The Geopolitics of Vulnerability: Ukraine’s War, the 28-Point Plan, and the Great Power Gains

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

As Kyiv now negotiates from a position of profound weakness, the conflict exposes the perilous consequences of fear-driven decisions and overdependence on external powers

Imran Khurshid*

More than three years into the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the country faces catastrophic losses. What began as Kyiv’s pursuit of security guarantees against potential Russian aggression—particularly through its aspiration to join NATO— escalated into a devastating war. Direct infrastructure damage now stands at US$ 176 billion, while reconstruction and recovery needs over the next decade are estimated at US$ 524 billion. According to recent analyses, Russia has consolidated control of nearly 19% of Ukrainian territory. Today, with the proposed 28‑point U.S. peace framework under discussion, Ukraine finds itself negotiating from a position of profound weakness.

The war has reshaped global alignments and realignments. Russia and China have drawn closer, India–U.S. relations have experienced significant strains, and Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy faces major challenges, as China is increasingly viewed as an economic competitor rather than a strategic rival, and the Quad has been undermined. Many countries have experienced domestic instability due to inflation, energy price spikes, and economic disruptions triggered by the conflict. For instance, Sri Lanka’s fuel shortages and rising costs worsened its economic collapse; Moldova grappled with an energy crisis as Russian gas supplies were cut; West African countries like Niger and Mali saw sharp increases in food prices, exacerbating food insecurity; and Lebanon experienced heightened political and economic fragility due to surging wheat prices. Some governments came under severe political pressure, and in a few cases, collapsed as these global price shocks compounded existing crises. As for Ukraine itself, the country has endured immense civilian suffering, while Russia has also lost thousands of soldiers. Yet the central question that drove the conflict remains unchanged: security guarantees.

Analysing 28-Point Peace Plan

It was this pursuit—often shaped by perceived threats—that pushed President Zelensky and Ukraine towards NATO. Ironically, the very quest for security has now cost Ukraine large parts of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, population, and economic stability. The current 28‑point proposal, outlines potential terms for ending the war, including territorial, military, and political concessions in exchange for conditional security guarantees. According to multiple sources, it would require Ukraine to recognise Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as de facto Russian territories, even asking Kyiv to withdraw from parts of Donetsk it currently holds — these areas would become a demilitarised buffer zone. The plan would also “freeze” the front lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia along their current contact lines.

Crucially, it proposes constitutional neutrality for Ukraine: Kyiv would have to officially bind itself to never join NATO, and NATO would have to adopt a rule barring Ukraine’s future membership. The Ukrainian armed forces, now estimated at some 800,000–850,000 personnel, would be capped at 600,000, effectively limiting their conventional defence capabilities. The plan also forbids foreign military bases or NATO troop deployments in Ukraine.

On security guarantees, the proposal is contradictory: while it promises “reliable security guarantees” from the U.S. and Europe, it also states that these guarantees could be voided if Ukraine attacks Russian territory or is judged to violate its commitments. In return for these guarantees, the U.S. would receive financial compensation, signaling that guarantees are not a gift but a transaction.

The plan includes a non-aggression pact between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe, with all “ambiguities” of the past 30 years intended to be resolved. There would also be a U.S.-mediated “dialogue mechanism” between NATO and Russia to manage future security concerns.

Economically, the proposal envisions a major reconstruction package funded partly through frozen Russian assets. Some reports estimate up to US$100 billion would be directed toward rebuilding Ukraine under a development fund structure. At the same time, the U.S. and Russia would enter into long-term economic cooperation—including energy, natural resources, AI, data centers, and rare-earth mining. Russia might also be readmitted to the G8.

On the nuclear front, Ukraine would remain a non-nuclear state, in line with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, currently under Russian control, would be operated under IAEA supervision, with its electricity output shared equally (50:50) with Russia.

Humanitarian provisions are also included: a committee would manage prisoner exchanges (“all for all”), the return of civilians including children, reunification of families, and general relief measures. The plan further calls for Ukrainian elections to take place within 100 days of agreement.

In sum, the 28-point plan resembles, in some respects, the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I by imposing severe military restrictions, territorial losses, and economic reparations on Germany. Similarly, Ukraine faces substantial military limitations, potential territorial concessions, and significant external oversight. Yet Kyiv seems to have very limited strategic choice: continuing the war indefinitely without stable Western weapons support risks even more catastrophic losses.

Cost of Dependence

Practical considerations now outweigh nationalist aspirations. A negotiated agreement could stabilise Europe, ease geopolitical tensions, and bring relief to global markets. Yet the situation underscores a sobering lesson: the dangers of excessive reliance on external security guarantees. By depending overwhelmingly on foreign support, Zelensky overlooked a foundational realist principle—that states must prioritise self-strengthening over expectations of external rescue. The United States has exploited this dependence. Reports indicate that Trump pressured Ukraine into committing to a US$90 billion weapons package, effectively leveraging Kyiv’s vulnerability for economic advantage.

Trump has also contributed significantly to Zelensky’s current vulnerability. He repeatedly subjected Zelensky to political and psychological pressure, publicly humiliating him and, at times, engaging directly with Putin in ways that undermined Kyiv’s authority. These actions weakened Zelensky’s diplomatic leverage and strengthened Russia’s bargaining position. Trump’s praise for Putin and his statement that Zelensky “has no cards” signalled to Moscow that Ukraine lacked strong political backing in Washington. He ambushed Zelensky in the White House and, more recently, called him “ungrateful” despite Zelensky’s repeated expressions of thanks. By engaging directly with Putin and publicly undermining Zelensky, Trump significantly weakened Ukraine’s negotiating position, tilting the emerging 28‑point proposal closer to Russia’s demands and leaving Kyiv with very little room to manoeuvre.

However, it is also true that Ukraine cannot fight without U.S. support. As a CSIS assessment bluntly notes, “Ukraine currently relies heavily on U.S. systems, training, intelligence, and logistics … they cannot fully replace U.S. capabilities.” If the United States stops providing weapons, Ukraine simply cannot continue fighting at the same scale; Europe, while able to provide some support, lacks the industrial capacity and stockpiles to fully compensate for American aid. Ultimately, Ukraine has emerged as the greatest loser—territory lost, economy shattered, population displaced, and sovereignty compromised. Whether one agrees with Trump’s view that Ukraine entered a war it could not win, the conflict has undeniably exposed a sharp power imbalance.

Even if Zelensky wishes to prolong the war, he cannot: Ukraine is weaker, isolated, and increasingly vulnerable. Trapped between the deep sea and the devil, pragmatic realism demands that he pursue a deal now; otherwise, he risks losing even more territory with little chance of meaningful support. Any external backers willing to intervene will inevitably seek their own gains, making delays costly. Prolonging the conflict risks further territorial losses, while negotiations may prevent deeper collapse. Europe cannot rescue Kyiv; Washington holds most of the leverage. His position is further weakened by serious corruption allegations — including a high-level US$100 million embezzlement scandal in the energy sector and pressure from EU partners to restore independent anti-corruption institutions — which have compounded his diplomatic fragility and left him with little bargaining power.

Final lesson

Ultimately, this war offers a profound lesson: fear, misperception, and overdependence on external powers can push leaders into decisions that undermine, rather than strengthen, national security. It also demonstrates how the perceived fear of a threat—when amplified or misjudged—can lead a state to take actions it might not have otherwise pursued, producing the very outcomes it sought to avoid and turning anticipation into a self-fulfilling reality. Today, as Ukraine approaches a settlement from a position of near collapse, it is clear that Zelensky has achieved very little of what he initially sought. Meanwhile, the major powers—Russia and the United States—have secured or advanced their interests, while Ukraine bears the heaviest costs. The broader lesson for other countries is clear: overreliance on external guarantees and misjudging threats can erode sovereignty and leave nations vulnerable to exploitation.

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* Dr Imran Khurshid is an Associate Research Fellow, ICPS, Adjunct Fellow, Peninsula Foundation, Visiting Faculty, Nalanda University, Rajgir, Bihar, India. The views expressed here are personal. 