Examining Illegal Migration from Pakistan

Abstract

This essay attempts to give a comprehensive overview of irregular migration (read illegal migration) emanating from Pakistan. International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration “as a movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit, and receiving country”. The paper delves into the facilitation of cross-border migrant smuggling from Pakistan and its consequential effects on regular migration. Additionally, it examines the socio-cultural-political tensions that host states in Europe experience, as well as the complications in bilateral ties between Pakistan and receiving states. Methodologically, the paper relies on secondary sources like journal articles, UN documents, and news media reports. For the sake of lucidity, the phrases ‘irregular migration’ and ‘Illegal migration’ were used interchangeably. This paper will be relevant for scholars and practitioners interested in cross-border organised crime, integration of immigrants into the host society, limits to multiculturalism, and the implication of cross-border migrant smuggling on international politics.

Keywords: Migration, Smuggling, Kin-state diplomacy, Multiculturalism, Pakistan, Europe.

Introduction

“Migrant smuggling (in Pakistan) is a thriving criminal industry, consisting of several different market segments, mostly insulated from other forms of organised crime but reliant on a range of complementary crime types, such as identity fraud and money laundering.”¹

The tragic incident² of 300 Pakistanis drowning due to the capsizing of their vessel in the Mediterranean Sea on June 14th this year has once highlighted the menace of human smuggling in Pakistan. Reportedly, the boat was sailing from the shores of Libya towards European shores. Although this incident remains largely footnoted in the events of the world, it is a significant motivator in examining and understanding the patterns of illegal migration emanating from Pakistan. The casualty list included nationals from Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine, and even Egypt; however, astonishingly half the victims of this tragic incident belonging to Pakistan, a country located far off from the Mediterranean coast begs the need for understanding factors, mechanisms, and infrastructure that facilitate this large-scale migrant smuggling. This isn’t a lone incident, in fact, according to the European Migrant Smuggling Centre (EMSC)³, last year, law enforcement authorities from Spain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Romania, and Slovenia, in collaboration with Europol and Eurojust busted a criminal migrant smuggling network involving Pakistani nationals, (it also included nationals from Colombia, Spain, and Romania) who were involved in smuggling of migrants using Vans or Trucks via Western Balkan route to Italy or Spain. The EMSC report estimates the smuggling network to have generated an illegal overall turnover of around EUR 2 million by the transportation of around four hundred migrants to Italy/Spain.⁴ In fact, Italy has the second largest Pakistani diaspora in Europe after the United Kingdom (UK). The Year Book 2020-2021 of the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and Human Resource Development (OPHRD) gives a country-wise snapshot of Pakistanis abroad (see Table 1).

Table 1: Country-wise population of Pakistanis⁵

It is important to recognise that the official statistics may not accurately reflect the number of Pakistanis living in other countries due to illegal migration and human smuggling.

United Nations defines human smuggling as ‘the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident’⁶. To counter this organised cross border nexus, United Nations came up with the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air that mandates the signatory state to apprehend those involved in migrant smuggling. Till date⁷, the protocol has 112 signatories, and interestingly, Pakistan isn’t a signatory to this protocol despite large numbers of Pakistanis falling prey to this organised crime. This is despite Pakistan being categorised as one of the prominent ‘source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation’⁸. As per the Global Organized Crime Index⁹ (an initiative funded by the United States and European Union to measure the level of organised crimes in a country and the subsequent resilience of the country’s politico-administrative apparatus in dealing with the menace of organised crime), Pakistan’s criminality score is around 6.8 (where 1 is for least criminality, and 10 for the most), and resilience of its institutions in dealing with the organised crime is 4 ( where 1 is least resilient, and 10 is most). Within the criminality index of Pakistan, crimes like human trafficking, human smuggling, and arms trafficking rank substantially high with scores of 8.0, 7.0, and 8.0 out of 10, respectively¹⁰. Commenting on the nature of leadership and governance needed to counter such organised crime, the report notes the following¹¹:

Pakistan’s government’s efforts to counter organised crime are largely cosmetic. In particular, the Pakistani government demonstrates tolerance towards anti-Indian criminal groups that aligns with its foreign policy objectives…. Pakistan’s efforts against violent extremism have been fraught with complications… [Pakistan’s] government’s lack of territorial authority is also visible in the flourishing of criminal activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi; the power struggle between the civilian and military apparatus further weakens the efficacy of anti-organized crime efforts.

According to the International Migrants Stock 2020¹², approximately 992,953 Pakistani nationals reside in Europe, and although it would be erroneous to attribute this to irregular migration, investigations by Pakistan’s own Federal Investigation Agency have highlighted that close to 40,000 trips/ year¹³ are attempted by migrants from Pakistan to Europe. In fact, the report quotes a survey from Mixed Migration Centre in Europe to suggest that approximately 90 per cent of migrants from Pakistan in 2022 used human smugglers to enter Italy¹⁴. Similarly, an investigative report by Turkish News Agency Anadolu¹⁵, notes that for a price of USD 525, agents (read human smugglers) dispatch undocumented migrants to countries like Greece and Germany.  These smugglers, the report noted, operate openly and are generally quite active on social media and can arrange a trip from Pakistan’s port city Karachi to Italy via Greece and Serbia for USD 12000. Another media report notes that between 2015-2021 almost 6,18,887 Pakistanis were deported from 138 countries¹⁶. This equals a daily average deportation of around 300 Pak immigrants. Interestingly, almost 3/4^{th of} roughly 72 per cent of deportation comes from countries that Pakistan’s foreign policy deems friendly such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, and Turkey. Similarly, between 2012-2015, close to 242,817 Pakistanis were deported and a substantial chunk of them were deported from Saudi Arabia¹⁷. The country-wise breakdown provided in the aforementioned media report is listed down below.

Table 2: Country-wise deportation list of Pakistanis (2012-2015)¹⁸

The report goes on to note that overall, between 2007 to 2015, approximately 513,231 Pakistani individuals were deported. Small towns like Gujrat and Gujranwala in Pakistan’s Punjab province are hotspots for illegal immigration to Europe¹⁹. Additionally, towns like Naukundi in Balochistan also serveas an important conduit/hub²⁰ for human smugglers smuggling Pakistani migrants to the West. Given the contiguous border of Baluchistan with Iran and Afghanistan, it has become a renowned transit hub for migrant smuggling. In fact,Balochistan is one of the most prominent routes for transporting even Afghan refugeesfrom Pakistan to Iran and thereafter to Turkey and Europe.  A graphical representation of the routes taken by migrant smugglers is given below²¹

Figure 1: Routes opted for by migrant traffickers from Pakistan.²²

A joint report by the UNDOC and Pakistan’s Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) has demarcated 23 prominent districts which act as the hub of irregular migration, mostly belonging to Central and Southern Punjab province alongside the frontier provinces. A province-wise snapshot of Pakistan’s irregular migration is given below.

Table 3: Districts with high instances of illegal migration²³

It is to be noted that the COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted the ability of law enforcement agencies like the FIA in Pakistan to crack down on migrant smuggling networks. A glance at the 2018-2020 joint annual report of the UNDOC and FIA points to the same. The same is tabulated below.

Table 4: Year-wise arrest of traffickers and smugglers²⁴

It is worth noting that most of these regions where such large-scale irregular migration occurs, be it Punjab, FATA, or Balochistan, are known to be a grooming ground for terrorists and have active terrorist training camps. Significant events ranging from 9/11 (US) to 26/11 (India) could also be traced down to this part of the world. Therefore, Pakistan’s inability to clamp down on the irregular/illegal/undocumented migration from this region has serious security implications for the receiving state, be it in Europe, the Gulf or even immediate neighbours like India. To quote Galeotti²⁵: “if the twentieth century was dominated by the Cold War- which periodically erupted into the real thing (….) then the struggle against the organised crime and transnational crime will become a parallel security theme of the 21st century”. Given the security implications of illegal migration from Pakistan, the subsequent sections of this paper will broadly reflect on the following themes: (a) factors responsible for large-scale irregular migration from Pakistan, (b) challenges of irregular migration from the receiving and sending state and (c) conclusions and the way forward.

Examining factors responsible for large-scale irregular migration from Pakistan

In the initial years of the formation of Pakistan in the 50s, colonial links facilitated an early wave of immigration from Pakistan to Britain. The early immigrants worked in the construction sector as well as unskilled textile workers in the UK. This continued till about 1962 when the then UK government decided to tighten the immigration restriction from its ex-colonies, including Pakistan, by bringing in the Commonwealth Immigration Act²⁶

It is argued that the introduction of the voucher system²⁷ in the UK prompted many Pakistani workers to settle there. Those who had already settled in the UK used their networks of family and friends to help others migrate. Further, people who lost lands to Mangla Dam used compensation money and the existing networks of families to migrate to the UK.²⁸ This led to the growth of the ‘Mirpur’ diaspora in Britain. Estimates suggest²⁹ that the number of Pakistanis in the UK grew from just 5000 in 1951 to 119,700 in 1966. The proportion of Pakistanis immigrating as workers declined substantially due to the passage of the Commonwealth Immigration Act.

The late 60s³⁰also witnessed substantial immigration of educated and middle-class Pakistanis into the USA because of the changes in American immigration procedures. This prompted professionals from Pakistan to migrate to the USA. Subsequently, Gulf owing to the oil boom during the 70s and 80s, witnessed substantial immigration of low and middle-skilled Pakistani workers and today houses the largest number of Pakistani diaspora in the world. Speaking of Europe³¹, the 1970s saw Pakistanis moving to Greece. This was a consequence³² of a bilateral agreement signed between Pakistan and Greece that allowed Pakistanis to work in the shipyard and textile mills. Reportedly, Greek’s regularisation procedures³³ pertaining to undocumented migrants made it a popular destination among the transiting Pakistanis wanting to settle in other regions of Europe, prompting many to enter Greece via the Aegean Sea or through land border via Turkey. The unfortunate shipwreck³⁴ that led to the drowning of around 300 Pakistanis should also be viewed in this larger historical context.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and anti-globalisationsentiment contributed sharply to tightening formal immigration from low-income Muslim countries, including Pakistan. However, various factors in low-income countries, such as Pakistan, contributed to the transnational menace of migrant smuggling. Thus, to comprehend the drivers and motivations behind migrants subjecting them to perilous journeys, it is pertinent to analyse the associated pull and push factors.Large-scale irregular migration from Pakistan could be studied through migration literature terms such as the ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ factors. As per the Oxford reference³⁵, “push factors are defined as those that encourage a population to leave their home, while pull factors are those that draw a population to another area or place”.

Illegal Migration and Push Factors

Pakistan, a country on the brink of bankruptcy with deteriorating political stability, offers its citizens a bleak future, thereby creating strong push factors to migrate out of the country. A cursory look (fig 2) at the country’s inflation trend offers a glimpse of hardships that poor often face. High inflation (with a recent World Bank report suggesting it to be around 23% for the FY 23)³⁶ could be attributed to higher energy prices partly due to the prevailing geopolitical situation, natural disruptions like the flood, weaker Pakistani Rupee (PKR) etc. Inflation, the report suggests, sharply impacts poor households as these low-income households experienced one per cent higher inflation on average than the wealthier households.

Figure 2: inflation, consumer prices (annual %)- Pakistan³⁷

Similarly, speaking of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is indicative of the cost of living, Pakistan’s CPI in February this year jumped to around³⁸ 31.5% this year with transportation prices hovering around 45%. This is believed to be the highest spike in the last thirty years.

Figure 3: A snapshot of the last ten years of Pakistan’s CPI growth is provided below³⁹.

Pakistan’s economy is plagued with systemic issues of high inflation, unemployment, decreasing investment, and a high debt to gdp ratio. In fact, Pakistan’s poverty headcount ratio (HCR) at the national poverty line level, used to determine the overall population below the poverty line, was around 46 million, amounting to 24.3% of the overall population. A snapshot of the same is provided below.

Table 5:  A snapshot of poverty in Pakistan⁴⁰.

Pakistan’s external debt to GDP ratio is hovering at around 35%⁴¹. On the other hand, overall debt to GDP ratio has dangerously breached the dangerous threshold of 70%⁴²; and half of the government revenues earmarked for paying interests on debt. As a consequence, the pinch on developmental expenditure is acutely felt. Here, it is worth noting that running a high-debt to GDP ratio in itself isn’t a symptom of a downhill economy as large economies like the US, UK, and Japan run substantial deficits but Pakistan’s problem lies⁴³in short and medium-term loan re-payment. Another worrisome trend, which could be a result of maximum revenues going for debt servicing, is the declining investment to GDP ratio. It is argued⁴⁴ that Pakistan’s investment-toGDP ratio is among the lowest in the world, hovering around 15%, while the average in South Asia is around 30%, and this results in poor social infrastructure and is worrisome because it impedes the possibility of high growth rates needed for employment generation. Recent estimates⁴⁵ suggest that Pakistan’s investment to GDP ratio is around 13%, a further decline would spell doom for the masses as far as developmental expenditure or employment generation is concerned.

Unemployment is regarded as one of the strongest push factors as far as migration (regular or irregular) is concerned. Pakistan’s unemployment rate as of FY 2021 is around 6.3%⁴⁶. Interestingly, reports suggest that graduates face higher unemployment in Pakistan and the analysis by Pakistan scholars “shows gap between the rate of overall unemployment and that of graduates..is almost 10% point wide.⁴⁷” In fact, the unemployment rate in the working age group of 20-24 years as per Pakistan’s labour force survey⁴⁸ for the FY 2020-21 is almost twice high (12.3%) than the overall unemployment rate. These numbers highlight various push factors for migration and for nexus of organised crimes associated with migrant smuggling.

At the provincial level, the labour force survey notes that Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) has the highest unemployment rate at around (8.8%), and Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province is second in the list with (6.8%), followed by Balochistan (4.3%), and Sindh (3.9%). A detailed snapshot of unemployment at the provincial level is given below (fig. 4). Here, it is worth noting that a substantial chunk of irregular migration stems from Punjab and not KP, despite the former being second on the list of unemployment and latter topping the tally because Punjab is Pakistan’s most populous province, and therefore, has the highest number of working age population. The snapshot below notes the working age population in Punjab to be around 88.4 million, followed by Sindh’s 36.3 million, KP’s 26.1 million, and Baluchistan 8.9 million.

Fig 4. Province wise labour force statistics for Pakistan (2020-2021)⁴⁹

Political instability is another push factor that motivates Pakistanis to move abroad as it inflicts costs  to their life and livelihood. Nawaz et.al⁵⁰, in their analysis of the economic impact of political instability on economy for the period ranging 2000-2019 argue a negative correlation exists between political instability and economic growth. Similarly, it isargued that terrorism not only resulted in the loss of lives of Pakistanis but induced significant costs via capital flows that stymied investment and subsequently limiting growth and jobs⁵¹. World Bank’s⁵² own political stability and absence of violence/terrorism index that measures the perception of political instability and politically motivated violence marks Pakistan at -1.67 for the year 2021 on a scale of (-2.5 to +2.5). The countries closer to (+)2.5 are deemed better in governance, while those closer to (-2.5) are deemed faltering in governance. A detailed snapshot is provided below (Fig 5)⁵³

Similarly, the Global Terrorism Index (GTI)⁵⁴,which ranks countries on composite indicators such as “incidents, fatalities, injuries, and hostages,” places Pakistan in the 6^th spot with a score of 8.16.

Table 6 : List of top 10 countries most impacted by terrorism alongside their score (2022)⁵⁵

A few points are worth noting here; first, terrorism in Afghanistan is linked to Pakistan as the relationship between Taliban fighters and Pakistani agencies is quite well known. Second, terrorism in Pakistan is a consequence of policies adopted by its own security apparatus. As former US Secretary of State famously noted, “you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours….eventually, those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard.⁵⁶”

Syria and Pakistan are almost identically placed as far as being impacted by terrorism is concerned. Six months into 2023,  Pakistan is reported to have witnessed 236 incidents with overall 738 fatalities; between 2020-2023, Pakistan witnessed 16,229 terror-related incidents with a fatality tally of 66,657⁵⁷. The Pakistani think tank,  Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies in its Pakistan Security Report for the year 2021, notes Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province to have witnessed a maximum number of terrorist attacks (111) in the year 2021, followed by Baluchistan (81)⁵⁸. A snapshot of province-wise terrorist incidents is given in the table below.

Table 7: Province wise terror incidents in the year 2021⁵⁹

The terrorist incidents in Pakistan or the consequence of improvement security policies adopted by the Pakistani military establishment. Waging proxy wars and formatting terrorism in the region has come at a high cost for Pakistan. Sadly, despite the negative consequences the Pakistani military establishment seems to be reluctant to do some course corrections. Therefore, poor governance, political instability, terrorism, fragile economy, deteriorating law and order, double digits unemployment figures in the working age population, and a bleak future constitute strong push factor for Pakistanis to move abroad even through irregular channels.

Illegal Migration and Pull Factors

Asurvey⁶⁰ of Pakistani migrants from five provinces (KP, Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh, and Islamabad) by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) notes that the majority of respondents prefer to migrate to the EU & Turkey (23%), Gulf (61%), and Asia-Pacific region (20%) due to job opportunities that exist there. Another significant dimension is the presence of social networks in the form of having friends or relatives already residing in that region that motivated them to migrate; the subsequent tally for Gulf, Asia-Pacific, and the EU & Turkey is 18%, 20%, and 21% respectively⁶¹. Availability of educational opportunities in Europe and Turkey too loomed larger for 30% of migrants interviewed by the IOM. These responses match IOM’s 2018 flow monitoring survey of Pakistani migrants in Europe. Flow monitoring surveys aim to understand migrant profiles, routes, and drivers of migration. The survey notes⁶² that 29% of the Pakistani migrants interviewed opted for Europe as a destination for better socio-economic conditions, 22 % for the search of safety, 17 % for access to asylum, and 14 % opted because of social networks of friends and family. Another significant dimension associated with pull factors as far as irregular migration is concerned is the concept of ‘chain migration’, also known as ‘dekha-dikhi’ (Urdu word for copy/emulate). Explaining this phenomenon, Ali Nobil Ahmad notes that ‘immobile men’ (referring to those who haven’t been able to migrate to foreign shores) “fetishize and exotify bodies and material goods that have come from (or returned from) abroad, and want these for themselves”. Ahmed cites the testimony of Faizal, a man who migrated to Kuwait from Pakistan’s Punjab. Faizal, as quoted by Ahmed, notes:

“‘You  see  him  [the  returnee]wearing  white  clothes.  He’s  holding  a  good  suitcase  in  his  hand…He’ll  wear  white clothes,  and  be  wearing  a  gold  watch…’ []…‘I’ll go abroad and make good money. I’ll come back wearing watches and stuff’.”

Researchers argue that smugglers and traffickers are also exploiting this aspirational dimension associated with illegal migration as they tend to exploit their personal networks and social capital to plant rumours of success stories abroad and subsequently lure youngsters. This leads to the creation of demand by grooming potential customers for irregular migration. Media reports also corroborates the same, and of late, there have been instances of young Pakistani girls/women being smuggled to China under the pretext of fake nuptial knot, subsequently pushing them into sex and organ trade. Crimes like these further blur the distinction between smuggling and trafficking. However, another factor that complements irregular migration is Pakistani states’ weak state capacity, which has led Pakistan deep into the fragility trap as far as taming down illegal cross-border migration is concerned. United States Institute of Peace defines fragility trap as the following:

‘ it [fragility trap] is encapsulated by the concept of the “parallel state” where there is clandestine nexus between formal political leadership where there is “the existence of a clandestine nexus between formal political leadership, self-serving factions within the state apparatus, organised crime, and/or experts in violence.” Fragile situations are also marked by the coexistence of both formal and informal institutions, with competing claims to power.’

The above is also corroborated empirically into Pakistan’s positioning at the Global Organized Crime Index. It is argued that 60% of Pakistan’s territory is almost ungovernable; and Balochistan-Pakistan’s largest province figures prominently in this list alongside regions of FATA, Southern Punjab, and areas of Pakistan’s largest metropolis of Karachi. The borderlands as a transit hub for migrant smuggling in Pakistan could be understood as spaces of exception, described as spaces/(extra) territorial enclaves where the regular judicial process remains suspended. Borderlands acting as a transit hub could be understood as a space of exception within the Pakistani territorial state. These are mostly governed like tribal confederacy, where tribal rulers are allowed autonomy as long as they don’t challenge Pakistan’s sovereign authority. Thus, this lack of governance should be understood as a manner in which Pakistan’s state-building and national integration was negotiated between Pakistani elites and tribal leaders. However, it can also be argued that the Pakistani military deliberately leverages such ‘ungoverned spaces’ tactically to foment trouble in neighbouring states. Other than that, bordering provinces like Balochistan and KP have been at the receiving end of military operations against insurgents – a phenomenon that tends to defy regular civilian cum judicial modus operandi, thereby reinforcing it as a space of exception. As the world is grappling with post covid damage control and demands for economic nationalism and anti-immigration policiesare growing, the faltering capacity to check irregular migration has strained Pakistan’s ties with the receiving states in Gulf, Turkey, and the EU.

Challenges of irregular migration for the receiving and sending state

Given the transnational presence of networks of migrant smuggling, the security and stability of the host/receiving state are also contingent on the willingness and ability of the sending state to clamp down on the same. This has implications for the former’s security and stability and the bilateral relationship between the sending and receiving states. It is worth noting that many Pakistanis were deported from Saudi Arabia on suspicion of crimes like drug trafficking, forgery, theft, and links with extremist terror groups like ISIS. Reportedly, the deportation of some Pakistani workers was largely driven by security concerns⁷². A spate of incidents in the recent past has led to a growing concern in Europe regarding the extremism being fomented by irregular migrants. In the wake of the Charlie Hebdo incident in 2020 carried out by a Pakistani man who illegally migrated to France and forged documents to acquire citizenship, EU parliamentarians like Dominique Bilde labelled Pakistan as a serious security threat and called for stringent scrutiny of the sale of fake European passports and Visas to persons involved in criminal activities⁷³. Similarly, the Wurzburg train attack⁷⁴ (whose responsibility was claimed by IS) in Germany in 2016 was carried out by a Pakistani asylum seeker masquerading⁷⁵ as an Afghan so that to get prioritised for the immigration list. Subsequently, German authorities and the policies of Chancellor Merkel were subjected to intense criticism and bolstered anti-immigration calls by outfits like the Alternative for Germany (AfD).  It is argued that many irregular migrants from Pakistan find shelter and protection in religious-cultural institutions like the Tablighi Jamaat, which has wide network across Europe. Here, it is worth noting that these incidents aren’t new to Europe.⁷⁶ In fact, Spanish law enforcement agencies in 2018 arrested 14 men on the suspicion that they were intent on carrying out a suicide bombing, and 12 of them were Pakistani citizens, with some linked to Tariq Bin Zaid mosque⁷⁷– a mosque linked with Tablighi Jamaat and under scanner by the Spanish authorities for spreading extremism/terror. Interestingly enough, Tablighi Jamaat was banned by Saudi Arabia in 2021, labelling it as a ‘gate of terror’⁷⁸. The Saudi ban prompted Punjab legislative assembly in Pakistan to pass a resolution backing the Jamaat. Commenting on the role of Tablighi Jamaat (TIJ) and the subsequent radicalisation of Muslim immigrants in Western European society, Joshua W. Hedges notes that organisations like the TIJ sharea “symbiotic relationship with global jihad”⁷⁹ and very often, due to their decentralised nature of operations they can influence Muslim migrants and exploit the multicultural fault lines that exist due to the inability of the western governments to integrate them into their host societies fully. This has substantial security implications for the host state apart from the localised socio-economic tensions that it generates, as these networks could be leveraged for narcotics, arms, and even by terrorist outfits for sneaking in attackers, thereby throwing a plethora of challenges to law enforcement agencies in the host state.  A significant dimension to note here is that most of the provinces from where irregular migration happensin Pakistan are known to have terrorist training and hideout centres. Given this context, the faltering response of the sending state to clamp down on irregular migration and the inability of the host country to authenticate these migrants entering their territory illegally opens Pandora’s box as far as law enforcement is concerned.

Koslowski⁸⁰ commenting on migration and terrorism, notes that contrary to the realist thinkers like Waltz and Mearsheimer who argue that only states with substantial military power matter in international politics, a bunch of persons sneaking into the territory and carrying out armed violence could bring the entire country to a halt. Attacks like 26/11 are a case in point. Even the 9/11 Commission detailed the linkages that existed between human smugglers and Al-Qaeda⁸¹. A study of migration inflows and associated terrorist attacks in 145 countries between 1970 and 2000found that although immigration overall reduces the risk of terrorism, migration flows from regions prone to terrorism and political violence increase the risk/threat of terrorism for host countries.⁸² The risk compounds when undocumented migration happens from terror-prone regions. Research⁸³ suggest that the clandestine nature of these routes and network serves as a perfect vehicle for the terror outfits to inject terrorists into host countries.

The prevalence of migrant smuggling in Pakistan highlights the appalling failure of the government to create reliable pathways for its citizens to migrate safely. In fact, this has the potential to backfire as incidents like this lead to further scrutiny of immigrants by the host state, making it tougher for the citizens of the sending state to migrate formally. It could also complicate the relationship between the sending and receiving states. For instance, while Turkey and Pakistan share close ties, illegal migration may emerge as an irritant.  Turkish authorities are increasingly attributing the increase in crimes, such as gang wars, kidnapping of tourists, narcotic wars etc., to illegal migration from countries like Pakistan. ⁸⁴According to a Turkish news agency⁸⁵, a Pakistani group abducted Nepali tourists at gunpoint in Turkey, demanding 10,000 euros; although the group was nabbed, it negatively impacted the image of Turkey’s tourism industry.  A sentiment similar to the Turkish agencies was expressed by the Dubai Police head when a handful of Pakistani citizens were caught in a drug smuggling racket⁸⁶. Likewise, top officials/leadership in Saudi Arabia have expressed their apprehension regarding Pakistani migrants.  The chair of Saudi Arabia’s security committee Abdullah Al- Sadoun, was reportedly quoted as demanding a tougher security process for Pakistani nationals as, according to him, the “Taliban extremist movement was itself born in Pakistan”⁸⁷. Bilateral ties⁸⁸ between South Africa and Pakistan also got strained due to illegal migration from the latter. In fact, investigations⁸⁹ by the South African agencies revealed that Pakistani embassy officials were hand in glove with smuggling networks and helped Pakistani citizens sneak into South Africa illegally via Zimbabwe’s’ border town Beitbridge. This has led to the South African government imposing stringent visa restrictions on Pakistani citizens making formal migration tougher. Growing illegal migration and associated domestic political pressure have resulted in the EU attempting to finalise migration deals aimed at facilitating deportations/returns and preventing departures of illegal migrants from sending states. Countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Morocco, Nigeria etc. are on the priority list. In fact, the EU home affairs commissioner threatened⁹⁰ to put even harsher visa restrictions, thereby raising the barriers for formal migration if the migration deal isn’t implemented.  Similarly, the UK has signed an extradition agreement with Pakistan aimed at deporting Pakistani citizens engaged in organised crime, immigration offences, and sexual abuse, to name a few, will be deported to Pakistan under the UK’s New Immigration Plan⁹¹. UK home secretary  Braverman’s comment regarding the involvement of British-origin Pakistani men in the grooming gang scandal (child sex abuse), where she noted, “ British Pakistani males hold cultural values totally at odds with the British values”, led to a terse rebuttal by the Pakistani foreign office labelling⁹² the comment as misleading, discriminatory and xenophobic.  Although this incident is tangentially related to immigration, the sentiment is very much a consequence of it, where Tories are trying to play to the majoritarian sensibilities in the light of the growing domestic pressure, with the grooming gang scandal adding fuel to the fire.  Thus, illegal immigration seems to impact both the sending and the receiving state in myriad ways, often encouraging policies and politics that make formal migration tougher from the sending state, subsequently leading to strained bilateral ties.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Thus far, the essay has laid out a comprehensive overview of the extent of the illegal/irregular migration from Pakistan, the associated push-pull factors, and its implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy and its reputation on the international stage. The concluding section aims to reflect on the broader implications of immigration on international relations and will conclude with recommendations to make migration more workable for Pakistan and the receiving host states.

Migration has been central to human history, and the subsequent networks and flows that emanate from this have been instrumental in shaping history and the present. The advances in technology and state capacity have made it possible for the state to effectively police the border and determine who gets to enter, stay, work, and live. To quote James F. Hollifield, “necessary conditions for migration could be social and economic, but the sufficient conditions must be political and legal”⁹³. Thus, states should be willing to open their borders and give rights to immigrants or those migrating in; this has made regulating migration an instrumental function of the state, giving rise to the ‘migration state’⁹⁴ whose function is to manage border flows. The ability of the states to exercise one’s writ over its territory and be mutually recognised by the other co-states is the premise of the territorial state as well as international relations. It could be argued that illegal migration is an attempt to bypass, if not subvert, states’ sovereignty primarily by the non-state actors. Without the international community pressurising Pakistan’s state apparatus to act and deploy effective measures to patrol borders proliferation of these cross-border networks is vulnerable to be misused for other organised crimes like drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and even injection of terrorists, thereby spreading the risk of political violence and social unrest to that of the receiving states and host societies. Therefore, the paper proposes the following recommendations for illegal migration from Pakistan, keeping in mind the concerns and interests of both the sending state (here, Pakistan) and the receiving countries.

• Receiving/host states need to disincentivise employers who seek to benefit from low wages by hiring illegal migrants. Such hiring practices often lead to violations of the human rights of migrants. Concerted efforts to curtail unlawful benefits that employers seek to achieve will also address unhealthy pull factors that prompt illegal migration.
• High Commissions/Embassies of these receiving /host states should partner with the local authority as well as civil society networks to organise workshops in local colleges and universities in mufassil districts of Pakistani provinces to educate and make aware local college youth on the perils of illegal/irregular migration. They should encourage Pakistani diaspora organisations based in their respective countries to engage with local Pakistani youngsters to educate them on the futility of getting lured by migrant smuggling networks. Because diaspora members are one among them, it is argued⁹⁵such an effort will result ineffective outreach.
• Media reports suggest that a significant usage of social media networks such as Facebook, Tiktok etc., by the smugglers/agents to plant fake rags to riches stories and generate demand for smuggling among locals. Thus, there is a need to generate an effective counter-narrative on social media to negate the rags-to-riches narrative through illegal immigration. Advertisements by cricketers or film stars could be used to communicate this message as they have a widespread fan base. Additionally, organisations like the UNDOC or UNHCR, in collaboration with Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), could produce engaging and interactive social media content to create awareness among vis-à-vis illegal migration.
• Large-scale irregular migration from Pakistan indicates cosmetic efforts on the part of Pakistani State to eliminate migrant smuggling networks. The inability to clamp down on illegal migration at the expense of the lives of thousands of people and jeopardising formal migration chances for its competent population is inexcusable. A sovereign country is expected to keep its house in order, and the international community should lobby organisations like the IMF to make bail-out packages contingent on Pakistan providing satisfactory empirical evidence of targeting these smuggling networks. Similarly, Gulf countries that host large numbers of Pakistani overseas populations could pressurise Islamabad to ratify relevant international treaties and build state capacities to deal with migrant smuggling. Gulf countries often extend financial assistance to Islamabad, so they have considerable leverage over Pakistan.
• Pakistan needs to prioritise international collaboration for gathering intelligence on the transnational networks of migrant smuggling. A senior Pakistani official dealing with organised crime has listed the following important policy measure that need to be taken to address illegal migration: ‘(1) revival a quadrilateral collaboration mechanism comprising of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Greece for facilitating information exchange and undertaking joint operations against the smugglers (2) the National Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling (NAPAMS) needs to be endorsed by the federal cabinet so that sufficient resources be are allocated for the task (3) ratification of Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants (SOM) and (4) creation of a national steering committee headed by the interior minister with members from the law and finance ministry.’⁹⁶

Although it is politically incorrect to link irregular/illegal migration with the menaces of organized crimes, as any “securitization” of migration generates emotive responses within the ‘humanitarian’ community, it is worth noting that any serious engagement cannot discount the concerns of the receiving state/host society. By focusing on the aforementioned measures to combat migrant smuggling, Pakistan could improve its citizens’ access to formal and safe migration channels. Subsequently, host states may find it easier to allow immigration from Pakistan based on their economic needs, creating a favourable environment for all stakeholders.

Paras Ratna is a PhD candidate at the National University of Singapore, Singapore.Sanjay Pulipaka is the Chairperson at Politeia Research Foundation, India. The views expressed here are personal.

***

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2 Dawn. 2023. ‘Death at Sea’, 19 June 2023. https://www.dawn.com/news/1760476.

3 Europol. 2022. ‘European Migrant Smuggling Centre 6th Annual Report – 2022’. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EMSC%206%20th%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

4 Europol. 2022. ‘European Migrant Smuggling Centre 6th Annual Report – 2022’. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/EMSC%206%20th%20Annual%20Report.pdf.

5 OPHRD. 2020. ‘Year Book 2020-21’. Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 53.

https://www.ophrd.gov.pk/SiteImage/Misc/files/Year%20Book%202020-21.pdf.

6 UNDOC. 2018. ‘Migrant Smuggling in Asia and the Pacific: Current Trends and Challenges’. Bangkok: UNDOC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Migrant-Smuggling/2018-2019/SOM_in_Asia_and_the_Pacific_II_July_2018.pdf.

7 United Nations Treaty Collection. 2000. ‘CHAPTER XVIII:12. b Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime’. United Nations. https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12-b&chapter=18&clang=_en.

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10 Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime 2021, 154

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21 The map used in fig.1 is replicated from FIA, Pakistan, and should be taken only for illustrative purposes. The author /report does not agree or support the territorial claims made by the Pakistani state vis-à-vis Indian or any other territories.

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33 Shah, ‘The Role of Agents’,24.

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43 Bhowmick and Ghosh, ‘Debt ad Infinitum: Pakistan’s Macroeconomic Catastrophe.’

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59 Rana, and Sial, ‘‘Overview of Security in 2021: Critical Challenges and Recommendations’, 18.

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61  IOM,‘Pakistan: Survey on  Drivers of Migration’.

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77 Sciolino, Elaine. 2008. ‘Terror Threat From Pakistan Said to Expand.’ The New York Times, February 10, 2008. ht tps://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/world/europe/10spain.html.

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79 Hedges, Joshua W. 2008. ‘Tablighi Jamaat:The Premier Latent Network’. Washington D.C.: The Fund for Peace. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/93813/200804%20Tablighi%20Jamaat.pdf.

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83 Light, Michael T., and Julia T. Thomas. 2021. ‘Undocumented Immigration and Terrorism: Is There a Connection?’ Social Science Research 94 (February): 102512. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102512.

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