-coco-island.
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Jeremy Page, and Carol E. Lee and Gordon Lubold. “China’s President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands.” The Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818
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Maha Atal, “China’s ‘String of Pearls’ – Real or Fake?” Forbes, February 2, 2013, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/mahaatal/2013/02/02/chinas-string-of-pearls-real-or-fake/?sh=28a83d442980
Maria Siow, “China the ‘natural Suspect’ Behind Military Upgrades on Islands Near India.” South China Morning Post. April 11, 2023, available at https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3216578/china-natural-suspect-behind-military-upgrades-myanmar-islands-near-india?module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article&campaign=3216578.
Namrata Goswami, “China’s Second Coast: Implications for Northeast India.” Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, June 19, 2014, available at https://idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasSecondCoast_ngoswami_190614.
Snehesh Alex Philip, “Myanmar’s Great Coco Island Near Andamans Gets New Military Infrastructure, Chinese Hand Suspected.” The Print, March 31, 2023. https://theprint.in/defence/myanmars-great-coco-island-near-andamans-gets-new-military-infrastructure-chinese-hand-suspected/1487003/.
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace,” (New York: United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, 1983): pp 375-389. https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210579872s005-c003#:~:text=As%20a%20result%20of%20that,as%20a%20zone%20of%20peace.
Vinayak Bhat, Strong need to monitor activities in strategic Coco Islands, ORF, March 15 2017, available at https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/strong-need-to-monitor-activities-in-strategic-coco-islands/
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