Conceptual Framework for Narrative Warfare
by Captain (IN) TSV Ramana (Retd.)
Introduction
In India, the word ‘narrative’ assumed significance in the backdrop of OP Sindoor. There were diverse voices expressing a wide range of opinions, with some stating that India had got the ‘narrative’ wrong and others saying that it had done everything right. This Paper attempts to arrive at a conceptual framework for handling narrative.
What is a ‘Narrative’?
A narrative is something that gives meaning to a series of events.1 A narrative has the following four components: – 2
(a) Meaning: Narratives do not necessarily tell the truth; they convey meaning. If done well, they do not allow the audience to derive their own meaning.
(b) Identity: In the best-case scenario, the narrator’s identity must align with that of the target audience. To achieve this, a clear understanding of the narratives that have helped shape the target audience’s identity is required.
(c) Content: Narratives are about something. This ‘something’ is the content.
(d) Structure: The way the content is presented is the ‘structure.’ The generally accepted norm is that a structure must have a beginning, middle, and end.
The Jargon Pitfall
A seminal article by Rear Admiral Raja Menon titled “Military jargon cripples serious thinking” highlighted the fact that the indiscriminate use of ‘jargon’ ends up creating an intellectual fog.3 Narrative warfare also seems to be afflicted with the malaise of numerous such jargons. The 10 activities and associated jargon in vogue that can be deemed to be part of narrative warfare are highlighted in subsequent paragraphs.
Types of Activities and Jargon Associated with Narrative Warfare
Strategic Communication (Stratcom): STRATCOM can be defined as “the transmission of integrated and coordinated themes, messages and actions that advance national interests and policies through synchronised efforts of all involved agencies.”4
Information Warfare (IW): IW is defined as “any action taken to deny, exploit, corrupt or destroy the enemy’s information and its functions, while protecting against those actions and exploiting own military information functions.” The purpose of IW is to attain an information advantage over the adversary, in order to establish information dominance and control the adversary’s actions to suit naval plans in pursuance of national objectives. 5
Information Operations (IO): Information operations include, among others, “the spread of disinformation and propaganda; the systematic suppression of information and internet takedowns; the manipulation of social media platforms and the use of their algorithms to create information bubbles that are polarising society and inciting hate against societal groups. In addition, paid advertisement and targeted content; hack-and-leak operations during electoral processes; threats and harassment against various members of society, including journalists, political opponents and representatives of civil society organisations, are used in information operations.” 6 Influence Operations (Infl Ops): “Influence Operations refers to the use of non-military means of psychological, informational and political influence and subversion to undermine the security and governance of a targeted country.”7
Cognitive Warfare (CW): The term ‘cognitive domain’ was first coined by the US Department of Defence in its 2001 congressional report on ‘Network Centric Warfare’. “It encompasses ‘neuroscience, behavioural science, and digital technologies’, targeting influence and disruption of human cognition. It combines aspects of psychological warfare (Psy War), information warfare (IW), political warfare, targeting of ‘hearts and minds’ and propaganda through sophisticated strategies.”8
Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO): The goal of CDO is “mind superiority” using psychological warfare to shape or even control the enemy’s cognitive thinking and decision-making. According to a leading Chinese PLA theorist, Zeng Huafeng of the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), “cognitive space” is defined as “the area in which feelings, perception, understanding, beliefs, and values exist, and is the field of decision-making through reasoning.” It includes many “intangible factors” such as “leadership, morale, cohesion; training level and experience; situational awareness and public opinion.” 9
Perception Management (PM): Perception Management (PM) is a term that has its origins in the United States military. “It is defined as “actions to convey and/or deny selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning, as well as to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels, to influence official estimates, ultimately resulting in foreign behaviours and official actions favourable to the originator’s objectives. In various ways, perception management combines truth projection, operations’ security, cover and deception, and psychological operations.”10
Psychological Warfare (Psy War): “Psychological warfare is a deliberate employment of manipulation techniques to induce or reinforce attitudes that are favourable, to gain strategic advantage over others”.11
Public Affairs (PAs): “Public affairs is a term used to describe an organisation’s relationship with stakeholders. These are individuals or groups with an interest in the organisation’s affairs. Public affairs practitioners engage with stakeholders to explain organisational policies and views on public policy issues, assisting policymakers and legislators in amending or enacting better policies and legislation. They provide statistical and factual information and lobby on issues which could impact upon the organisation’s ability to operate successfully.”12
Public Diplomacy (PD): Public diplomacy is the diplomacy beyond traditional Government-to-Government engagement. It is about building people-to-people links and sustaining an extensive network of relationships with other countries. It advances a country’s interests through strengthening its influence and reputation.13
Desired End State (DES) of the Activities
The DES of the abovementioned activities (gleaned from the definitions in the Paper), are as tabulated below: –
| Ser | Activity | DES |
|---|---|---|
| (a) | Strategic Communication (Stratcom) | Advance national interests and policies. |
| (b) | Information Warfare (IW) | To attain information advantage over the adversary in order to establish information dominance and control the adversary’s actions. |
| (c) | Information Operations (IO) | To create information bubbles that polarise society. |
| (d) | Influence Operations (Infl Ops) | Undermine the security and governance of a targeted country. |
| (e) | Cognitive Warfare (CW) | Influence and disrupt human cognition. |
| (f) | Cognitive Domain Operations (CDO) | Mind superiority using psychological warfare to shape or even control the enemy’s cognitive thinking and decision-making. |
| (g) | Perception Management (PM) | To influence emotions, motives, and objective reasoning. |
| (h) | Psychological Warfare (Psy War) | Induce or reinforce attitudes that are favourable to gain strategic advantage. |
| (j) | Public Affairs (PAs) | Explain organisational policies and views on public policy issues, assisting policymakers and legislators in amending or laying down better policy and legislation. |
| (k) | Public Diplomacy (PD) | Advances a country’s interests by strengthening its influence and reputation. |
(Table 1- Purpose of Jargon-Source- Author’s Compilation from notes 4-13)
The overall desired end states of the abovementioned activities can be summarised as follows: –
- Advance national interests.
- Gain an advantage over the adversary/target country.
- Control the actions of the adversary.
- Strengthen the influence and reputation of the country.
- Undermine the security and governance of the target country.
- Shape and control the cognitive domain of the target audience by influencing emotions, reasoning ability and decision-making.
Overcoming the Jargon Pitfall
Continued use of the 10 jargons indicated above will only lead to confusion and cloud the thinking. It would be better to discard these, and only one jargon, namely ‘narrative warfare (NW)’, should be adopted.
Who Should Conduct the Narrative Warfare?
Once the decision to conduct NW has been taken, it has to be realised that narratives are never limited to any one particular organisation, and once out in the public domain, it is very difficult to predict and control their horizontal and vertical spread.
Hence, if each organisation tries to conduct its own NW, it will lead to disjointed efforts and, many a time, be at cross-purposes with other organisations. This can prove to be counter-productive and sometimes even catastrophic.
NW requires a national-level effort. Ideally, an organisation designated as ‘National Information Dissemination Organisation (NIDO)’ may need to be constituted. NIDO must be a permanent organisation headed by a senior functionary who is empowered to take a call in an emergency and initiate the narrative or put out relevant counters. The act of disseminating narrative will lose its effectiveness if one needs to cross layers of bureaucracy to obtain approvals.
NIDO must be staffed with members from various agencies, such as the bureaucracy, diplomats, armed forces, central and state police forces, national intelligence agencies, cyber agencies, journalists, and others, such as social media influencers, who could be co-opted as and when required.
Further, NIDO must also have an extensive repository of all content related to narrative warfare conducted by various countries, covering the entire spectrum from old historical data to recent ones. All these should be analysed, lessons drawn, and documented.
It would also need a war room manned 24 hours and 365 days, continuously monitoring the print, media, television, radio and cyberspace for developments and narratives that impact the country. Each stakeholder must have a mirror organisation, and preferably, a designated single point of contact to coordinate with the NIDO. On every occasion when there is a need for NW, the NIDO must lead/coordinate all actions.
What Should be the Characteristics of the Narrative?
The narrative must, inter alia, have the following characteristics: –
(a) The content could be text (in relevant languages), images, videos, annotated images (with annotations in relevant languages), subtitled videos (in relevant languages), or videos in the target audience’s native language.
(b) The message that is sent out must be clear, concise and easy to understand. It must not be open to interpretation due to inherent ambiguities.
(c) The content could be the complete truth, easily verifiable by the adversary; it could be a sanitised version of the truth, not easily verifiable by the adversary; or it could even be an outright lie (fake news) that is impossible to verify. The originator must be clear about this.
(d) Ideally, hyperbole should be avoided both in the content and during in-person briefings.
(e) The individuals who are nominated to brief the media must be credible, have sound knowledge of the issues at hand, be articulate, be able to connect with the target audience and handle tricky questions, if any.
(f) Sometimes, there may be a need to impose a total blackout and not publish any content at all to see how the adversary reacts. However, this has to be a well considered decision and carries a high degree of risk.
(g) The originator must be clear as to what the DES of the content being sent out is.
(h) Metrics have to be designed that will indicate whether the DES is being achieved or not. Sending out content without knowing whether it is effective is fraught with risk and could be counterproductive.
(j) The anticipated reaction of the adversary, including the counter-narrative that could be sent out by the adversary, must be war-gamed in quick time by the ‘Red Team.’
(k) The means employed for disseminating the content could, inter alia, include media briefings, media releases, statements by credible high functionaries, publishing in print media and social media.
(l) The important aspect is that all these actions must occur in multiple languages, and not be limited only to English. All relevant languages in a particular situation must be used when disseminating the narrative. These languages must include those native to India, the target country, and other widely used languages worldwide.
(m) There will be a need for a large number of linguists fluent in various languages, either on permanent payroll or whose services can be requisitioned in quick time.
When and How Should NW Be Conducted?
NW needs to be happening at all times (in peacetime, in less-than-war situations, in no-peace-no-war situations, during wartime and post-war) and must never stop. In specific situations, the focus, pace and intensity of NW may shift. Ideally, all NW must be a pre-planned activity. However, there may be unforeseen events warranting impromptu NW with very little time for preparation.
Further, the originator must be proactive as far as NW is concerned, and speed is of the essence. The entity that takes the lead has the advantage, since the adversary can then only scramble to counter the narrative irrespective of whether it is true or not.
Cyber capabilities must be employed to disrupt the adversary’s ability to utilise social media. Once a narrative has been put out, advantage will be gained if the adversary is constrained to respond because his social media handles are inoperative. It is but natural that defensive measures to prevent the adversary from engaging in such activities against the originator must also be taken. Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities are the key during NW.
NW must be regularly war-gamed, and all possible scenarios must be exercised, lessons learnt, and documented. The ‘Red’ team must be given full freedom in these war games and no constraint must be imposed on it.
Recommendations
The following recommendations are relevant for an effective NW: –
(a) All the 10-jargon indicated in this Paper must be discarded and only one, namely ‘Narrative Warfare (NW)’ must be adopted as part of the official lexicon.
(b) A dedicated national-level organisation designated as ‘National Information Dissemination Organisation (NIDO)’ needs to be constituted for the conduct of NW.
(c) Formal training and, more importantly, sensitising of the personnel involved in NW is critical.
(d) Personnel executing NW must be intellectually sharp, have a high degree of situational awareness, be articulate with excellent communication skills and have the boldness to take quick calls when necessary.
(e) NW has to be a continuous activity that runs 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and must never cease.
(f) The Desired End State (DES) and the metrics for monitoring the effectiveness of the narrative need to be defined before any information is disseminated.
(g) A large pool of linguists fluent in relevant languages needs to be assembled, and their services requisitioned by the NIDO.
(h) Significant scaling up of offensive and defensive cyber capabilities and their use during NW is critical.
(j) NW must be regularly war-gamed, and all possible scenarios must be exercised and lessons learnt and documented. The ‘Red’ team must be given full freedom in these war games, and no constraint must be imposed on it
Conclusion
Narrative Warfare (NW) has assumed critical importance at all times, especially during times of war/crisis. Significant financial investment is not needed to make it effective; rather, it only requires harnessing of ‘intellectual capital’ and the cliched ‘out of the box thinking.’ Remaining two steps ahead of the adversary is the need of the hour, and is non-negotiable.
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1 Paul Cobaugh, “Narrative Warfare”, Medium, Jan 22, 2019, https://medium.com/@paulcobaugh/narrative-warfare-14ab7fa7ef89 (accessed 15 June 2026)
2 Ajit Mann & Paul Cobaugh, “Introduction to Narrative Warfare- A Primer and Study Guide”, (Narrative Strategies LLC, Washington DC,2018)
3 Rear Admiral Raja Menon Retd., “Military jargon cripples serious thinking”, The Tribune, Jun 04, 2026, https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/comment/military-jargon-cripples-serious-thinking/ (accessed 15 June 2026)
4 Indian Navy, “Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Navy Maritime Security Strategy (INMSS-2026)”, https://indiannavy.gov.in/sites/default/files/2026-06/Book_Indian%20Navy%20Maritime%20Security%20Strategy_Version6_ver3-3.pdf (accessed 16 June 2026)
5 Ibid *definition given by Indian Navy has been used in this Paper
6 Katarína Klingová, “Information operations”, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Progressive Yearbook 2023, Big Issues 131, 2023/01/13, https://feps-europe.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/13.-Information-operations-by-Katarina-Klingova.pdf (accessed 18 June 2026)
7 Adil Rasheed, “Influence Operations: The Sharp Power of Non-Kinetic Subversion”, Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA),April 2024, https://idsa.in/publisher/monograph/influence-operations-the-sharp-power-of-non-kinetic-subversion-3 (accessed 18 June 2026)
8 Manohar Parrikar Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), “Cognitive Warfare: Key Aspects”, August 18,2025, https://idsa.in/publisher/issuebrief/cognitive-warfare-key-aspects (accessed 18 June 2026)
9 Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, “Cognitive Domain Operations: The PLA’s New Holistic Concept for Influence Operations”, Jamestown, China Brief Vol 19, Issue 16, 09-06-2019, https://jamestown.org/cognitive-domain-operations-the-plas-new-holistic-concept-for-influence-operations/ (accessed 18 June 2026)
10 Brigadier BM Kapoor, “The Art of Perception Management in Information Warfare Today”, United Service Institution of India (USI), USI Journals, Dec 2009-31-33, https://usiofindia.org/pdf/USI%20Journals%20Oct%20-%20Dec%202009-31-33.pdf (accessed 18 June 2026)
11 Dr. Pranay Kumar Tripathi, “Psychological Warfare: Conceptual Overview”, Forum for Integrated National Security (FINS), March 01,2029, https://finsindia.org/psychological-warfare-conceptual-overview.html (accessed 18 June 2026)
12 Public Affairs Networking, “What is Public Affairs?”, https://www.publicaffairsnetworking.com/what-is-public-affairs.php (accessed 18 June 2026)
13 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Public diplomacy”, https://www.dfat.gov.au/people-to-people/public-diplomacy (accessed 18 June 2026)
Captain TSV Ramana is a former Indian Navy Officer and a pioneer of the Indian Navy’s analytical studies vis-à-vis China, with extended tenures in the Directorate of Naval Intelligence at Naval Headquarters, the China Cell at the National Maritime Foundation, at the Maritime Doctrine and Concept Centre (MDCC) as part of the ‘Strategic Maritime Assessment Team (SMAT) – China’ and the Centre for Contemporary China Studies (CCCS). He is a qualified Mandarin interpreter from the School of Foreign Languages at New Delhi. The views expressed are his own. He can be reached at tsvramana68@gmail.com.
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