Russia and Two Wars: Ukraine and Iran

by Krishnan Srinivasan

The Ukraine War

Two curious media references, one in the western media and the second in India, are notable and worth emphasis. In the West, and almost totally aped word for word by the media elsewhere, is the term ‘full-scale war’ with reference to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2022. To any but the most bigoted observers, Russia has imposed a far from full-scale war in Ukraine, considering its underused range, short of nuclear, weaponry and air force. The second reference is the Indian media’s inability to look beyond the biased western sources in their reporting, apparently oblivious or forgetful of Ukraine’s unfavourable if not hostile attitude and actions towards India ever since the break-up of the Soviet Union.

As the war in Ukraine enters its fifth year, Russian opinion is convinced that President Vladimir Putin, made no error in initiating it in February 2022 and looks back with a sense of achievement, that the war is ending on their terms, perhaps even soon. A feature of this conflict is the discrepancy between Russia’s expectations and how it is interpreted by the western/Indian media and our so-called expert commentators. The former tend to describe Russia’s motives as a manifestation of its alleged ambition to establish control over half of Europe, whereas Russian motives are ad hoc and pragmatic. In general terms, they draw a firm line against NATO’s expansion towards Russia’s borders, which was aimed at Russia’s isolation and containment.

The security-obsessed elements within Putin’s circles have benefited from the West’s open hostility towards Russia. The interplay between those security elites and hawkish western lobbies who service the media and military-industrial complex is a joint venture that serves both parties with money and influence. In Russia’s case, the conflict in Ukraine – which most Russians see as a proxy war with NATO – allowed these securocratic elites to eliminate the pro-western liberal opposition that once threatened their political position.

There was logic to Putin’s decision stemming from 2019-2021 when the then new Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought rapprochement with Russia – a policy that resulted in a near ceasefire along the front line in the Donbas region where a low-intensity historic conflict had simmered since 2014. Zelenskyy came under immense pressure from Ukraine’s elites to claim he faced a coup over what was described as capitulation, and hawkish lobbies in the West persuaded him that Russia could, with their help, of course, be defeated militarily, taking their cue from Azerbaijan’s victory over Armenia in the last few months of 2020.

So in January 2021, Zelenskyy made a u-turn in his Russia policy, transforming into a hawk, to clamp down on Putin’s allies and launch an aggressive campaign for Ukraine’s NATO membership and against the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. This u-turn coincided with President Joe Biden’s inauguration in the White House. In March 2021, Putin started deploying troops at the Ukrainian border, but it took another 11 months before he launched the invasion, while Ukraine’s western friends seemed more eager to contest Russia than to avert the invasion.

When Putin finally launched his invasion, it transpired that his plan was along the pattern of Russia’s war in Georgia in 2008, prompted by President Saakashvili’s ill-advised and western-inspired decision to recapture the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Russia’s ‘invasion’, which was in reality hardly more a symbolic parade on the assumption that there would be little or no Ukrainian resistance, was to force upon Kiev a version of the Minsk agreements, reached in 2014 and 2015 but not implemented due to the bad faith of the participants, OSCE, Ukraine, France and Germany. This has since been confirmed by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

The hope to avoid a war along the fortified line of contact in the eastern region of Donbas failed due to the above bad faith, Ukrainian resilience and large-scale western military aid. But the Russians definitely did not see it as something not worth attempting. While threatening Kyiv, they achieved a land corridor between Russia and Crimea that has been annexed in 2014.

After the Istanbul talks of 2022 were derailed – once again an example of bad faith and folly by Britain and the USA – the Russians chose to regroup, abandoning loosely controlled and difficult-to-hold areas, and settled on a prolonged war of attrition along the Donbas front line. They also raised the cost of what they saw as Ukrainian intransigence by formally annexing four partially occupied Ukrainian regions.

The following four years were a test of Ukrainian and Russian resilience. Russians see themselves as underdogs in a battle with the Western military-industrial machine, which, in this view, uses Ukrainian proxies as cannon fodder. During the first two years of this war, the Western experts and media prophesied the collapse of the Russian army and economy; the former portrayed as an unruly mob of poorly equipped and motivated soldiers and the latter described as fundamentally brittle.

Neither the Russian economy nor its military machine has collapsed. Russia experienced an economic boom during the first two years of the war, when the rouble was the world’s best-performing currency in 2025. The Russian army withstood the Ukrainian counter-offensive of 2023, which was advertised by the Ukrainian leadership and Western punditry as an advance for the liberation of Crimea. Russia resumed its slow offensive to break Kyiv’s will rather than occupy huge territories. The Russians proved an ability to adapt and innovate, gradually taking the lead in drone warfare, that makes this war the most technologically advanced form of warfare so far.

At present Ukraine looks devastated, depopulated and deprived of a demographic and economic future, while Russian society continues to enjoy the same lifestyle by and large as before the war. Its human toll of the war, currently estimated at 200,000-219,000 dead by BBC/Mediazona, is significant for a country of 140 million but primarily affects the most destitute social classes and regions, while largely sparing the country’s urban and middle classes. Putin is patiently waiting for Ukrainian and European leaders, heavily invested in illusory outcomes of this war, to accept reality on the ground and to find ways of scapegoating others rather than themselves for the expected outcome.

This year will see concerted attempts by the Europeans to derail the peace talks underway under US President Trump’s auspices. The delays in a peace settlement come at the cost of numerous Ukrainian lives, territory and devastated infrastructure. The longer the war continues, the more likely it is that Ukrainians will start feeling at least as bitterly about pro-war cheerleaders in the West as about Russia, the prime cause of their suffering.

The Iran War

The US-Israeli attacks on Iran and the assassination of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei cause concern in Moscow; some hawkish Russian commentators warn that Russia could be attacked in the same manner despite its nuclear arsenal. Although the attack on Iran is a vindication of Russian geopolitical strategy, including the aggression against Ukraine, a confirmation of Kremlin’s view of the US-led West as a rogue international actor.

For Putin, the war against Iran echoes 2011 in Libya, when a NATO-led military intervention resulted in the ouster of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. The attack on Libya, was ironically facilitated by then Russian President Medvedev’s abstention at a UN Security Council vote. The end of Gaddafi’s regime has brought neither democracy nor prosperity to Libya and plunged the country into civil war and fragmentation. For Putin, it was an indication of what awaits Russia should he tolerate the neoliberal democratisation crusade waged by the West. In December that year, protests against fraud in Russian legislative elections by pro Western elements in Moscow served to underline these fears. A turning point then arose in Russia’s domestic and foreign policy, with Russia intervening in Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution upheaval less than two years later.

Observing the events in Iran now, Putin probably feels vindicated that his actions in Ukraine were justified, and thankful to his Soviet predecessors that they built the world’s largest nuclear arsenal which ensures Russia’s sovereignty and the impregnability of his regime. Despite starting a war against Russia’s closest European neighbour, Putin considers himself a disciple of the post-World War II order, whose demise, in his opinion, was precipitated by the US-led West becoming overconfident and reckless.

Ukraine and Georgia became ‘enemy territory’ when NATO decided in 2007 to process their membership. This was followed by the short conflict in Georgia in 2008, which led to the division of that country into Russian majority areas recognized by Russia.

The attacks on Ukraine in 2014 and the invasion of 2022 were regarded by the Kremlin as preventive of the military intervention that Iraq, Libya and Syria experienced and that Iran is now facing. Making Ukraine the decisive battlefield of its conflict with the West has allowed the Kremlin to shield the vast majority of the Russian population from any considerable impact of the war, which was portrayed to the Russian people as inevitable.

Iran entered the scene of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict as an unlikely ally of Russia, given the historically difficult relations between the two countries. Iran provided crucial drone technology in the days of Russia’s invasion when the West was convinced that Ukraine had a technological edge over Russia by deploying Turkish Bayraktar drones. Iran’s support was paid for in dollars, which helped prop up its struggling economy. Russian-Iranian ties, however, are not strong enough for Moscow to intervene openly. Additionally, Russia has an informal non-attack understanding with Israel, which refuses to supply weapons systems to Ukraine or join anti-Russian sanctions.  Israel is also a safe haven for elements of the Russian oligarchy who have historically close links to that country.

Another reason for Russia’s neutrality in the US/Israel war with Iran is President Trump’s near-neutral position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with attempts to end it through negotiation. Moscow has no wish to allow European leaders to disrupt its relationship with the Trump administration. Even if it had a wish to help Iran, it would have had little capacity to do so because the Kremlin understands that to extend military technology to Iran would jeopardise relations with Israel and the US.

The US-Israeli war against Iran benefits Russia in the short term. It has caused a spike in the oil and gas price, which means greater revenue from energy sales by Russia, and higher energy prices also affect the ability of the European Union, Ukraine’s prime funder, to finance the war effort. A prolonged war in the Middle East would deplete US arsenals, which would otherwise be available to Ukraine, especially when it comes to air defence missiles, and the US bogged down in the Middle East means Moscow’s greater leverage in ongoing talks with Ukraine.

Finally, Putin stands to benefit from the destruction in Iran, which the US and Israel are trying to sell as something to help Iranians build a freer country. This fortifies the besieged attitude among Russians and enhances Putin’s aura as a protector of the nation, even if an authoritarian one.

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Krishnan Srinivasan is a former foreign secretary