The Chinese Mediation in the Middle East

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Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

By Sanjay Pulipaka

China has scaled up its diplomatic activity in the Middle East. On April 17, China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang, in separate calls to his counterparts in Israel and Palestine, expressed concerns following the clashes at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and urged them to ‘prevent conflicts from escalating’. FM Gang called on both parties to “resume peace talks and implement the two-state solution”  and added, “China stands ready to provide facilitation to that end”.

On the Israel-Palestine issue, over the years, Beijing has advocated a two-state solution. For instance, in 2021, the Chinese foreign minister proposed a three-step road map to implement the “two-state solution”, which included empowering the Palestinian Authority, improving solidarity among the Palestinian factions and resumption of dialogue between Israel and Palestine. More recently, the official statement issued during President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia (in December 2022) referred to the “two-state solution”.

While China has a history of articulating the ‘two-state solution’, Qin Gang’s offer to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Palestine caught the international community’s attention. The Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyadh al-Maliki reportedly “thanked China for supporting Palestine’s national self-determination and establishment of an independent state” and welcomed “all the efforts made by China.” On the other hand, the Foreign Minister of Israel, Eli Cohen, noted that the Israel-Palestine conflict might be difficult to solve any time soon and added that his country expects China ‘to play a positive role’ in the Iranian nuclear issue.

The guarded response from the Israeli foreign minister is understandable. Undoubtedly, China has emerged as an important economic partner of Israel. The bilateral trade boomed from “$50 million in 1992 to some $15 billion or more in 2021”, and China became an important investor in infrastructure projects in Israel. However, some in Israel have called for a more cautious political and economic engagement with China because of the recent diplomatic moves of Beijing. For instance, news reports pointed out that a joint statement issued during Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to China “stressed the importance of Israel’s participation in the non-proliferation treaty to effectively place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.” Such references to Israel’s nuclear programme may not have gone down well with Tel Aviv.

Israel will closely study the sustained attempts by China to redefine the regional security dynamic. In March 2021, in an interview with Al Arabiya, the Chinese foreign minister enunciated a ‘five-point initiative to achieve security and stability in the Middle East.’ A few months later, in July 2021, Beijing proposed a four-point solution to the Syrian crisis. More recently, in early March this year, Iran and Saudi Arabia, after negotiations mediated by China, agreed to resume their diplomatic relations, which were suspended since 2016 after the execution of a prominent Shia cleric.

The Iran-Saudi deal generated considerable discussion in Israel, with opposition leaders accusing Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu that he did not keep pace with the fast-changing geopolitical dynamic. Former PMY air Lapid reportedly stated that the Iran-Saudi deal represents a “collapse of the regional defence wall that we started building against Iran.” Similarly, Former PM Bennet called the development a “political victory for Iran. ”Nonetheless, the Iran-Saudi deal may open new doors for Tel Aviv. If Saudi were to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, Riyadh can argue that its improved relations with Tel Aviv pose no threat to Tehran. After all, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated a genuine interest in improving relations with Iran. Nonetheless, the fact that PM Benjamin Netanyahu called on Saudi Arabia to be cautious in its engagement with Iran suggests a possible uneasiness in Israel with the Iran-Saudi agreement.

There are three important takeaways from Beijing’s diplomatic forays in the Middle East. First, Beijing’s mediation of the Iran-Saudi agreement and the recent offer to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Palestine is aimed at contesting the presence of the United States (US) in the Middle East. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia (a US ally), Iran (a country under US sanctions) and China (a systemic rival of the US) reached an agreement, and there was speculation in the media that Washington was caught by surprise. Subsequently, there was considerable discussion in the media about whether China is quickly stepping into the vacuum created by the alleged US withdrawal from the Middle East.

China’s Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson pointed out that Beijing has “no intention to and will not seek to fill the so-called vacuum.” Nevertheless, the Global Times in its editorial, stated that the deal constitutes a warning that “US’ Middle East policy…of creating crises and conflicts…will never truly win the hearts of the people.”

Even on the Israel-Palestine conflict, officials in Beijing contended that ‘China has no selfish interests.’ However, a former Chinese representative to Israel had noted that “Israel is a pillar of the geopolitics of the United States in the Middle East, once China mediates successfully, it will naturally weaken the huge influence of the United States in the Middle East for a long time and win the respect of Arab countries.” While one can debate if Israel will play along, the recent mediation efforts demonstrate China’s intent to dilute the US presence in the Middle East.

Second, by seeking to scale up engagement in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which has deep emotional resonance in the Middle East, China is trying to convey that it understands the pain on Arab Street. Beyond the emotional connect, economic imperatives also guide China’s engagement in the Middle East. China has been working persistently to scale up the internationalisation of the Renminbi. Reportedly, Saudi-China talks on singing yuan-priced oil contracts have gained momentum. In March this year, China Exim bank and Saudi National Bank concluded their first loan cooperation in the Chinese Yuan, which will be “used to meet the demand of China-Saudi Arabia trade projects.” The Chinese objective is to encourage the oil-exporting countries to engage more in Yuan-based trading, which may prompt other oil-importing countries participating in BRI to trade in Renminbi with greater intensity. Further, given the prosperity that comes with the energy resources, countries in the Middle East can collaborate with China in big infrastructure projects in the region and beyond.

Third, the Chinese diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are also guided by Beijing’s geopolitical objective in the Indo-Pacific. China needs to secure its energy supply lines in case of a conflict with Taiwan. Therefore, Beijing is making sustained efforts to develop positive relations with important powers across the Gulf of Hormuz. There are reports that China is considering scaling up connectivity projects from Central Asia and even Afghanistan into Iran. With Gwadar at the entrance of the Gulf, China’s ability to secure and control energy supplies is also witnessing a steady increase. Recently, China, Iran and Russia conducted Security Belt-2023,a joint maritime military exercise in the Gulf of Oman. While China may be concerned about the Straits of Malacca dilemma, it appears that Beijing is attempting to acquire capabilities to create the Straits of Hormuz dilemma for other oil-importing countries.

The recent Chinese diplomatic efforts in the Middle East demonstrate varied ways in which spheres of influence are created and also undermined. In their interactions with China, strictly abiding by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, none of the major powers in the Middle East have raised issues of ethnic diversity and the treatment of religious minorities. Various countries across the world will now have similar expectations from the Middle Eastern powers.

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The views expressed are personal

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