The Iran War: Response of the Middle Powers (India, Japan and South Korea)
by Rajaram Panda
The maverick and mercurial US President Donald Trump, notorious for his disruptive stances and policies on foreign affairs, waged a war against Iran jointly with Israel that has already lasted 45 days and is snowballing into a major regional conflict with the potential to escalate further. Although several leading political leaders of the world have tried to use their good offices to find a solution and end the conflict, nothing has worked so far. There was a glimmer of hope when Trump announced on 7 April 2026 a two-week ceasefire. His own military strike deadline had barely expired before negotiations began, and a deal brokered by Pakistan on 12 April also broke down.
The talks ended without a breakthrough, followed by allegations from Iran’s Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had telephoned US Vice President J D Vance, who was leading the US delegation, after which the focus of negotiations shifted to Israeli interests. Iran claimed it entered the Pakistan-hosted talks in good faith, but the US side became stuck on Iran’s nuclear programme, citing enrichment as the central obstacle.
The talks marked the first direct high-level engagement between the two sides since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Another major concern for the world was that the conflict that began on 28 February had disrupted regional stability and global energy flows. Iran alleged that the US “failed to win the trust” of Iran during the discussions. It may be noted that Iran pursues the “diplomacy of power” alongside its military capabilities to secure its national interests.
In the meantime, the impact of Trump’s war against Iran had already negatively affected all economies and all walks of life in most countries in the world. Oil prices have surged, and equity markets from Tokyo to European capitals have plunged to lows as the world watched the most critical energy chokepoint become a war zone.
When talks in Islamabad broke down without an agreement, Trump wasted no time in announcing that the US Navy would immediately begin a blockade of ships entering or leaving the Strait of Hormuz. Before fighting began, Trump’s idea was to eliminate Iran’s key source of leverage in the war by extending strategic control over the waterway responsible for the shipping of 20 per cent of global oil supplies. If Trump does this, the blockade could rattle global energy markets. Since Iran had already announced plans to impose a toll on ships transiting the waterway, Trump wanted to end Iran’s illegal practice of collecting fees from ships on the high seas. Trump argued that freedom of peaceful navigation is a basic principle of navigation and international maritime trade, a premise least expected to be observed by countries at war. Iran was just doing that as a countermeasure and retaliation against Trump’s actions.
Neither side is willing to yield. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard claims that the strait remained under Iran’s “full control” and was open to non-military vessels, but military vessels would receive a “forceful response”.
Impact of the War on India and East Asia
The war’s impact has not spared the two important US allies in East Asia, namely Japan and South Korea. President Trump has also rattled the global economy by imposing high tariffs on all US trading partners, including India. Imposing high tariffs as a weapon goes against global trading norms, for which Trump has little respect. As the US moves assets to the Middle East for a protracted conflict, both its allies in East Asia – Japan and South Korea – find themselves on the edge. These two allies are sandwiched between China, North Korea and Russia, and with trust in their main benefactor diminishing, their concerns are understandable.
How such middle powers, including India, can navigate these turbulent times is a moot question that begs an answer. At one level, President Trump has been pressuring both Japan and South Korea to increase their defence spending, raising it to at least 5 per cent of GDP and aligning with the commitments of NATO countries. Now, Trump has been demanding that several countries, including Japan and South Korea, send warships to the Middle East to help secure the Strait of Hormuz and allow the passage of oil. This demand sparked protests in the streets of Japan and South Korea. Anti-war activists in both these allies are wary of the impact the conflict could have on their countries and on the lives of the people.
The most worrying aspect for the two East Asian allies was Trump’s decision to move defence assets and weaponry stationed in Japan and South Korea to the Middle East to aid US war efforts. This prompted concern in both countries, as such assets in the region were intended to deter military muscle-flexing by North Korea and China, raising fears that a deployment to the Middle East could destabilise the region. South Korea genuinely fears that if US assets are moved to the Middle East, US bases and South Korea could become targets at any time. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi raised this issue with Trump during her visit to Washington in March.
When reports surfaced that the US was moving parts of the THAAD (Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence) and Patriot missile defence systems out of South Korea, the fears in South Korea were real. The issue was further complicated when Pyongyang launched 10 ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan around this time, in response to annual military exercises by the US and South Korea on the peninsula. Pyongyang has always viewed such joint exercises as rehearsals for invasion. It is worth comparing Iran’s case with that of North Korea, which is why the nuclear issue remains at the centre stage.
Writing for The Diplomat on 1 April 2026, Jong Eun Lee observed that Seoul had three options in response to the US request for naval involvement in the Strait of Hormuz: leveraging, minimising, or compensating.1 In a theoretical postulation, Lee explains South Korea’s case, arguing that “abandonment” vs “entrapment” is a classic alliance dilemma in geopolitical crises. He goes further, explaining that a country may fear being abandoned by its allies during a war. Lee observes: “Alternatively, a country may fear being drawn into a costly war as a result of its alliance commitment…For U.S. allies, the ongoing Iran-U.S. military conflict has resulted in a new round of diplomatic challenges to navigate between these risks of abandonment or entrapment.”2
Like South Korea, Japan was also rattled by the news that two US destroyers based in Japan were being deployed to the Middle East. The issue was raised in the Diet by the Opposition, which demanded an answer from the government. The news that the US was moving 2,500 marines from Japan sparked concern across the country.
As it transpired, many allies that Trump demanded share their military resources declined to comply with his request for ships. Both Japan and South Korea, being allies and still dependent on the US nuclear umbrella, were more circumspect and hesitant to confront Trump with a definite ‘No,’ just not to aggravate the situation and provoke Trump. Japan was concerned that Trump might request the supply of defensive missiles, as American stocks were being depleted. Both the allies were also concerned about the complicated domestic legal issue. Japan was also weighing legal complexities, as the country’s pacifist Constitution, despite its ambiguities and multiple interpretations, would have increased Japan’s dilemma. Japan also realises that, despite being an ally, it has maintained friendly relations with Iran in the past, as it is heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil. When Trump finally withdrew the appeal and said the military assistance was no longer needed, the allies felt relieved. Takaichi was spared the dilemma of balancing American demands against legal and political sensitivities at home.
As the trust in the US begins to diminish, discussions are gathering pace on whether the time is opportune for Japan and Korea to revisit the nuclear option to defend their sovereignty. This is a separate issue that demands in-depth analysis.
Diplomacy at Work
The three middle powers – India, Japan and South Korea – realised that there is no better option than pursuing diplomacy as the ideal tool for seeking a solution. History has shown that it is easy to start a war, but ending it is always messy. It is regrettable that Trump overlooked this truth and, by his questionable action, has harmed the whole world. Diplomacy, therefore, is always relevant, and three countries in focus in this analysis have demonstrated this by their stances.
Japan’s Prime Minister Takaichi weathered a domestic storm. Prime Minister Takaichi called Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and spoke for 25 minutes, hours after the US and Iran announced a two-week ceasefire in their military conflict to ensure the safe navigation of vessels from all countries, including those affiliated with Japan, through the embattled Strait of Hormuz. Her main intention was to de-escalate the situation as soon as possible. This was Takaichi’s first conversation with the Iranian President since the US and Israel launched military strikes on Iran on 28 February 2026. Japan has also held three rounds of talks at the foreign minister level with Iran. The significance of this diplomatic outreach can be understood by the fact that, for Iran, talks with Japan serve as a bargaining chip against the US, while for Japan, holding discussions with Iran sends a message to the US.3
Japan was also concerned that the Strait of Hormuz remained under a de facto Iranian blockade, leaving more than 3,000 vessels, including about 40 linked to Japan, stranded in the Persian Gulf west of the strait. It is widely recognised that the Strait of Hormuz is a crucial artery for global logistics and constitutes an “international public good.” It was worrisome that Iran was leveraging its proximity to the Strait and demanding transit fees from vessels passing through it.
India imports nearly 50 per cent of its LNG and about 60 per cent of LPG, with a large share coming from Doha. The conflict disrupted supplies via the Strait of Hormuz, which remained closed for nearly a month. India has major long-term contracts with QatarEnergy for LNG supplies, including a 17-year deal with Gujarat State Petroleum Corporation for 1 million tonnes per annum (MTPA) starting in 2026, and a 20-year extension with Petronet LNG for 7.5 MTPA from 2028 to 2048. Iranian strikes in mid-March caused extensive damage to QatarEnergy’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, the world’s largest LNG facility, cutting output by 17 per cent (12.5 million tonnes) and triggering a global supply disruption.4
India also activated its energy outreach amid the truce, reaching out to Gulf nations. While India’s Foreign Minister S. Jayashankar travelled to the UAE, Petroleum and Natural Gas Minister Hardeep Singh Puri went to Qatar to secure safe passage for vessels through the key Strait of Hormuz. Both the UAE and Qatar are vital energy suppliers for India. The visit was also intended to deepen the strategic partnership with the UAE. The UAE is India’s fourth-largest source of crude oil and second-largest source of LNG and LPG, accounting for over 40 per cent of its global LNG imports. Puri’s visit was significant as India seeks to secure energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz.
India hopes that the twin visits will provide an opportunity to assess the broader security situation and raise issues related to the Indian diaspora, as around four million in the UAE and over 830,000 in Qatar are engaged in various professions. India has legitimate concerns for its interests and the welfare of the diaspora. As it transpires, the war against Iran has broader ramifications and requires understanding accordingly. The middle powers have a major role to play in this process. It is hoped that good sense will dawn on Trump and that he will abandon his destructive path in the interests of global peace.
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Prof. Rajaram Panda is a former Senior Fellow at the MP-IDSA (2009-2012) and PMML (2021-23). He is also a former ICCR Chair Professor at Reitaku University, Japan (2016-18)
Endnotes
1 Jong Eun Lee, “How Will South Korea Respond to the Iran-US Conflict?” The Diplomat, April 01, 2026, https://thediplomat.com/2026/04/how-will-south-korea-respond-to-the-iran-us-conflict/
2 Ibid.,
3 “Takaichi urges Pezeshkian to keep Hormuz safe for traffic,” The Asahi Shimbun, April 9, 2026, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/16486099
4 “Fragile Truce in Place, India Reaches out to Gulf Nations”, Times of India, 10 April 2026. Also see, “Rajveev Jyaswal and Rezaul H Laskar, “India Steps up Energy Outreach Amid Truce”, Hindustan Times, 10 April 2026.
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